Porter v. English
| Decision Date | 12 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:13cv348/RS/EMT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | CHARLES E. PORTER, Petitioner, v. N.C. ENGLISH, WARDEN, Respondent. |
This cause is before the court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (doc. 1). Respondent filed a response with evidentiary support (doc. 9). Petitioner filed a reply (doc. 11). Respondent filed a motion for leave to file a surreply, which the court will grant, as well as a surreply with additional evidentiary support (docs. 13, 14).
This matter is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(b). After careful consideration of the issues raised by Petitioner, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The background facts are established by the evidence submitted by Respondent (docs. 9, 14). On September 6, 2007, Petitioner was arrested and charged in Kentucky state court with Sexual Abuse First Degree, Possession of Marijuana, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon, and Possession of Handgun by Convicted Felon (doc. 9, Ex. 1, Declaration of Henry Davis ("Davis Decl.") ¶ 3; doc. 14, Declaration of Bryan Erickson ("Erickson Decl.") ¶ 3). The same day, September 6, 2007, Petitioner was also detained on charges of violating his three-year Sex Offender Conditional Discharge Supervision, which had been previously imposed by the Kentuckystate court (Davis Decl., ¶ 3; Erickson Decl. ¶ 3). On December 4, 2007, the Kentucky state court revoked Petitioner's term of supervision and sentenced him to serve the remainder of his three-year discharge sentence in the Kentucky Department of Corrections (Davis Decl. ¶ 4; Erickson Dec. ¶ 4). On January 16, 2008, Petitioner was placed in the custody of the Kentucky Department of Corrections to begin service of his three-year sentence (Erickson Decl. ¶ 4). On May 5, 2008, Petitioner was indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Case No. 3:08-cr-44-JGH-DW, on a charge of Felon in Possession of Firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1) (Erickson Dec. ¶ 5). See United States v. Porter, Case No. 3:08-cr-44-JGH-DW, Indictment . On May 8, 2008, the State of Kentucky dismissed the remaining pending state charges (Sexual Abuse First Degree, Possession of Marijuana, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon, and Possession of Handgun by Convicted Felon) (see doc. 11 at 2; Erickson Dec. ¶ 6). On July 21, 2008, Petitioner was placed in the secondary custody of the United States Marshals Service ("USMS"), pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, for disposition of the pending federal charge in Case No. 3:08cr-44-H (Davis Decl. ¶ 5; Erickson Dec. ¶ 7). See Porter, Case No. 3:08-cr-44-JGH-DW, Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum . On June 26, 2009, the federal court for the Western District of Kentucky adjudicated Petitioner guilty and sentenced him to a term of 180 months of incarceration for Felon in Possession of Firearm (Davis Decl. ¶ 6, Attach. 1; Erickson Decl. ¶ 8, Attach. 1). See Porter, Case No. 3:08-cr-44-JGH-DW, Judgment and Commitment Order . The court ordered Petitioner's federal sentence to run concurrently with his state sentence (Davis Decl. ¶ 6; Erickson Decl. ¶ 8). Id. On August 20, 2009, Petitioner was returned to the Kentucky Department of Corrections (Davis Decl. ¶ 7; Erickson Decl. ¶ 9). On March 1, 2010, he completed his state term of imprisonment and was released to federal custody to continue service of his concurrent federal sentence (Davis Dec. ¶ 8; Erickson Decl. ¶ 10).
On July 8, 2009, the United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), designated the Kentucky Department of Corrections for service of Petitioner's federal sentence, effective June 26, 2009, to effectuate the federal court's recommendation that Petitioner's federal sentence run concurrently with the state sentence he was then serving, pursuant to BOP Program Statement 5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual (CCCA of 1984), and 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), (b)(Davis Decl. ¶¶ 9-13, Attachs. 2-5; Erickson Decl. ¶¶ 11-17, Attachs. 2-6). Petitioner was not given prior custody credit on his federal sentence for the time period between Petitioner's arrest on September 6, 2007, and the date his federal sentence was imposed on June 26, 2009 (Davis Decl. ¶¶ 13-14; Erickson Decl. ¶¶ 11-17). However, Petitioner received credit on his state sentence for the period September 6, 2007 to March 1, 2010 (Davis. Decl. ¶ 14). Petitioner's scheduled release date is July 21, 2022 (Erickson Decl. ¶ 17, Attachs. 2, 6).
In this habeas action, Petitioner seeks credit on his federal sentence for time spent in state custody, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (doc. 1 at 3-6). He requests that this court issue an order directing the BOP to credit his federal sentence for the period September 6, 2007, to March 1, 2010 (id. at 6). Respondent contends Petitioner has received all credit to which he is entitled under federal law (docs. 9, 14).
Once a petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies within the BOP, the district court may review the constitutionality of the BOP's decisions and its statutory construction. See Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 747 (11th Cir. 1995). The court's analysis, however, is deferential: if the language of the applicable statutory provision clearly outlines its congressional purpose, an interpreting court and administrative agency "'must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.'" Id. (citing Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984)). If the statute is silent or ambiguous, however, a reviewing court must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation unless it is "'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'" Id.
As previously discussed, Petitioner contends he is entitled to credit for the period September 6, 2007, to March 1, 2010, which encompasses the time between the date of his arrest and the date he completed his state prison sentence and was released to federal custody to continue service of his federal sentence. He argues the BOP is required to give him sentence credit for this period, because the federal court ordered his federal sentence to run concurrently with the undischarged portion of his state sentence (doc. 1 at 3-4, 6; doc. 11).
Section 3585 of Title 18 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Commencement of sentence.—A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a).
Section 3621 of Title 18 provides, in relevant part:
18 U.S.C. § 3621(a), (b). Acting through the BOP, the federal Attorney General initially possesses the exclusive authority to determine when a sentence is deemed to "commence," see 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), and to compute sentence credit awards after sentencing. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 117 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)); Rodriguez, 60 F.3dat 747. Additionally, the BOP has the exclusive discretion "to designate any institution where prisoners may be held." Hogue v. United States, 287 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1961).1
The BOP has interpreted § 3585 in Program Statement 5880.28, which provides:
(Davis Decl. ¶¶ 9-12, Attach. 4; Erickson Decl. ¶¶ 11-14, Attach. 3).
In Petitioner's case, the federal court...
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