Porter Memorial Hospital v. Harvey
| Decision Date | 07 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 871A161,871A161 |
| Citation | 151 Ind.App. 299,279 N.E.2d 583 |
| Parties | PORTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL et al., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Robert E. HARVEY, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Glenn J. Tabor (Blachly, Tabor & Bozik), Valparaiso, Nelson G. Grills (Collins, Grills & Suess), Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS--This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered against defendant-appellant, Porter Memorial Hospital (the Hospital), as a result of a suit by plaintiff-appellee, Dr. Robert E. Harvey (Harvey), to enjoin the Hospital from denying Harvey), the use of the Hospital's facilities for the general practice of medicine, exclusive of major surgery.
On November 6, 1969, the Hospital Trustees adopted certain Medical Staff By-Laws for the appointment and retention of members of its medical staff. Included in these By-laws is the requirement that medical staff applicants must have satisfactorily completed at least 'one year of internship in an approved hospital' 1 (the Rule).
Completion of such an internship program is not a requirement for the receipt of an unlimited license to practice medicine in the state of Indiana.
On November 17, 1969, Harvey, a resident physician of Porter County, applied for an appointment to the medical staff of the Hospital. Prior to this application, Harvey had been practicing medicine in Indiana for twenty-five years pursuant to an unlimited license to practice medicine, osteopathy, surgery, and obstetrics issued by the Indiana State Board of Medical Registration and Examination on April 26, 1945. During that time, he wrote several medically oriented articles and attended numeroud conventions and seminars. He did not serve a one-year internship at any time following his graduation from medical school.
The Hospital, a tax-supported institution, by action of its board of trustees denied his application on May 15, 1970 for the sole reason that Harvey had not completed a one-year internship program as required by Article III, Section 1--e of the By-Laws, Rules and Regulations for the Medical Staff of the Hospital.
A substantial number of Harvey's patients are taxpayers or dependents of taxpayers of Porter County. Consequently, the Hospital's facilities are necessary for their health and well-being under his care as the physician of their choice. Had Harvey's application to the staff of the Hospital been approved, he would have been permitted to use the Hospital's facilities for the paractice of general medicine excluding major surgery.
After denial of his application, Harvey brought this action to enjoin the Hospital's enforcement of the Rule. He alleged that such a restriction, if allowed to continue, would render his practice of general medicine ineffectual and that he had no adequate remedy at law.
The Hospital, by counterclaim, sought a declaratory judgment that the Rule was reasonable.
Harvey filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with his accompanying Affidavit. The Hospital then filed a Motion for Speedy Hearing on the Motion for Declaratory Judgment and for Special Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereon. It also requested permission to submit testimony during the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment so that the trial court would have more than the pleadings and affidavits on which to base its decision. While no pre-trial conference was held, the trial court did permit testimony, but limited its presentation in the following Order:
'On the basis of evidence presented, the court also rules that the defendant may adduce such evidence at such hearing as may relate to the differences between the rules of the Porter Memorial Hospital and such rules as were construed by the Appellate Court in McCray Memorial Hospital VS Hall, the reasonableness of said rules as they may relate to the facts in this case, or such other matters as may relate to the rules and regulations of Porter Memorial Hospital as they apply to this cause: Plaintiff may adduce such rebuttal evidence as plaintiff may see fit to adduce at such time.'
At a subsequent hearing the Hospital introduced expert medical testimony by several physicians who described at some length the virtues and advantages of completing a one-year internship program. The court, after hearing evidence and arguments as limited by its Order, entered Special Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The court specifically found that the Hospital denied Harvey's application for the reason that he lacked one of the qualifications for staff privileges set out in the Medical Staff By-Laws, to-wit: the completion of one year of internship, and that the evidence did not disclose any inaccurate or misleading statements in Harvey's application, nor did it establish that he had been guilty of dishonorable or unprofessional conduct or that he was incompetent to practice medicine. The court then concluded that the Rule was unreasonable and that the denial of Harvey's application was arbitrary and capricious and a violation of IC 1971, 16--12--23--1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 23--3314 (Burns 1964). The court then granted
the injunction and the Hospital now appeals.
ISSUE ONE. Was there a material issue of fact as to whether the Rule adopted by the Hospital is a reasonable one as applied to Harvey?
ISSUE TWO. Was the Hospital denied a fair trial because of the trial court's Order limiting the scope of evidence in the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment?
As to ISSUE ONE, the Hospital argues that the evidence introduced conclusively proved that a one-year internship is required to objectively evaluate a physician's competency. This evidence therefore created an issue of material fact, thereby rendering the summary judgment improper. The trial court should have granted a trial on the Hospital's Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment that the internship requirement of the Hospital was a reasonable rule within the language of IC 1971, 16--12--23--1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 22--3314 (Burns 1964).
Harvey replies that the Rule is more stringent than the requirement to practice medicine in the state of Indiana. Since the Hospital is a tax-supported institution, its rule is unreasonable under § 22--3314, supra.
As to ISSUE TWO, the Hospital asserts that the trial court was bound to admit all evidence in the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment that would have been admissible at a full trial. Since the trial court limited the scope of the evidence, the Hospital was prevented from establishing a material issue of fact and therefore denied a fair trial.
Harvey points to Rule TR. 56 which permits a trial court to limit the presentation of evidence in a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.
ISSUE ONE. It is our opinion that summary judgment was properly granted because the Rule adopted by the Hospital is unreasonable as a matter of law.
The lawgivers of this state have granted tax-supported hospitals the authority to establish reasonable rules and regulations concerning the use of its facilities by members of its medical staff. Ind.Ann.Stat. § 22--3314 (Burns 1964) provides:
'Hospital receiving county funds--Use by all taxpayers and physician of choice.--Any hospital supported by funds provided by a county unit of government authorized to levy taxes shall provide the use of its facilities to all taxpayers within its jurisdiction and to dependents of such taxpayers under the care of the physician of their choice if such physician possesses a license to practice medicine without limitations issued by the Indiana state board of medical registration and examination: Provided, that the provisions of this act (section) shall not deprive the governing board of such a hospital of the right to adopt and enforce reasonable rules and regulations concerning the use of such hospitals and its facilities by such physicians: Provided, further, that denial of the use of such hospital and its facilities to such a licensed physician who is a resident of the county shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this act (section).' (Emphasis supplied.)
(hereinafter referred to as the 1961 Statute).
The stated purpose of the 1961 Statute is to require that a tax-supported hospital accommodate all taxpayers within its jurisdiction and the physician of their choice if that physician possesses an unlimited license to practice medicine granted by the State of Indiana. That this is the essential thrust of the Statute is indicated by the specific language stating 'if such physician possesses a license to practice medicine without limitations' and by the proviso that the denial of a hospital's facilities to a licensed physician is 'prima facie evidence of a violation of this act.' No higher standard of competency is expressed or contemplated.
Having firmly established the right of taxpayers to use such a hospital under the care of the licensed physician of their choice, the 1961 Statute modifies this right by recognizing the need for reasonable rules and regulations as to the use of such hospital and its facilities by such physicians.
While tax-supported hospitals are allowed by the 1961 Statute to make reasonable rules for the use of their facilities, they do not possess the power to create any rule. McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall, (1967) 141 Ind.App. 203, 226 N.E.2d 915. Tax-supported hospitals are operated by public funds in the public interest. The managing authorities of such hospitals act in a fiduciary capacity for the public, thereby subjecting their rule-making power to judicial and legislative supervision. Dean v. State of Indiana ex rel. Board of Medical Registrations, etc., (1953) 233 Ind. 25, 116 N.E.2d 503. Thus a public hospital may not exclude a physician or surgeon from its staff by unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory rules and regulations.
Our...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Economy Oil Corp. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue
...together so as to produce a harmonious system. State ex rel. Moore v. Smock (1973), Ind.App., 295 N.E.2d 857; Porter Memorial Hospital v. Harvey (1972), Ind.App., 279 N.E.2d 583. In this respect, when two statutes on the same subject must be construed together, the court should attempt to g......
-
Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc. v. Klapper
...(1969) 253 Ind. 48, 246 N.E.2d 383; Blankenbaker v. Great Central Ins. Co., (Ind.App.1972) 281 N.E.2d 496; Porter Memorial Hospital v. Harvey, (Ind.App.1972) 279 N.E.2d 583. The mere fact that both parties have filed motions for summary judgment does not alone establish the absence of a met......
-
First Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Central Indiana v. Furnish
...to each, New York Central R. Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Indiana (1957), 237 Ind. 544, 147 N.E.2d 547; Porter Memorial Hospital v. Harvey (1972), 151 Ind.App. 299, 279 N.E.2d 583, the obvious intent of the legislature is that only "owners" are entitled to actual notice. That a mortgagee ......
-
Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Osco Drug, Inc.
...as to produce a harmonious system. State ex rel. Moore v. Smock (1973), 156 Ind.App. 158, 295 N.E.2d 857; Porter Memorial Hospital v. Harvey (1972), 151 Ind.App. 299, 279 N.E.2d 583. In this respect, when two statutes on the same subject must be construed together, the court should attempt ......