Porter v. Henry Ford Hosp.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1990
• Docket Number: Docket No. 108100
• Citation: Porter v. Henry Ford Hosp., 450 N.W.2d 37, 181 Mich.App. 706 (Mich. App. 1990)
• Parties: Leonard PORTER, Janice Porter, individually and as next friend of Jeffrey Porter, Lori Porter and Mary Ann Porter, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HENRY FORD HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

Page 37

450 N.W.2d 37

181 Mich.App. 706

Leonard PORTER, Janice Porter, individually and as next friend of Jeffrey Porter, Lori Porter and Mary Ann Porter, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HENRY FORD HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 108100.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 10, 1989.

Decided Sept. 11, 1989.

Released for Publication Jan. 22, 1990.

Robert A. Tyler, P.C. by Robert A. Tyler, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Kitch, Saurbier, Drutchas, Wagner & Kenney, P.C. by Susan Healy Zitterman, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before CYNAR, P.J., and BRENNAN and MARILYN J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right the circuit court's order granting summary disposition against them on their medical malpractice claim. The trial court's decision was based on a failure to plead medical malpractice with the required specificity and plaintiffs' failure to present expert testimony on the standard of care.

In April, 1983, plaintiff Leonard Porter underwent open heart surgery at the defendant Henry Ford Hospital. Following surgery, Porter developed an infection which required approximately twenty-seven months to bring under control with treatment at the University of Michigan Hospital.

On April 10, 1985, plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action. The complaint stated that Porter did not receive appropriate care after demonstrating signs of an infection. Plaintiffs alleged the following acts were a breach of duties owed to him: (1) failing to take adequate steps to avoid or minimize the development of an infectious process; (2) failing to take adequate steps to avoid or minimize the development of osteomyelitis; and (3) failing to recognize signs and symptoms of an infectious process.

On March 16, 1988, the scheduled trial date, defendant moved for summary disposition. It contended that plaintiffs' complaint did not comply with the specificity requirements for medical malpractice pleadings. It also argued that the complaint should be dismissed because plaintiffs had no expert witnesses to testify to the standard of care. The court dismissed the complaint on both grounds.

On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in holding they failed to state a cause of action. They contend the complaint was specific enough to put defendant on notice as to the nature of the claim.

In reviewing a grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we are obligated to accept as true all well-pled facts. We then determine whether the plaintiff's claim, on the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. Monusko v. Postle, 175 Mich.App. 269, 273, 437 N.W.2d 367 (1989). The complaint must contain allegations that are specific enough reasonably to inform the defendant of the nature of the claim against which he must defend. MCR 2.111(B)(1).

Defendant, relying on Simonelli v. Cassidy, 336 Mich. 635, 59 N.W.2d 28 (1953), asserts that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action bears a higher burden of pleading, including more specific allegations. We recognize that some panels of this Court have interpreted Simonelli as imposing an elevated burden of pleading on a malpractice plaintiff. See Welniak v. Alcantara, 100 Mich.App. 714, 300 N.W.2d 323 (1980), O'Toole v. Fortino, 97 Mich.App. 797, 295 N.W.2d 867 (1980), lv. den. 410 Mich. 863 (1980), and Bryson v. Stone, 33 Mich.App. 512, 190 N.W.2d 336 (1971).

However we believe the panel in Martinez v. Redford Community Hospital, 148 Mich.App. 221, 384 N.W.2d 134 (1986), made the correct interpretation of Simonelli. It held that the degree of specificity required in setting forth a medical malpractice action flows from the circumstances and nature of the case, rather than from any objective heavier burden of pleading. Martinez, at 223, 384 N.W.2d 134. The Court reasoned:

Many medical malpractice actions involve a complex and technical factual basis which is outside the knowledge of the ordinary layperson. In considering the averments provided in a complaint "the court must be able to draw but one inference from the facts, as stated, and not from the pleader's inferences". Thus where the facts which form the basis of the action are outside the common knowledge of the ordinary layperson, a greater degree of specificity in the complaint will be required so as to lead the court to only one inference. This generalization is not a hard and fast rule peculiar to medical malpractice actions but, rather, the simple application of GCR 1963, 111.1(1) [MCR 2.111(B)(1) ] to any factually complicated lawsuit. [Citation omitted. Martinez, at 230, 384 N.W.2d 134.]

Where the factual basis of the alleged malpractice is within the knowledge of the ordinary layperson, the cause may be pled with less specificity than a more complicated, technical malpractice claim. The crucial question is whether the complaint is specific enough to provide the defendant with notice of the allegations against which he must defend. Martinez, at 233, 384...