Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union

• Decision Date: 02 May 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34290,34290
• Citation: 324 P.2d 1099,52 Wn.2d 317
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The PORT OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S & WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION, an unincorporated association; International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 9, an unincorporated association, William Gettings; Hugh R. Bradshaw; Frank H. Crosby; First Doe to One Hundredth Doe, both inclusive, First Doe Union to Tenth Doe Union, both inclusive, Appellants.

Page 317

52 Wn.2d 317

324 P.2d 1099

The PORT OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S & WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION, an

unincorporated association; International Longshoremen's &

Warehousemen's Union, Local 9, an unincorporated

association, William Gettings; Hugh R. Bradshaw; Frank H.

Crosby; First Doe to One Hundredth Doe, both inclusive,

First Doe Union to Tenth Doe Union, both inclusive, Appellants.

No. 34290.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

May 2, 1958.

Zabel & Poth, Philip J. Poth, Seattle, for appellants.

Bogle, Bogle & Gates, Edward G. Dobrin, J. Tyler Hull, Donald McMullen, Seattle, for respondents.

FINLEY, Justice.

On January 18, 1957, the Port of Seattle filed an action to enjoin the defendant unions, their members and representatives from striking and picketing its terminal and warehouse operations. On January 19, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order pending a hearing set for January 22. After the hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction, and the defendants thereupon appealed.

A brief statement of the facts giving rise to this action will be sufficient to clarify the issue involved.

The Port of Seattle (hereafter referred to as the port or respondent) was established pursuant to RCW 53. The purposes and functions of port districts are prescribed in general by RCW 53.04.010, as follows:

'* * * the acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, development, and regulation of a system of harbor improvements and rail and water transfer and terminal facilities therein * * *'

The port is a political subdivision of the state and a municipal corporation. RCW 53.04.060; Anderson v. Port of Seattle, 1956, 49 Wash.2d 528, 304 P.2d 705; Woody v. Port of Seattle, 1922, 118 Wash. 163, 203 P. 59; State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Wardall, 1919, 107 Wash. 606, 183 P. 67; State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 1916, 93 Wash. 267, 160 P. 755, L.R.A.1917B, 354.

The International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 9 (hereafter referred to as the union or appellant), is a labor organization affiliated with the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, an international union. The union maintains a hiring hall through which men are supplied to the industry when needed. The private operators of port and dock facilities in the Seattle area have entered into collective bargaining agreements with the union for the various categories of workmen within the union's jurisdiction.

The port employs an average of 350 employees in connection with the operation and maintenance of its waterfront facilities and terminals. Of this number, 24 are members of the union. The port uses the facilities of the union's hiring hall, but it has consistently refused to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the union.

The present dispute resulted from union demands for (1) higher hourly wages for certain of its members who are employed by the port, and (2) increased vacation benefits for all of its members employed by the port. When the port refused to acquiesce to its demands, the union members employed by the port went on strike. They began peaceful picketing of the affected facilities on January 18, 1957. The picketing resulted in stopping operations of the port's waterfront facilities.

It is an established rule in this jurisdiction that one who seeks relief by temporary or permanent injunction must show (1) that he has a clear legal or equitable right, (2) that he has a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right, and (3) that the acts complained of are either resulting in or will result in actual and substantial injury to him. Le Maine v. Seals, 1955, 47 Wash.2d 259, 287 P.2d 305; King County v. Port of Seattle, 1950, 37 Wash.2d 338, 223 P.2d 834. In its order granting the temporary injunction, the trial court concluded that the strike and picketing were unlawful; that, by reason thereof, the port was suffering 'immediate, substantial and irreparable loss and damage.'

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the strike was unlawful, and that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the injunction.

Two broad and basic principles are involved in this case: (1) The right of organized labor to employ the strike and picketing as a weapon in order to maintain an effective bargaining position; (2) The general immunity of government from a strike. It is the position of the respondent that the government's immunity from a strike is unqualifiedly paramount. The appellants, on the other hand, assert that governmental immunity in the field of labor relations is subject to qualification; that the right of labor to strike is paramount if the municipal function involved is 'proprietary' in nature.

The policy of characterizing the functions of government as (a) proprietary or (b) governmental was developed in the common law courts as a means of mitigating manifest injustices resulting from an unqualified application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to personal injury actions. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, 1949, 94 Cal.App.2d 36, 210 P.2d 305; New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, 1956, 2 Misc.2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2D 209. With the increasing enactment of statutes making governmental units liable for the negligence of their employees, the influence of the above-mentioned shadowy and ill-defined legal terms or judicial concepts is waning. ¹ In any event there is unquestionably no logical basis for the application of those terms in the particular area of the law with which we are concerned in the case at bar. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, supra; New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, supra.

With respect to municipal immunity from strikes, the Connecticut supreme court of errors, in Norwalk Teachers' Association v. Board of Education, 1951, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482, 484, 31 A.L.R.2d 1133, had this to say:

'* * * President Franklin D. Roosevelt said in a letter to the president of the National Federation of Federal Employees on August 16, 1937: 'Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of Government employees. * * * [A] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.' As the author of the article cited says, 'The above statement by President Roosevelt, who certainly was no enemy of labor unions, epitomizes the answer to the problem. It seems to be axiomatic."

Appellants do not specifically rely on the so-called little Norris-LaGuardia Act (RCW 49.32.010-49.32.100) for the obvious reason that it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that general legislation is inapplicable to the state or its political subdivisions, unless the statute expressly applies to them, or unless they must be included by necessary implication. State ex rel. Thielicke v. Superior Court, 1941, 9 Wash.2d 309, 114 P.2d 1001; United States v. United Mine Workers, 1947, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 1957, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59.

Appellants vigorously contend that the instant case is controlled by the reasoning in Christie v. Port of Olympia, 1947, 27 Wash.2d 534, 179 P.2d 294, as is evidenced by the decision of the Arizona supreme court in Local 266, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L. v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, 1954, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393, which cites the Christie case, supra.

In the Christie case this court decided that a port district has the power to make contracts for the payment of deferred compensation to longshoremen. At least, inferentially,...