Porter v. State

• Decision Date: 12 May 1904
• Citation: 37 So. 81,140 Ala. 87
• Parties: PORTER v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

37 So. 81

140 Ala. 87

PORTER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 12, 1904

Appeal from Circuit Court, Russell County; A. A. Evans, Judge.

Uriah Porter was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The defendant pleaded "not guilty," and the statutory plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." As stated in the opinion, there was no conflict in the evidence as to the killing of the deceased by the defendant; the evidence showing that the defendant rode up to within 15 feet of the storehouse of Joseph Fincher, and that, upon Fincher coming to the doorway of the storehouse, the defendant shot him in the breast with a doublebarrel shotgun, killing him instantly. There were many witnesses introduced for the defendant, whose testimony tended to show that the defendant at the time of the homicide, was insane. In rebuttal to this testimony, the state introduced several witnesses whose testimony tended to show that the defendant, at the time of the killing, was sane. R. P. Baldwin, a witness for the defendant, testified that he lived about a mile and a half from where the defendant lived at the time of the killing and had known the defendant for 20 years, and was somewhat intimate with him; that he saw the defendant two or three days before the killing, and the defendant talked unreasonably about the value of a horse and dog which he owned, and that he thought the defendant was insane at the time of the killing; that the last time he saw the defendant before the killing was about an hour and a half before the killing. On cross-examination this witness testified that when he last saw the defendant before the killing, he appeared to be very much under the influence of whisky; that the defendant had a quart and a half of whisky with him at that time; and that he had seen the defendant under the influence of whisky. Thereupon the solicitor for the state asked the witness the following question: "Did you notice any difference in defendant's conduct when he was sober and when he was drunk?" The defendant objected to this question on the ground that it called for illegal irrelevant, and incompetent evidence, and because it put the defendant's character in issue. The court overruled the objection, and to this ruling the defendant duly excepted. The witness answered: "In his opinion, when the defendant was drinking, he was easily insulted, and would try to raise a fuss with his best friend. When not under the influence of whisky, he was a very social kind of a fellow." The defendant moved to exclude this answer of the witness from the jury upon the same grounds, and duly excepted to the court overruling his motion. Aaron Tharp, a witness for the state, testified that he had known the defendant for 15 or 18 years intimately; that he had talked with the defendant a short time before the killing, and that in the witness' opinion, the defendant was insane at the time of the homicide; that some time before the killing the witness moved Mrs. Porter, the wife of the defendant, from the defendant's house to Crawford. Thereupon the defendant asked the witness the following question: "Why did you move Mrs. Crawford?" Upon the witness answering, "Because she was afraid to live with Porter, because he was crazy," the state objected to the answer, and moved to exclude the same, upon the ground that it was illegal, irrelevant, and incompetent, and hearsay evidence. The court sustained the objection, and excluded the answer, and to this ruling the defendant duly excepted. Monroe Fuller, a witness for the state, testified that he had known the defendant for 10 or 12 years, and had been to school with him; that, since they were in school, witness had seen him as often as two or three times a week, and had lived in the neighborhood with him, associated with him continuously, conversed with him, and hunted with him frequently. The state then asked the witness the following question: "Was he, in your opinion, sane or insane?" The defendant objected to the question because it called for illegal, incompetent, and irrelevant evidence, and for the opinion of the witness. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. Upon the witness answering that, in his opinion, the defendant was sane, the defendant moved to exclude the answer of the witness upon the same grounds, and duly excepted to the court overruling his motion. The state introduced Dr. W. B. Prather as a witness, who testified that he was a regularly licensed and practicing physician, and had been for 30 years; that he had treated insane patients, and was county physician for Russell county while the defendant was in jail; and that, shortly after the killing of Fincher by the defendant, and while the defendant was in jail, he carefully examined the defendant on two separate occasions with reference to his mental condition, and saw and conversed with the defendant several times while he was incarcerated. The state then asked the witness the following question: "Whether or not, in his opinion, the defendant was sane or insane at the time the witness examined him?" The defendant objected to this question because it called for irrelevant, incompetent, and illegal evidence. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. Upon the witness answering that, in his opinion, the defendant was sane, the defendant moved to exclude the answer upon the same grounds, and duly excepted to the court overruling his motion.

Upon the introduction of all the evidence, the defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them as asked: "(2) The court charges the jury that an unsound mind cannot form a criminal intent, and, as crime includes both act and intent, an indispensable...