Port of Seattle v. Oregon Co

• Citation: 255 U.S. 56,65 L.Ed. 500,41 S.Ct. 237
• Decision Date: 31 January 1921
• Docket Number: No. 107,107
• Parties: PORT OF SEATTLE v. OREGON & W. R. CO. et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

255 U.S. 56

41 S.Ct. 237

65 L.Ed. 500

PORT OF SEATTLE

v OREGON & W. R. CO. et al.

No. 107.

Argued Dec. 6, 1920.

Decided Jan. 31, 1921.

[Syllabus from pages 56-57 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Leander T. Turner, Harold Preston, and O. B. Thorgrimson, all of Seattle, Wash, for appellant.

Messrs. W. H. Boyle, R. S. Terhune, and George F. Aust, all of Seattle, Wash., and Henry W. Clark, of New Yrok City, for appellees.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The main question in this case is whether the Oregon & Washington Railroad Company acquired, as owner of land adjoining East waterway in the port of Seattle, the right to build in the waterway piers, wharves, and other structures over which it would secure access from its land to the navigable channel. The question arises in a suit to quiet the title of the state which was brought against the railroad in a state court of Washington, in 1917, by the Port, a municipal corporation,¹ created by the laws of Washington. J. F. Duthie & Co., lessees of the railroad's land, were joined as defendants; but they have no substantial interest in the controversy; and their peculiar rights do not require consideration. The case was removed to the District Court of the United States by petition of the railroad, which is an Oregon corporation, and a motion to remand was denied. Upon full hearing on the merits a decree was rendered dismissing the bill. The case comes here by direct appeal of the port under section 238 of the Judicial Code (Comp. Ct. § 1215); it having been contended by the railroad and held by the lower court that the validity of chapter 168 of the Laws of Washington of 1913, p. 582, is involved, and that its provisions violate the contract clause and the due process clause of the federal Constitution. The following facts are material:

When the state of Washington was admitted into the Union, there lay in front of the city of Seattle extensive tidelands in the area now comprised within the limits of the municipal corporation known as port of Seattle. Under appropriate legislation of the state this area has been developed as a port. Waterways have been established and in part dredge; tidelands abutting upon the waterways have been filled, platted as city blocks, and laid out with streets; and lots therein have been sold for business and other purposes. Among the waterways so established is that known as East waterway, which connects Duwamish river with Elliott Bay, an arm of Puget Sound. East waterway, as established, has at the point in question a width of 1,000 feet. The bed of the waterway was in its natural state tideland. The 750 feet of the waterway which lie in the center have been dredged to a depth at mean low tide of from 26 to 30 feet. The rest of the waterway, being that portion which extends on either side for a distance of 125 feet from the bulkhead of the filled land to the fairway, is of varying depth and is not navigable by large vessels. The bed of the waterway within these 125 feet areas slopes from the bulkhead to the line of the fairway. It is exposed at low tide ordinarily at points about 36 feet from the bulkhead.

The railroad's parcel here in question is filled land adjoining the west side of this waterway. The tract is a part of block 393, Seattle Tidelands, shown on a plat duly filed with the county auditor in 1895, and was acquired from the state by the railroad's predecessors in title prior to 1907. The deeds by which the state conveyed the land do not in words purport to grant any right in the waterway; nor is mention made of East waterway either in the granting clause or elsewhere in the deed.² On the plat, by which the land was sold, the boundaries of the block, and of the several lots comprised within it, are set forth clearly and lineal measurements are given. East waterway is shown on the plat and, on each side of the waterway, a broken line called 'pierhead line,' is marked at a distance of 250 feet from the bulkhead. It is alleged by the railroad that this pierhead line, established by the War Department as prescribing the limits beyond which structures obstructing navigation would not be permitted in the waterway, had been adopted also by the state authorities. In 1914, by joint action of the War Department and of the state authorities and with the assent of abutting owners, the pierhead line was moved back to a point 125 feet from the bulkhead, leaving the fairway in the center 750 feet, as above stated, instead of 500 feet as originally indicated on the plat. The rights claimed by the railroad are limited to this 125-feet area.

Chapter 168 of the Laws of Washington 1913, p. 582, provides that:

'Whenever, in any waterways created under the laws of the state of Washington, the government of the United States shall have established pierhead lines in said waterway at any distance from the boundaries thereof established by the state, no structure shall be allowed in the strip of waterway between the boundary and the nearest pier head line except by consent of the state land commissioner and upon plans approved and terms and conditions fixed by him, and then only for such period of use as shall be designated by him, but any permit shall not extend for a longer period than thirty (30) years: Provided, however, that the owner of land abutting upon either side of any such waterway shall have the right, if application be made therefor within a period of ninety (90) days following the date when this act shall go into effect, to obtain * * *'

—a permit authorizing the improvement and use of such area under conditions to be prescribed by the state authorities upon the payment of an annual rental dependent in amount upon the assessed value of an equal area of the abutting land.

The railroad failed to apply for such a permit. Asserting the rights above stated, it leased a part of its land to J. F. Duthie & Co. for a shipbuilding and manufacturing plant, and purported to authorize the construction of wharves, piers and other structures upon the adjoining water area up to the 125-foot pierhead line. By the act of 1913 the control over the waterways therein conferred upon land commissioners is to be exercised in port districts by the port commissioners. This bill to enjoin such use of the waterway by the railroad and its lessees and to quiet title was therefore brought by the port of Seattle.

The decree entered by the lower court declared in substance (1) that the state has no proprietary interest in the water area between the bulkhead and the pierhead line; (2) that it is not entitled to lease the same or otherwise to deprive the railroad of access to the fairway; (3) that chapter 168 of the laws of 1913 in so far as it provides for such leasing violates the federal Constitution; (4) that the railroad has no proprietary interest in the waterway, but as owner of the abutting lots is entitled to access to the deep or navigable waters 'subject to proper governmental supervision.' The decree declared further that the state had never established harbor lines in the waterway, and expressly recited that the court does not determine whether or not the state now has power to establish harbor lines, nor what the effect might be of hereafter establishing them.

The main question presented for our decision is whether the railroad acquired, in connection with the lots of filled land abutting on the waterway, a private riparian or littoral right to construct wharves, dock and piers on this 125-foot area, in order to provide for itself, as owner of the land, and for those claiming under it, convenient access to the fairway for purposes of navigation and commerce. The port contends that the railroad acquired no such right, nor any private right whatsoever, in any part of the adjoining waterway; and that the state is free either to use this portion of East waterway directly for purposes of navigation, as the present fairway is used, or to use it as a part of the harbor; and that, since it is also the proprietor of the tideland, under this water area, it has the full right to develop it, or authorize its development by others, through the erection of wharves piers, docks or other structures in aid of navigation and commerce; and to charge a rental for the privilege.

First. The right of the United States in the navigable waters within the several states is limited to the control thereof for purposes of navigation. Subject to that right Washington became upon its organization as a state the owner of the navigable waters within its boundaries and of the land under the same. Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57, 21 L. Ed. 798. By section 1 of article 17 of its Constitution the state asserted its ownership in the bed and shore 'up to and including the line of ordinary high tide in waters where the tide ebbs and flows.' The extent of the state's ownership of the land is more accurately defined by the decisions of the highest court, as being the land below highwater mark or the meander line, which ever of these lines is the lower.³ The character of the state's ownership in the land and in the waters is the full proprietary right. The state, being the absolute owner of the tidelands and of the waters over them, is free in conveying tidelands either to grant with them right in the adjoining water area or to completely withhold all such rights. Whether a conveyance veyance made by the state of land abutting upon navigable water does confer upon the grantee any right or interest in those waters or in the land under the same, is a matter wholly of local law. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331. Upon such questions the provisions of the Constitution and statutes of the state and the decisions of its highest court are accepted by us as conclusive. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349, 18 Sup. Ct. 157, 42 L. Ed. 497. The precise question presented here is...