Porter v. S. Nev. Adult Mental Health Servs.
| Decision Date | 13 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-02949-APG-PAL |
| Parties | CLORISSA D. PORTER and WILLIAM D. SPENCER, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHERN NEVADA ADULT MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART AND DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiffs Clorissa D. Porter and William D. Spencer bring this putative class action against Southern Nevada Adult Mental Health Services (SNAMHS), also known as Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital, and numerous individuals employed by the state of Nevada. In their first amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). All of the defendants move to dismiss the complaint.1 Because the named plaintiffs are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, I grant the motion in part. However, because Porter and Spencer seek to bring this case as a class action, I grant leave to amend to substitute new named plaintiffs that are not subject to the statutes of limitations bar, if they exist.
The plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification while the defendants' motion to dismiss was pending.2 I deny the plaintiffs' motion as premature; the plaintiffs may refile it after proper plaintiffs have been substituted and a second amended complaint has been filed.
The plaintiffs allege that Rawson-Neal engages in a policy or practice of involuntarily discharging mentally ill, indigent patients on anti-psychotic medications, placing them in taxis bound for the local Greyhound station, and providing them with bus tickets to cities throughout the United States, where the patients often have no contacts or plans for alternative care. Plaintiff Porter alleges that she was involuntarily discharged on January 9, 2013, transported to the Greyhound bus station, and given a pre-paid bus ticket to Flint, Michigan. While she was given enough anti-psychotic medication for the two-day bus ride, she was given no food or money for the trip. The defendants told her that they had made arrangements for her care in Cora, Michigan, a city at least two hours away from Flint, but did not provide her with a way to get there. Rawson-Neal allegedly never contacted the facility in Cora to arrange for care. Porter had no contacts in Flint and had no funds for food or transportation to Cora. She experienced a mental breakdown and was admitted to a Michigan hospital, which was unable to obtain her medical records from Rawson-Neal.3
Plaintiff Spencer was admitted to Rawson-Neal in August 2012. After a few weeks at the facility, a psychiatrist—noting that Spencer used to live in Glendale, California—informed Spencer that he would be provided a bus ticket to Los Angeles. The psychiatrist told Spencer that after the Greyhound dropped him off in Los Angeles, he should "call 9-1-1" for help. Spencer refused the proposed discharge plan and stated that he had no intention of returning to California. The psychiatrist discharged Spencer approximately one month later, telling him that he would be sent to a "residential aftercare facility" in Pasadena where he would receive further treatment. Spencer was transported to the bus station, was given a bus ticket to Los Angeles, and was told that staff from the Pasadena facility would pick him up once he arrived in Los Angeles. When he arrived after the eight-hour trip, without money or food, he called the facility in Pasadena and was informed that Rawson-Neal never provided them with any information about him or his arrivaland they had no space for him at the facility. After experiencing a severe panic attack, Spencer became homeless for approximately one week until he was able to connect with family members.4
Porter and Spencer seek to represent similarly situated persons who were former patients of Rawson-Neal and were subjected to these alleged discharge procedures. They allege that the hospital's actions violate their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as Title II of the ADA, and EMTALA's prohibition on "patient-dumping."
This is not the first time these allegations have been raised before the District Court of Nevada. On June 11, 2013, plaintiff James Brown filed a putative class action raising the same causes of action brought here.6 Judge Mahan granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the allegations on the merits before class certification was determined, and gave Brown an opportunity to amend his complaint.7 Instead, Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, which Judge Mahan denied.8 Brown did not amend his complaint despite two extensions of time to do so. On July 24, 2014, Judge Mahan dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to comply with court orders as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).9 Judge Mahan did not address the class nature of the complaint in either the merits dismissal or the 41(b) dismissal.
Brown appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but did not mention the 41(b) ruling in his opening brief, instead arguing that Judge Mahan's dismissal on the merits was erroneous. On November 4, 2016, in a 2-1 split decision, the Ninth Circuit found that it could not reach the merits in lightof the final 41(b) dismissal.10 The court also held that Brown waived any argument against the 41(b) dismissal by not raising it in his opening brief.11 The plaintiffs in this case filed their complaint on December 21, 2016, the day the Ninth Circuit's mandate in Brown issued.12
When deciding a motion to dismiss, I must view the facts in the complaint as true and in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.13 Rule 8 requires factual support amounting to more than mere labels and recitations of the claim's elements.14 I may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in the complaint but I cannot rely on legal conclusions to find that a claim is properly pleaded.15 I must dismiss any cause of action that does not state a plausible claim for which relief can be granted.16 A complaint or individual claim should be dismissed without leave to amend only when "it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment."17
I cannot dismiss a claim based on an affirmative defense unless the elements of the defense are clear on the face of the complaint.18 When a statute of limitations issue is clear on the face of the complaint, then a defendant can argue that defense in a motion to dismiss.19 If it is clear from the face of the complaint that the statute of limitations has passed, then I must determine whether "the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would notpermit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled."20 Further, I find it appropriate here to resolve the motion to dismiss before ruling on class certification.21
State law applies in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions "to determine what the limitations period is, whether that period was tolled, and the effect of the tolling."22 Both parties agree that Nevada's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims.23 EMTALA claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations based on federal law.24
Title II of the ADA "borrow[s] the statute of limitations applicable to the most analogous state-law claim."25 The plaintiffs argue in their response to the motion to dismiss that Nevada's "catch-all" four-year statute of limitations should apply.26 However, in their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs appear to agree with the defendants that Nevada Revised Statutes § 651.070, Nevada's disability discrimination statute related to public accommodations, is analogous to Title II, and therefore its one-year limitations period applies.27 I agree that a claim under § 651.070 is most closely analogous to the ADA.28 Therefore, § 651.070's one-year statute of limitations applies to the plaintiffs' ADA claim.
The defendants argue that the named plaintiffs cannot maintain this action because they are barred by all relevant statutes of limitations. Porter claims that she was involuntarily discharged on January 9, 2013. Spencer alleges that he was discharged on September 21, 2012. Therefore, the two-year limitations period for the EMTALA and § 1983 claims would have expired on January 9, 2015, and September 21, 2014, respectively. The plaintiffs' ADA claims would have expired on January 9, 2014, and September 21, 2013, respectively. Absent tolling, all of Porter and Spencer's claims are time-barred.
The plaintiffs argue that the class action tolling principles established by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe Construction Company v. Utah29 toll this action for the pendency of the Brown class action, in which they allege they were putative members. Under the American Pipe doctrine, "the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action."30 "Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied" or until a case is otherwise stripped of its class action character.31 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has held that a class action can toll the statute of limitations for a subsequent class action when the new class is "not attempting to re-litigate an earlier denial of class certification, or to correct a procedural deficiency in an earlier would-be class."32
For actions under § 1983 and Title II of the ADA, I borrow state tolling principles.33 In Roe Dancer...
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