Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County

• Decision Date: 05 November 1910
• Parties: PORT RICHMOND & BERGEN POINT FERRY CO. v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF HUDSON COUNTY.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

77 A. 1046

80 N.J.L. 614

PORT RICHMOND & BERGEN POINT FERRY CO.

v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF HUDSON COUNTY.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Nov. 5, 1910.

(Syllabus by the Court.)+++++

Certiorari by the Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Company against the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Hudson to review resolutions of the board fixing rates. Resolutions affirmed.

Argued June term, 1910, before PARKER and BERGEN, JJ.

Frank Bergen, for prosecutor.

John Griffin, for defendant.

PARKER, J. This writ of certiorari brings up the same two sets of resolutions that were passed upon by the Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. Freeholders of Hudson, 76 N. J. Law, 664, 74 Atl. 954. The prosecutor owns and operates a ferry between Bergen Point, the southern extremity of Hudson county in this state, and Port Richmond on Staten Island, in the state of New York. The first resolution of the board of freeholders passed under and by virtue of the act of 1799 (2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1469), referred to in the case just cited, after a somewhat lengthy preamble, resolves: "That in the exercise of its discretion and pursuant to the direction of said lastmentioned act this board does hereby fix the rates of ferriage to be charged by the aforesaid companies (prosecutor being one of them) for the transportation of foot passengers from the county of Hudson to the terminal of said ferries in the state of New York, and from said terminal returning to the county of Hudson, at the rate of six cents for each adult person for the round trip, and four cents for each person under ten years of age," etc. The second resolution is similar in form, except that the rate is fixed at three cents and two cents, respectively, for adults and children "for the transportation of foot passengers from the county of Hudson by said ferries to the terminal of said ferries in the state of New York."

The case is submitted on briefs; and counsel for prosecutor concedes in his brief that this case, excepting in one particular mentioned by him, is controlled by the decision just cited. This particular, which, as he claims, differentiates this case from the New York Central Case, is that whereas in that case the prosecutor was operating in right of a New Jersey ferry company, incorporated in 1852, and, consequently, as he says, subject to all rights of the freeholders to fix ferry rates that were vested in them by the ferry act of 1799, in the present case the prosecutor is a corporation chartered in the state of New York, originally in 1857, and by that charter and by subsequent enactments in that state is authorized to charge ferry rates considerably in excess of those prescribed in the resolutions now attacked. His point, if we understand it correctly, is that the fact of incorporation in New York and the fact of rates having been fixed by the New York charter gave rights to the prosecutor that are paramount to and unaffected by our legislation, although one terminus of the ferry is within the jurisdiction of this state.

We deem this point to be fully covered by decisions in this state which are controlling on this court. The question elaborately discussed in both the prevailing and dissenting opinions in New York Central R. R. v. Freeholders was whether the court should be governed by the old case of Freeholders v. State, in 24 N. J. Law, upholding the jurisdiction of the freeholders, or regard that case as overruled by later decisions of the United States Supreme Court and hold on their authority that the regulation of Interstate ferries is a matter of interstate commerce to be regulated by Congress. The judgment of the court was that State v. Freeholders was still controlling; and, in view of that judgment, we are pointed to the opinion in the former case for an exposition of the law on the subject. An examination of the opinion shows that the question of conflicting jurisdiction was fully recognized and discussed. On page 722 of 24 N. J. Law, Mr. Justice Elmer observes, with regard to the old ferries between Philadelphia...