Porter v. State Land Office Bd.

Decision Date03 April 1944
Docket NumberNo. 60.,60.
Citation13 N.W.2d 836,308 Mich. 324
PartiesPORTER et al. v. STATE LAND OFFICE BOARD.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Original mandamus proceeding by Glenn M. Porter and others against the State Land Office Board to compel the defendant board to execute and deliver quitclaim deed to plaintiffs.

Petition for writ of mandamus denied.

Before the Entire Bench.

Penny & Charter, of Muskegon, for plaintiffs.

Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Detroit, and Daniel J. O'Hara and Elbern Parsons, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant.

STARR, Justice.

Plaintiffs petition this court for writ of mandamus to compel defendant board to execute and deliver quitclaim deed conveying to them all right, title, and interest held by the State on August 3, 1943, in and to certain lands located in the village of Saugatuck, Allegan county. In response to an order to show cause, defendant filed answer denying plaintiffs' right to the writ.

The material facts are not in dispute. In pursuance of the general tax law, 1 Comp.Laws 1929, § 3389 et seq. as amended, Comp.Laws Supp.1940 and 1943, § 3389 et seq., Stat.Ann. and Stat.Ann. 1943 Cum.Supp. § 7.1 et seq., the lands described in plaintiffs' petition were offered for sale at the annual May, 1940, tax sale for delinquent taxes for the years 1930 to 1935, inclusive, and, there being no other bidders, said lands were sold to the State. As there was no redemption from such sale, the State's title became absolute May 6, 1941, and on June 3, 1941, the auditor general conveyed the lands to the State. The State land office board act, hereinafter referred to as the act, is Act No. 155, Pub. Acts 1937, as last amended by Act No. 196, Pub. Acts 1943, Comp.Laws Supp.1940 and 1943, § 3723-1 et seq., Stat.Ann.1943 Cum.Supp. § 7.951 et seq. Thereafter, under section 3 of the act, defendant board was vested with control and jurisdiction of the lands in question.

In pursuance of section 7 of the act, defendant board prepared to sell the lands at the February, 1942, so-called scavenger sale, but upon the application of the village of Saugatuck, in pursuance of section 5 of the act, they were withheld from such sale. The village did not redeem, and in pursuance of sections 5 and 7, the board offered the lands for sale at the February, 1943, scavenger sale. As no bid was received at such sale, the lands became ‘subject to disposition’ by defendant board under section 8 of the act, which provides in part:

‘All other lands under the jurisdiction and control of the board shall be classified with the end in view of rehabilitating such lands as rapidly and speedily as possible and returning said lands to the tax rolls. * * * The state land office board shall make or cause to be made an appraisal of such lands. * * *

‘The board is authorized to sell any such lands, except those over which it has relinquished jurisdiction, to the best advantage, but for not less than the appraised valuation to be fixed by the board from time to time, to reliable purchasers, either at cash or on time payment plans, such time payments not to run for longer than 10 years from the date of such sale and the board shall, upon request by resolution of the governing body of the county, city, village, township or school district in which said lands are located, transfer such lands as such county, city, village, township or school district shall request, upon proof satisfactory to said board that such lands are needed for public uses but not for resale, to such county, city, village, township or school district and give a quitclaim deed therefor covering such parcel or parcels of land, executed on behalf of the state of Michigan by the board.’

In pursuance of the above-quoted provisions of section 8, the lands were appraised, and defendant board fixed a valuation of $250 thereon. Thereafter it advertised and gave notice that the lands would be offered for sale to the highest bidder at a designated place in Allegan county on August 3, 1943. Such sale, referred to in plaintiffs' petition as a subsale, was held, and plaintiff Harold J. Mulder, as agent for all plaintiffs, bid the sum of $255, which was in excess of the appraised valuation. The lands were struck off to plaintiffs, who signed a form furnished by the board, entitled ‘memorandum of sale,’ which provided in part:

‘The above lands located in the above county, state of Michigan, identified by the above sale number of the official sale list for said county of the State land office board having been offered for sale at public auction pursuant and subject to the provisions of Act No. 155, pub. Acts 1937, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the State land office board, the undersigned has on the day above set forth made the highest bid therefor in the amount set opposite the sale number above.

‘The undersigned hereby agrees to pay the above stated highest bid price in accordance with the following terms: * * *

‘Total amount in cash on date of sale. * * *

The rights of the undersigned herein are subject to the provisions of Act No. 155, Pub. Acts 1937, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the State land office board.’

Plaintiffs paid their bid of $255 in cash and defendant board, by its agent, delivered the following ‘certificate of purchase’ dated August 3, 1943:

‘It is hereby certified that the lands identified in the above memorandum of sale have been bid in by Harold J. Mulder, the bidder executing said memorandum of sale pursuant and subject to the provisions of Act No. 155, Pub. Acts 1937, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the State land office board; that said bidder has deposited in cash with this board * * *

‘The full purchase price thereof as set forth in said memorandum of sale. * * *

Said highest bidder shall be entitled to receive a quitclaim deed * * * covering the lands above identified, executed in behalf of the state of Michigan by the State land office board.’

On October 6, 1943, plaintiffs made written demand that defendant board execute and deliver a quitclaim deed of the lands in question. On October 8th, in response to such demand, defendant wrote plaintiffs' attorneys as follows:

‘In connection with your demand I wish to advise that the State land office board has rejected the offer of Porter and Mulder for the purchase of this property and authorized a refund of their deposit. The action of the board was determined by the fact that the village of Saugatuck deeded (needed) this property for public use and the transfer of such lands for such use has also been approved by the board.

‘I wish to point out that under the rules and regulations of the board, the board reserves the right to reject any offers to purchase at any time prior to the execution and delivery of deeds or contracts.

‘Due to the above I wish to advise that this office cannot honor your request that a deed be executed and delivered to your clients.’

It appears that in pursuance of section 8 of the act the village council of Saugatuck, on October 8, 1943, had adopted a resolution requesting defendant board to convey the lands in question to the village for public purposes, and in its answer defendant alleges that it rejected plaintiffs' bid in order to make conveyance to the village.

Section 11 of the act authorized defendant board ‘to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions' ...

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6 cases
  • Campbell v. Michigan Judges Retirement Bd.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 19, 1966
    ...85 Mich. 328, 48 N.W. 577; National Bank of Detroit v. State Land Office Board, 300 Mich. 240, 1 N.W.2d 525; Porter v. State Land Office Board, 308 Mich. 324, 13 N.W.2d 836. Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought. If necessary, the writ or order will issue as prayed. Costs to KAVANAGH......
  • Young v. Thendara, Inc.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1950
    ...became the owner of the lot, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, and a new chain of title was started. Porter v. State Land Office Board, 308 Mich. 324, 13 N.W.2d 836; Darby v. Freeman, 304 Mich. 459, 8 N.W.2d 137. Subsequently, on February 4, 1942, plaintiff filed a claim of lien......
  • Lowrie & Webb Lumber Co. v. Ferguson
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • October 8, 1945
    ...the owner of the lot, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, and a new chain of title was started.* Porter v. State Land Office Board, 308 Mich. 324, 13 N.W.2d 836;Darby v. Freeman, 304 Mich. 459, 8 N.W.2d 137. Subsequently, on February 4, 1942, plaintiff filed a claim of lien on the......
  • Montgomery Real Estate & Co. v. Department of Natural Resources
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • April 26, 1973
    ...defendant's contention that the state becomes absolute owner as of the end of the period of redemption. Porter v. State Land Office Board, 308 Mich 324, 326, 13 N.W.2d 836, 837 (1944), squarely holds that the state's title vests on the termination of the redemption 'The material facts are n......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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