Porter v. Cook County

Decision Date07 September 1976
Docket NumberNo. 61628,61628
Citation42 Ill.App.3d 287,355 N.E.2d 561
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois
PartiesCharles Lester PORTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The COUNTY OF COOK, a body politic and corporate, Defendant-Appellant.

Bernard Carey, Sheldon Gardner, Donald P. Smith, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Sidney Robin, Nicholas Stevenson, Jack K. Levin, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

DEMPSEY, Justice.

Charles Porter was seriously burned while confined in the Cook County House of Correction. He sued the County for negligence, and in a non-jury trial was awarded a judgment for $117,500 from which the County has appealed.

Porter, who had a history of mental illness, came home drunk on January 2, 1971, threatened to harm his wife physically and chased her around the house. A neighbor heard her screams and called the police who arrested Porter. The next day he was brought to court and his case was continued to January 21st. An order was entered that he be examined in the meantime at the Psychiatric Institute--an adjunct to the Circuit Court of Cook County where psychiatric examinations are performed on defendants awaiting appearance before the court. The examination was conducted on the morning of January 7th by Dr. Gerson H. Kaplan, a psychiatrist employed part-time by the County. Kaplan filled out two forms: a Psychiatric Summary and a Certificate of Need for Hospitalization. In the certificate Kaplan stated that he had personally examined Porter and found that he was 'hearing voices. Believes people are after him. Alcoholic, taking pills, shaky.' He found that Porter was 'in need of mental treatment' and recommended 'that he be admitted to a hospital immediately as an emergency for the protection from physical harm of himself or others.'

Kaplan advised Porter to go on 'sick call' (that is, seek medical assistance at the House of Correction) and, after completing his examination at 10:30 A.M., assigned a guard to take him to the institution's doctors. He was taken to the doctors' office before being escorted to his cell. Although Porter's medical records were not available at the trial it appears from the trial record that he informed a doctor that a drug called 'thorazine' had been prescribed to allay his mental disturbances and he requested that he be given some of these pills. The doctor said that this would be done.

It is unclear what happened to Kaplan's certification. Normally, the guards bringing an inmate from and returning him to the House of Correction would be cognizant of the doctor's recommendations and would transmit them to the proper personnel at the correctional institution. There was no proof, however, that this was done in Porter's case. Despite this, Walter Sullivan, a lieutenant of guards at the House of Correction, who had had some psychiatric training, observed Porter at lunch on the same day that Dr. Kaplan examined him and came to the independent conclusion that he should be segregated from other prisoners. At noontime, Sullivan prepared a conduct report which stated: 'Porter was placed in segregation for safekeeping. Above subject constantly talks to himself, appears very apprehensive, states he heard voices and people are trying to kill him. Above subject not violent but his unusual actions causes concern amongst other inmates.'

The cell Sullivan assigned to Porter was about six feet by six feet and the cells on either side of it were unoccupied. The cell door had a little window through which the guards, who made their rounds every half hour, could peer. He was permitted to smoke and retained his cigarettes and matches.

Porter had his last meal of the day in another room under guard supervision. After he was locked in his cell, he began hearing voices that threatened him. He yelled for the guards to come to his aid and for medication. None came. The voices kept getting worse and worse. He thought that smoke would drive the voices away and decided to set his mattress on fire. The smoke and fire made it difficult for him to breath and he moved the mattress away from the door in an attempt to get some air. But his hair caught fire and he started screaming. Finally, a guard from two tiers above his cell rescued him, but not before he had suffered severe burns on his face and on his hands which ultimately resulted in the amputation of the four fingers of his right hand and the little finger of his left hand.

The County has attacked the judgment of the trial court on three grounds: first, that Porter never showed that the County breached any duty it owed him; second, that the County was immune from liability for the alleged negligent acts, and third, that Porter was guilty of contributory negligence in waiting until January 7th to request medication.

It has been held that a village and its police officers and jailers must exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the life and health of prisoners. Whether the village and its employees have failed to act in accordance with this duty is an issue for the trier of fact. Dezort v. Village of Hinsdale (1976) 35 Ill.App.3d 703, 342 N.E.2d 468. (See also, Thornton v. City of Flint (1972), 39 Mich.App. 260, 197 N.W.2d 485; LaVigne v. Allen (1971), 36 A.D.2d 981, 321 N.Y.S.2d 179.) There is no reason why this standard of care should be less applicable to a county than to a village.

One of the issues at the trial, relating to the question of whether the County employees acted reasonably in their treatment of Porter, was whether the jail guards knew of Dr. Kaplan's certification. As we have mentioned, there was no proof that the guards saw his certification and any knowledge they might have had can only be inferred. Dr. Kaplan testified that he believed that the personnel in charge of Porter would have known of his condition because of his practice of telling them about his findings, but he had no specific recollection of informing them of Porter's condition. On the basis of Dr. Kaplan's testimony about his customary procedure, the trial court concluded that the guards saw the medical reports and that Dr. Kaplan undoubtedly informed them of Porter's condition. These inferences reflect a debatable, though not unreasonable evaluation of the evidence. There is certainly no evidence contradicting these findings, and they must be sustained. In a trial without a jury the judge has the responsibility of determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. His decision will only be disturbed when it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Landfield Finance v. Feinerman (1972), 3 Ill.App.3d 487, 279 N.E.2d 30.

Another issue pursued at the trial concerned the usual and customary procedures governing an inmate in Porter's condition. Lieutenant Sullivan testified that he often assigned prisoners to segregation simply because their actions might affect the rest of the inmates, forty percent of whom had mental problems of some sort. He stated that he had no authority to remove articles from a segregated prisoner with which he might hurt himself, such as matches or cigarette lighters. His understanding was that only a doctor could order such articles taken away from the prisoner. He further stated that a prisoner would be sent to isolation with nothing but shirt and pants if a psychiatrist found that he should be transferred immediately as an emergency for protection from physical harm to himself and others. Sergeant Rayfield Thompson, the guard in charge of the segregation unit in which Porter had been placed, agreed that an inmate who was certified and in Porter's condition was almost always hospitalized immediately; but he contradicted Sullivan's testimony by saying that an inmate placed in segregation who might harm himself or others was usually searched and stripped of matches or lighters. Starling Hightower, the guard who rescued Porter,...

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  • GIRALDO v. Cal. Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 11, 2009
    ...have a duty to use reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm inflicted on one inmate by another]; Porter v. County of Cook (1976) 42 Ill.App.3d 287, 355 N.E.2d 561, 564 [jailers must exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the life and health of prisoner]; Daniels v. Andersen (1975) 195......
  • Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, A119046.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 2008
    ...have a duty to use reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm inflicted on one inmate by another]; Porter v. County of Cook (1976) 42 Ill.App.3d 287 [355 N.E.2d 561, 564] [jailers must exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the life and health of prisoner]; Daniels v. Andersen (1975) 19......
  • Harrell v. City of Belen
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • May 15, 1979
    ...for the life and health of the charge. Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga.App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962); see Porter v. County of Cook, 42 Ill.App.3d 287, 355 N.E.2d 561 (1976); compare Warner v. Kiowa County Hospital Authority, 551 P.2d 1179 (Okl.App.1976). Knowledge on the part of the custodian ......
  • Delasky v. Village of Hinsdale
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 18, 1982
    ...v. City of Bismark (N.D.1978), 268 N.W.2d 787); or there is a prior history or warning of a suicidal tendency. (Porter v. County of Cook (1976), 42 Ill.App.3d 287, 355 N.E.2d 561.) On the other hand, liability has not been found where the prisoner did not have a history of mental disease or......
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