Porter v. Karavas, 3311.

• Decision Date: 06 November 1946
• Docket Number: No. 3311.,3311.
• Citation: 157 F.2d 984
• Parties: PORTER, Price Administrator, v. KARAVAS et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

157 F.2d 984 (1946)

PORTER, Price Administrator, v. KARAVAS et al.

No. 3311.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

November 6, 1946.

Max Melville, Regional Litigation Atty., Office of Price Administration, of Denver, Colo. (George Moncharsh, Deputy Administrator for Enforcement, David London, Director, Litigation Division, Albert M. Dreyer, Chief, Appellate Branch, and Arthur G. Silverman, Sp. Appellate Atty., all of Office of Price Administration, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.

Seth & Montgomery, of Santa Fe, N. M., for appellees.

Before BRATTON, HUXMAN, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.

BRATTON, Circuit Judge.

The Administrator, Office of Price Administration, instituted this action against John Karavas and James Karavas. It was alleged in the first amended complaint that the defendants were engaged in the operation of a restaurant in Taos, New Mexico; that they sold foods and beverages there; and that on or about August 20 and 21, 1945, they made sixty sales of meals, food items, and beverages at prices in excess of the maximum ceiling prices in force and effect at that time. The items sold, the ceiling prices, the selling prices and the overcharges were set out separately, item by item. The names of the purchasers were not set out, and it was affirmatively alleged that they were unknown to the Administrator. It was further alleged that more than thirty days had elapsed since the occurrence of the overcharges; that the defendants had not refunded to the persons making the purchases any part of the overcharges; and that none of the persons had instituted any action against the defendants on account of the overcharges. The pleading contained a request that the overcharge as to each sale be treated as a separate cause of action as though set forth in a separate count or claim. The prayer was for damages in the sum of $3000 and for general relief. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The court sustained the motion and dismissed the action. The Administrator appealed.

In considering a motion of this kind to dismiss a cause for failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, every material fact well pleaded in the complaint construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff is admitted, and the legal question presented is whether the pleading construed in that manner states a cause of action on which plaintiff is entitled to recover. Galbreath v. Metropolitan Trust Company of California, 134 F.2d 569.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8(a), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, in presently material part requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief and a demand for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. The purpose of the rule is to eliminate prolixity in pleading and to achieve brevity, simplicity, and clarity. And all doubts or ambiguities concerning the meaning or intendment of the pleader's language must be resolved in favor of the claim attempted to be stated when the complaint is attacked by a motion to dismiss the action. Clyde v. Broderick, 10 Cir., 144 F.2d 348.

Rule 12(e) provides among other things that within twenty days after the service of a pleading upon him, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars in respect of any matter not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Indefiniteness of a complaint is not ground for dismissing the action if...