Porter v. People
| Decision Date | 16 October 1895 |
| Parties | PORTER v. PEOPLE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to circuit court, Jackson county; O. A. Harker, Judge.
Indictment of Walter A. Porter for assault with intent to commit rape. Defendant was convicted, and he brings error. Affirmed.
A. B. Garrett and W. A. Schwartz, for plaintiff in error.
M. T. Moloney, Atty. Gen., and John M. Herbert, State's Atty. (T. J. Scofield and M. L. Newell, of counsel), for defendants in error.
Walter A. Porter was indicted in the circuit court of Jackson county for an assault upon Nora Blackwood with intent to commit rape, and at the trial the jury found him guilty, and fixed his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of one year. Sentence having been pronounced upon him in accordance with the verdict, he now brings the record to this court by writ of error.
The first proposition submitted by counsel for the defendant is that the indictment is insufficient, in that it omits the use of the word ‘forcibly’ in its description of the offense which the defendant is charged with attempting to commit. The indictment alleges that the defendant, ‘on the 10th day of October, 1893, at and within the county of Jackson, state of Illinois, then and there being a male person of the age of sixteen years and upwards, unlawfully and feloniously did make an assault in and upon one Nora Blackwood, then and there being a female person under the age of fourteen years, to wit, of the age of eleven years, and her, the said Nora Blackwood, then and there wickedly, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent then and there to ravish and carnally know, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the same people of the state of Illinois.’ Our statute defines rape to be ‘the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will,’ and ordinarily the offense can be described only by alleging that it was committed ‘forcibly, and against the will’ of the female. But the same section of the statute in which the foregoing definition of the offense is given also provides that: ‘Every male person of the age of sixteen years and upwards who shall have carnal knowledge of any female person under the age of fourteen years either with or without her consent, shall be adjudged guilty of rape.’ 3 Starr & C. St. p. 368, § 293. This prosecution was brought under this latter clause of the statute, it being charged that the defendant was a male person of the age of 16 years and upwards, and that the female against whom the offense was attempted to be committed was a female person under the age of 14 years, to wit, of the age of 11 years. Under these circumstances it was immaterial whether the offense was forcibly and against the will of the female or not, as by the statute the consummated offense would have been rape whether committed with or without her consent. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the objection thus made to the indictment is not well taken.
The next point made is that there is no sufficient evidence that the offense charged was committed in Jackson county. It must be confessed that the testimony of the prosecuting witness, when taken alone, fails to show in what county the assault took place. She testifies that she lives in Murphysboro, Jackson county, Ill., and has lived there all her life, though on cross-examination she admits that she lived about 10 months at Champaign, and after that returned to Murphysboro. She further testified that some time prior to the commission of the assault she left her father's house, and went to live with the defendant, and that it was at his house that the assault was committed. She fails to state, however, where, or in what county, the defendant's house is situated. An elder sister of the complaining witness testifies that she lived in Murphysboro, and that the defendant lived ‘not very far’ from where she was living. In another place she says that the defendant lived ‘but a little piece,’ and in another that he lived ‘just a little ways over,’...
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State v. Riordan
...507, 124 Am. St. Rep. 291, 113 N.W. 322, 14 Ann. Cas. 1; State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 24 N.W. 458, 6 Am. Crim. Rep. 418; Porter v. People, 158 Ill. 370, 41 N.E. 886; v. State, 107 Ga. 666, 33 S.E. 63. "When there is a conflict of testimony so that it is a question for the jury, the findin......
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People v. Reynolds
...300 Ill. 451, 133 N.E. 208;People v. Allegretti, 291 Ill. 364, 126 N.E. 158;Weinberg v. People, 208 Ill. 15, 69 N.E. 936;Porter v. People, 158 Ill. 370, 41 N.E. 886. It is not necessary that someone testify, in so many words, to the place where the offense was committed, but it is sufficien......
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Addison v. People
...correct, and according to our decisions, although the authorities are not uniform on the subject. That view was adopted in Porter v. People, 158 Ill. 370, 41 N. E. 886, where Walter A. Porter, being over [193 Ill. 417]16 years old, was indicted for an assault with intent to commit rape upon......