Porter v. Epps

• Decision Date: 28 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–60324.,09–60324.
• Citation: 659 F.3d 440
• Parties: Will Terrance PORTER, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Christopher B. EPPS, Individually and in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

659 F.3d 440

Will Terrance PORTER, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Christopher B. EPPS, Individually and in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 09–60324.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 28, 2011.

Sidney Ray Hill, III (argued), Clayton O'Donnell, P.L.L.C., Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff–Appellee.Charles Baron Irvin, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, Leonard Charlton Vincent (argued), Mississippi Department of Corrections, Staff Attorney's Office, Parchman, MS, for Defendant–Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.Before REAVLEY, PRADO and OWEN, Circuit Judges.EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Christopher Epps, the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), appeals the district court's denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial. The jury found Epps liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Will Porter's constitutional rights by unlawfully incarcerating him for fifteen months beyond the expiration of his sentence. Because we find Epps is entitled to qualified immunity, we reverse.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Porter received a five-year sentence after he was convicted under Mississippi law for breaking into an automobile. The Mississippi trial court suspended four years of Porter's sentence and ordered him to serve one year in the MDOC Intensive Supervision Program (“ISP”), which is also known as house arrest. While on house arrest, Porter was arrested on suspicion of a misdemeanor charge. Mack E. Cox, an ISP officer with MDOC, issued Porter a Rule Violation Report (“RVR”). Porter was transported to an MDOC facility and processed.

Stephanie Jones, a hearing officer for MDOC, conducted a disciplinary hearing on the RVR. Jones determined that Porter violated the terms of the ISP rules and regulations, and she referred her decision to the MDOC records department so that Porter could be reclassified. The records department determined that since Porter's ISP had been revoked, he did not meet the conditions entitling him to the suspension of the four years on his sentence. Porter appealed the RVR through MDOC's grievance procedure, and he was denied relief at all three steps of that process. Porter then filed a motion for post-conviction relief in Mississippi state court. That court ruled that MDOC did not have the authority to reinstate an inmate's suspended sentence and ordered Porter to be released immediately.

Later, Porter filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was falsely imprisoned for fifteen months beyond the expiration of the sentence imposed upon him by the Mississippi trial court. All defendants were dismissed, except for Epps. Porter alleged that Epps, as a policymaker for MDOC, implemented the policies that led to the constitutional violations. Porter also alleged that Epps was aware of the MDOC records department's failure to interpret sentencing orders correctly, took no steps to remedy this situation by instituting procedural safeguards, training staff appropriately, or otherwise hiring competent individuals, and that Epps's indifference resulted in Porter's unlawful incarceration.

Although Epps raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in his answer, he did not raise qualified immunity in the motion to dismiss or the motion for summary judgment. The motions argued that the defendants had Eleventh Amendment immunity for the claims against them in their official capacities and did not address the issue of immunity for the claims against them in their individual capacities. Instead, the jury was instructed that it could not find Epps liable if he had a reasonable belief that his actions did not violate Porter's constitutional rights and that “under the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The court also instructed the jury “that supervisory officials such as the Defendant Commissioner Epps cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for the actions of subordinates such as Mack Cox and Stephanie Jones on any theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior liability,” but “[r]ather, the plaintiff must show that the conduct of the supervisor, in this case, Mr. Epps, denied the plaintiff his constitutional rights.”

The jury returned a verdict for Porter and awarded him $250,000 in damages. Epps then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a motion for new trial, in which he argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity and that he was impermissibly found liable on a theory of respondeat superior. The court denied the motion. It ruled that (1) the jury's determination that Epps was not entitled to qualified immunity was not “contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence or against reason,” and (2) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict on grounds other than respondeat superior—such as Epps was personally involved in reviewing Porter's third-step ARP form or that Epps's policies caused Porter's constitutional injury. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court. Wackman v. Rubsamen, 602 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir.2010). “The jury verdict must be upheld unless a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Shepherd v. Dall. Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 456 (5th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we “draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 542 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We reverse “only if the evidence points so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of the [ ]moving party that no reasonable juror could return a contrary verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).¹

III. DISCUSSION

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation. Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410–11 (5th Cir.2007). Qualified immunity questions should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But if the issue of qualified immunity is not decided before trial, the defense of qualified immunity may be submitted to the jury, “which must then determine the objective legal reasonableness of the [official's] conduct” by construing the facts in dispute. McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir.1998)).

Epps argues that his actions, if they violated Porter's constitutional rights, were not objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808.

A. There is a Clearly Established Right to Timely Release from Prison

Detention of a prisoner for over “thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.” Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.1980). Our precedent establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from prison. We have explained that “[w]hile not a surety for the legal correctness of a prisoner's commitment, [a jailer] is most certainly under an obligation, often statutory, to carry out the functions of his office. Those functions include not only the duty to protect a prisoner, but also the duty to effect his timely release.” Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir.1969) (internal citations and footnote omitted). We reaffirmed the jailer's obligation in this regard in Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc), a case in which a prisoner filed suit for damages under § 1983 for false imprisonment after he was held in prison for an additional month because the records were not updated to reflect his release notice. Id. at 1212–13. There, the en banc court recognized that, despite the defense of qualified immunity, “[i]f [the jailer] negligently establishes a record keeping system in which errors of this kind are likely, he will be held liable.” Id. at 1215. Thus, the issue is whether Epps's actions, in light of his duty to ensure Porter's timely release from prison, were objectively unreasonable.

B. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found that Epps's Conduct Was Objectively Unreasonable

Porter's § 1983 claim is predicated on Epps's conduct in (1) failing to promulgate adequate policies in the records department; (2) failing to train and supervise the employees in the records department; and (3) denying Porter's third-step appeal. “A supervisory official may be held liable ... only if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that...