Porter v. Illinois
Decision Date | 14 October 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 85-6977,85-6977 |
Citation | 479 U.S. 898,93 L.Ed.2d 272,107 S.Ct. 298 |
Parties | Anthony PORTER v. ILLINOIS |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
I would grant this petition for certiorari to consider the extent of the obligations our decision in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), imposes on a trial judge confronted with a claim of juror bias.
Petitioner Anthony Porter was convicted of two murders committed in the course of an armed robbery and was sentenced to death. During voir dire, the trial judge read a list of potential witnesses, including the mother of Marilyn Green, one of the victims. He did not ask whether any of the prospective jurors knew any of the persons on the list, and none of them volunteered that they did. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, petitioner waived his right to a jury at the penalty proceeding. Before the judge dismissed the jurors, however, he addressed them as follows:
Defense counsel was not permitted to question Mrs. Trigleth. After he suggested that "the Court should have questioned this juror in detail as to her relationship to that family," id., at 398, 95 Ill.Dec., at 470, 489 N.E.2d, at 1334, the judge made the following statement:
"This Court will state for the record that in an unusual proceeding, I think probably the most unusual I have ever engaged in in all my years as a lawyer and as a Judge, I did bring back the entire jury and I had not dismissed them and the lady that identified herself was under oath and said for the record that the facts that came to light after the case, sometime after the case had commenced, in earnest, didn't influence her whatsoever.
Id., at 413-414, 95 Ill.Dec., at 475, 489 N.E.2d, at 1339 (emphasis supplied).
Petitioner moved for a new trial. He submitted the affidavit of Isaias Torres, the juror who had brought the matter to the court's attention. In his affidavit, Torres stated that "a fellow juror informed him that another juror sitting in judgment of the facts with them . . . knew the deceased, Marilyn Green's mother and attended church with her." Id., at 402, 95 Ill.Dec., at 471, 489 N.E.2d, at 1335. He further stated that "this same Black female juror, when the jury was given the case to deliberate on, entered the jury room and said as far as she was concerned, they could vote guilty right then, and she made this statement before any discussion was had on the evidence. . . ." Ibid (emphasis supplied). At the hearing on petitioner's motion for a new trial, which was held before the same judge, Mrs. Trigleth was not called as a witness. After a brief oral argument, the judge denied the motion.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for a new trial, with three justices dissenting. People v. Porter, supra. Although the State Supreme Court recognized that the trial court's inquiry "could have, and possibly should have, been more searching," it considered the ruling to be within the trial judge's "sound discretion." Id., at 403, 95 Ill.Dec., at 472, 489 N.E.2d, at 1336. The State Supreme Court concluded that Id., at 404, 95 Ill.Dec., at 472, 489 N.E.2d, at 1336.
The right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at the heart of due process. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1641-1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). This Court has held that due process requires both "a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). When a substantial question of juror bias is presented to the trial court, as it was in this case, we have held that the defendant is entitled to a hearing " 'with all interested parties permitted to participate.' " Id., at 216, 102 S.Ct., at 945 (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954).
Under Smith v. Phillips, supra, the trial judge's inquiry into juror bias in this case fell far short of the minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judge...
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