Port Drivers Fed'n 18 Inc. v. All Saints Express Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 October 2010
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 09–0868 (WHW).
• Citation: 757 F.Supp.2d 443
• Parties: PORT DRIVERS FEDERATION 18, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,v.ALL SAINTS EXPRESS, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

757 F.Supp.2d 443

PORT DRIVERS FEDERATION 18, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ALL SAINTS EXPRESS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 09–0868 (WHW).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Oct. 18, 2010.

Grant W. McGuire, Tompkins, McGuire, Wachenfeld & Barry, LLP, Newark, NJ, David A. Cohen, The Cullen Law Firm, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.Joseph B. Fiorenzo, Sokol, Behot & Fiorenzo, Hackensack, NJ, for Defendants.

OPINION

WALLS, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs Port Drivers Federation 18, Inc., Florencio Hernandez, Julian Hernandez, Jose Landa, Nelson Rodriguez, and Juan Marte (“plaintiffs”) and defendants All Saints Express, Inc. and St. George Warehouse, Inc. (“defendants”) cross-move for summary judgment. The motions are granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are independent owners and operators of trucks ¹ who lease their trucking equipment and driving services to defendant All Saints Express, Inc. (“All Saints”). (Compl. ¶ 2.) All Saints is a Delaware corporation with its primary place of business in New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 6; Answer ¶ 6; Pl. Statement of Facts ¶ 3; Def. Resp. to Pl. Statement of Facts ¶ 3.) Defendant St. George Warehouse, Inc. (“St. George”) is a Delaware corporation engaged in the business of warehousing imports and exports that are subject to inspection by U.S. Customs; St. George owns a Custom-bonded warehouse in Kearny, New Jersey and holds multiple bonds with the U.S. Customs Office. (Def. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 4–5, 9–10; Pl. Resp. to Def. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 4–5, 9–10.)

All Saints' sole business is transporting the cargo of St. George's customers between ports in New York and New Jersey and the St. George warehouse, or directly from the St. George warehouse to customers of St. George. (Def. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 9, 13–14, 22; Pl. Resp. to Def. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 9, 13–14, 22.) All Saints owns no trucks and no warehouses, and has no board of directors and no employees; it provides transportation services to St. George by contracting with independent owner-operators of trucks to transport the cargo. (Pl. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 17–18, 21; Def. Resp. to Pl. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 17–18, 21.) ( See also Hearing Tr.) (“The Court: All Saints has no warehouse? / Mr. Fiorenzo: All Saints does not own any warehouse.”) St. George compensates All Saints for this transportation. (Pl. Statement of Facts ¶ 21; Def. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 16, 19; Pl. Resp. to Def. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 16, 19.)

Between 2004 and 2008, All Saints executed “Independent Contract(or) Agreement [s]” with plaintiffs Florencio Hernandez, Julian Hernandez, Jose Landa, Nelson Rodriguez, and Juan Marte, under which plaintiffs agreed to lease their equipment and services to All Saints for the purpose of transporting property. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–12; Answer ¶¶ 8–12.)

On February 25, 2009, plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against defendants. Plaintiffs allege that the agreements they entered into with All Saints are “leases” under the federal Truth in Leasing Regulations (“the Regulations”), with plaintiffs being the “lessors” of equipment and services and All Saints being the “lessee,” and as such, that All Saints is subject to the Regulations. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13–16.) Plaintiffs further allege that the leases violate the Regulations by failing to include:

(1) the amount of the lessors' compensation (49 C.F.R. § 376.12(d));

(2) documentation regarding the lessors' compensation (49 C.F.R. § 376.12(g));

(3) a term specifying the duration of the lease (49 C.F.R. §§ 376.11(a)-(b), 376.12(a)-(b));

(4) documentation regarding workers' compensation insurance (49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(2)); and

(5) information regarding the amount of “charge-backs” (items initially paid for by lessee but ultimately deducted from lessors' compensation) (49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h)).

(Compl. Counts I–V.)

Plaintiffs seek relief under 49 U.S.C. § 14704, which provides that a party injured due to a violation of the Truth in Leasing Regulations may bring a civil action for injunctive relief. 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(1). Specifically, plaintiffs seek:

(i) a declaratory judgment finding that the agreements in question are leases that violate the Regulations,

(ii) an injunction prohibiting All Saints from performing transportation requiring authorization from the Department of Transportation until it enters into written lease agreements meeting the requirements of the Regulations,

(iii) an injunction compelling All Saints to disclose documents as required by the Regulations,

(iv) an injunction preventing All Saints from engaging in retaliation or harassment against plaintiffs, and

(v) an award of attorneys' fees and expenses.

(Compl. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1–7.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party establishes that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). A factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment unless it is both genuine and material. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party must show that the non-moving party has failed to “set forth,” by affidavits or otherwise, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” in question. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must present more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” in his favor. Woloszyn v. Co. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir.2005). The opposing party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir.2001). At the summary judgment stage, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In doing so, the court must construe the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276–77 (3d Cir.2002).

“[W]here motions for summary judgment are made by both parties, if the pleadings present a genuine issue as to a material fact, there can be no valid summary judgment of the disputed facts.” Tomalewski v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 882, 884 (3d Cir.1974) (citations omitted). As the Eighth Circuit has stated, “Summary judgment should be granted sparingly, and we do not assume that no material facts remain in dispute simply because both parties moved for summary judgment.” Matter of Citizens Loan and Sav. Co., 621 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir.1980) (citations omitted). Rather, “[t]he court must rule on each motion separately in determining whether each judgment may be entered in accordance with applicable principles. Indeed, both motions should be denied if both parties fail to meet their burden.” In re Kewanee Boiler Corp., 198 B.R. 519, 524 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1996) (citing to ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. D.S. America, Inc., 674 F.Supp. 1330, 1331 (N.D.Ill.1987)).

DISCUSSION

Under Title 49 of the U.S.Code, the federal government is charged with overseeing modes of interstate and international transportation, including transportation by motor carriers. 49 U.S.C. §§ 13101, 13501. A “motor carrier” is a “person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). A “motor vehicle” is a “vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer ... used on a highway in transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16). “Transportation” is:

(A) a motor vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and

(B) services related to that movement, including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and property.

49 U.S.C § 13102(23).

Under the statutory framework of Title 49, motor carriers engaging in interstate transportation must register with the Secretary of Transportation to receive operating authority and then must comply with regulations promulgated by the Secretary. 49 U.S.C. §§ 13901–2, 14102. These regulations include the federal Truth in Leasing Regulations, which govern the agreements between motor carriers and the independent owner-operators of trucks who are hired by the carriers to transport goods. 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.1, et. seq. A person aggrieved by a motor carrier's non-compliance with the statutory and regulatory regime created by Title 49 may seek damages and equitable relief under 49 U.S.C. § 14704.

Plaintiffs make three basic arguments. First, plaintiffs assert that All Saints is subject to the provisions of Title 49 and, in turn, to the Regulations promulgated under Title 49. (Compl. ¶ 1; Pl. Br. 4–10.) Second, plaintiffs argue that the “Independent Contract(or) Agreements[s]” they entered into with All Saints violate the provisions of the Regulations. (Pl. Br. 14–22; Compl. ¶ 2.) Third, plaintiffs assert that St. George is liable for...