Porter v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014AP975.,2014AP975. |
| Citation | 362 Wis.2d 505,865 N.W.2d 207 |
| Parties | David G. PORTER and Mary A. Porter, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant–Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Timothy J. Aiken, Vincent P. Megna and Susan M. Grzeskowiak of Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., of Milwaukee.
On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Beth Ermatinger Hanan of Gass Weber Mullins LLC of Milwaukee.
Before CURLEY, P.J., KESSLER, J. and THOMAS CANE, Reserve Judge.
¶ 1 David G. and Mary A. Porter (“the Porters”) appeal the order denying their motions after verdict regarding their Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 (2011–12)1 Lemon Law claim against Ford Motor Company. On appeal, the Porters argue that they should have been granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on their Lemon Law claim because Ford should not have been allowed to present “inconsistent” defenses, which were: that the 2010 Ford Escape that the Porters purchased was not a “lemon,” and, even if it was a “lemon,” Ford provided a “comparable” replacement. The Porters also argue that they should be granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Question 4 from the special verdict—which asked the jury whether Ford provided the Porters “with a comparable new motor vehicle as a replacement for the” 2010 Escape—was not required for recovery under the Lemon Law and should have been stricken. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 2 In February 2010, the Porters bought a 2010 Ford Escape. The vehicle had a “Sangria Red Metallic” exterior and “Stone”-colored “premium cloth seats.” The Porters chose the red exterior because Mrs. Porter's first car as a teenager was red; they chose the light-colored interior because dark interiors made Mr. Porter feel “very enclosed” and because dark colors grew hot in the summer.
¶ 3 While the Escape's colors were perfect, the transmission was not. According to Mrs. Porter, the vehicle would pop in and out of gear when she stepped on the gas pedal and “jerk back and forth” when she tried to accelerate. Between June 2010 and July 2012, the Porters brought in the Escape for repairs approximately nine times, and, according to the Porters, the vehicle was out of service for more than thirty days in the first year after they purchased it.
¶ 4 When numerous repairs failed to correct the problem, the Porters, through counsel, sent Ford a Lemon Law notice, see Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, seeking a comparable new vehicle. Ford received the notice on September, 6, 2011, which, pursuant to § 218.0171(2)(c), gave Ford until October 6, 2011 to provide the Porters with a new vehicle. On October 6, 2011, Ford's counsel informed the Porters that a comparable new vehicle was available, and Mr. Porter went to the dealership to collect it.
¶ 5 Mr. Porter discovered that the “comparable” replacement vehicle that Ford had provided was, in his family's opinion, nothing of the sort. The vehicle was in fact a 2012 Escape and had all of the same equipment and accessories as the 2010 Escape; however, the interior was dark and the exterior was blue. The Porters would not have purchased an Escape that was not red with a light-colored interior, and they rejected the replacement vehicle because the colors were wrong. The next day, October 7, 2011, Ford faxed a letter insisting that the proposed replacement vehicle was comparable and that Ford satisfied any obligations under the Lemon Law. Ford also offered to research further replacement options, but by that point the Lemon Law's thirty-day compliance period had expired, so the Porters sued.
¶ 6 The Porters sued Ford under several theories, including, as relevant to this appeal, violation of Wisconsin's Lemon Law. In its answer and at trial, Ford denied that the 2010 Escape had been out of service for thirty or more days in the first year following purchase and denied that Ford failed to provide the Porters with a comparable new vehicle.
¶ 7 At trial, the jury was asked to answer the following four questions on a special verdict form:
The jury was directed to answer Questions 2 and 3 only if it answered “Yes” to Question 1, and to answer Question 4 only if it answered “Yes” to either Questions 2 or 3.
¶ 8 The jury answered all four questions “Yes,” finding that the 2010 Escape was a “lemon” but that Ford did not violate the Lemon Law because it provided the Porters with a comparable vehicle.
¶ 9 Thereafter, the Porters filed motions after verdict. As relevant here, the Porters argued that they should be granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on their Lemon Law claim because the defense should not have been allowed to argue defenses that the Porters claimed were “inconsistent,” namely: that the 2010 Escape was not a lemon, and, even if it was a lemon, Ford provided a “comparable” replacement. The Porters also moved to strike Question 4 from the special verdict, or, in the alternative, to change the jury's answer to Question 4 from “Yes” to “No” because “a blue vehicle with a dark charcoal interior cannot be comparable to a red vehicle with a beige interior as a matter of law.”
¶ 10 The trial court denied the Porters' motions. It did, however, acknowledge that the Porters did not want either the vehicle they originally purchased or the replacement vehicle that Ford provided, and pursuant to BCR Trucking, LLC v. PACCAR, Inc., 2009 WI App 36, 316 Wis.2d 465, 476, 765 N.W.2d 828, ordered Ford to issue the Porters a refund for the purchase price of the 2010 Escape and ordered the Porters to return the car.3
¶ 11 The Porters now appeal.
¶ 12 On appeal, the Porters renew two of the arguments made in their motions after verdict.4 They argue that they should be granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on their Lemon Law claim because Ford should not have been allowed to present the “inconsistent” defenses that the 2010 Escape was not a lemon, and, even if it was a lemon, that Ford provided a “comparable” replacement. The Porters also argue that they should be granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Question 4 from the special verdict was a “surplus” question that should be stricken.5
¶ 13 “A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ‘does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict,’ ” but rather, “asserts that ‘for reasons evident in the record which bear upon matters not included in the verdict, the movant should have judgment.’ ” See Danner v. Auto–Owners Ins., 2001 WI 90, ¶ 41, 245 Wis.2d 49, 629 N.W.2d 159 (citations omitted); see also Wis. Stat. § 805.14(5)(b) (2013–14). “In other words, a JNOV motion assumes that a jury verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, but asserts that judgment should be granted to the moving party on grounds other than those decided by the jury.” Dakter v. Cavallino, 2014 WI App 112, ¶ 16, 358 Wis.2d 434, 856 N.W.2d 523. We review the trial court's decision on the Porter's motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict independently, but with the benefit of the trial court's analysis. See Danner, 245 Wis.2d 49, ¶ 41, 629 N.W.2d 159.
¶ 14 A motion to change a verdict answer, on the other hand, does challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the answer, and the burden the movant must overcome is higher.See Kovalic v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 161 Wis.2d 863, 873 n. 7, 469 N.W.2d 224 (Ct.App.1991) (); see also Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1) (2013–14).
Appellate courts do not upset a jury verdict if there is any credible evidence to support it. “Weighing testimony and evaluating credibility of witnesses are matters for the jury.” In reviewing a jury verdict, “evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict” and courts “search for credible evidence that will sustain the verdict, not for evidence to sustain a verdict the jury could have but did not reach.”
Dakter, 358 Wis.2d 434, ¶ 18, 856 N.W.2d 523 ().
¶ 15 This appeal also involves the interpretation and application of Wisconsin's Lemon Law statute, Wis. Stat. § 218.0171. “Statutory interpretation and the application of a statute to specific facts are questions of law that we review de novo.” Garcia v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶ 7, 273 Wis.2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365. Moreover, “we construe remedial, consumer protection statutes like the Wisconsin Lemon Law ‘with a view towards the social problem which the legislature was addressing when enacting the law.’ ” Id., ¶ 8 (citation omitted). We therefore “liberally construe remedial statutes to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy that the legislature intended to afford.” See id.
¶ 16 With the proper standards of review in mind, we turn to the Porters' argument that the trial court erred in allowing Ford to present defenses that were inconsistent and therefore prohibited by law.
¶ 17 Wisconsin's Lemon Law is a “remedial statute designed to rectify the problem a new car buyer has when that new vehicle is a ‘lemon.’ ”
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...of a statute to specific facts are questions of law that we review de novo. ’ " Porter v. Ford Motor Co., 2015 WI App 39, ¶ 15, 362 Wis.2d 505, 865 N.W.2d 207 (citation omitted; emphasis added).¶ 16 "The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give full effect to the policy choices of the......