Porter v. State

Citation788 So.2d 917
Decision Date03 May 2001
Docket NumberNo. SC88562.,SC88562.
PartiesGeorge PORTER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

John W. Moser, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region, Michael P. Reiter, Chief Assistant CCRC, Amy C. Settlemire, Assistant CCRC and Linda McDermott, Staff Attorney, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel Middle Region, Tampa, FL, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

George Porter, Jr., a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm the trial court's denial of Porter's 3.850 motion.

FACTS

Porter was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the 1986 shooting deaths of Evelyn Williams and her boyfriend, Walter Burrows. The facts, as fully set forth in this Court's opinion on Porter's direct appeal, are:

Porter elected to represent himself, with the assistance of standby counsel, when he went on trial in November 1987 on two counts of first-degree murder and one count each of armed burglary and aggravated assault. The facts adduced at trial are as follows.
In 1985 in Melbourne, Florida, Porter became the live-in lover of the first victim, Evelyn Williams ("Williams"). Their relationship was stormy almost from the beginning, aggravated by hostility between Porter and Williams' children, especially Williams' daughter, Amber. Several violent incidents occurred during the course of Porter's relationship with Williams. In July 1986, Porter damaged Williams' car while she was at work, and later he telephoned and threatened to kill Williams and Amber. Porter left town shortly thereafter and was not seen again in town until early October 1986. Before Porter returned to Melbourne, Williams had entered a relationship with the second victim, Walter Burrows.
When Porter returned to town, he contacted Williams' mother, Lora Mae Meyer. He told her that he wanted to see Williams, and that he had a gift for her. Meyer told Porter that her daughter did not wish to see him anymore, and that Williams wanted nothing from him. Nevertheless, Porter persisted. During each of the two days immediately preceding the murder, Porter was seen driving past Williams' house.
A few days before the murder, Porter had a conversation with a friend, Nancy Sherwood, who testified that Porter told her, "you'll read it in the paper." She offered no explanation for Porter's remark. Porter went to the home of another friend, Dennis Gardner, and asked to borrow a gun. Gardner declined, but the gun subsequently vanished from Gardner's home.
On October 8, 1986, Porter visited Williams, who then called the police because she was afraid of him. That evening, Porter went to two cocktail lounges. He spent the night with a friend, Lawrence Jury, who said that Porter was quite drunk by 11 p.m.
At 5:30 a.m. the next morning, Amber awoke to the sound of gunshots. She ran down the hallway and saw Porter standing over her mother's body. Amber testified that Porter came toward her, pointed a gun at her head and said, "boom, boom, you're going to die." Burrows then came into the room, struggled with Porter, and forced him outside. Amber telephoned for emergency assistance.
Williams' son, John, who lived next door, testified that he heard gunshot blasts at about 5:30 a.m. He ran outside and saw Burrows lying facedown in the front lawn. Both Williams and Burrows were dead by the time police arrived at the scene.
On December 5, 1987, as the prosecution was nearly finished presenting its case-in-chief, Porter told the judge that he wanted to plead guilty to the murder charges and no contest to the other charges. When the judge sought the factual basis of the pleas from Porter, Porter denied killing Williams, although said he may have killed Burrows. The judge refused to accept the pleas on that basis. Porter consulted with his standby counsel and then said he would plead guilty to all four charges, but that he did not want to provide a factual basis for the pleas. The trial court conducted an extensive inquiry into the voluntariness of the pleas, and the prosecutor presented the factual basis in support of guilt. Porter admitted his guilt and said he changed his pleas "[b]ecause I want to get it over with." The trial court accepted the guilty pleas to all four counts.

Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110, 111 S.Ct. 1024, 112 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1991).

On January 21, 1988, the trial jury returned for the penalty phase, at which Porter was represented by counsel.1 The jury recommended death by a twelve-to-zero vote for the murder of Williams and by a vote of ten to two for the murder of Burrows, but the trial judge imposed death only on the murder of Williams. The trial judge found four aggravators2 and no mitigators. On direct appeal, this Court struck the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator but affirmed the conviction and sentence.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 27, 1995, Porter filed the instant amended rule 3.8503 motion, which contained fifteen issues. The trial court conducted a Huff4 hearing on May 22, 1995. Subsequent to that hearing, the trial court issued an order on July 12, 1995, summarily denying all claims raised by Porter except for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding counsel's failure to pursue mental health evaluations for the purpose of developing mitigating evidence and counsel's failure to present other matters in mitigation. On these claims the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 4 and 5, 1996. Subsequent to this hearing, the trial court denied the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This appeal follows.

ISSUES ON APPEAL5

Porter raises nine issues on appeal.6 We conclude that issues 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, as well as part of issue 6 (relating to the "committed during the commission of a burglary" aggravator) are procedurally barred because they could have been raised on direct appeal. See LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So.2d 236, 240 (Fla.1998)

(issue 9); Ragsdale v. State, 720 So.2d 203, 205 (Fla.1998) (issue 5); Oats v. Dugger, 638 So.2d 20, 22 (Fla.1994) (issue 6); Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So.2d 452, 453-54 (Fla.1993) (issue 4); Garcia v. State 622 So.2d 1325, 1326 (Fla.1993) (issues 7 and 8). The remaining arguments in issue 6, relating to the claim of vagueness in the instructions on aggravating circumstances, are procedurally barred because Porter did not make a specific objection at trial or propose an alternative instruction and then pursue the vagueness issue on direct appeal. See Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506, 517 (Fla.1999). We will discuss the remaining issues.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

As his first claim, Porter asserts his penalty phase counsel was ineffective.7 This claim involves alleged failures in respect to investigation and presentation of evidence concerning: (1) statutory and nonstatutory mental mitigation; (2) Porter's abusive childhood environment; (3) Porter's alcohol abuse; and (4) Porter's military combat service in Korea.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, taking two days of testimony. At the evidentiary hearing, Porter called his penalty phase counsel, Bardwell, as his first witness. The trial judge appointed Bardwell to represent Porter because the public defender had a conflict. Bardwell initially served as counsel in the guilt phase but became stand-by counsel when Porter made the decision to represent himself during the guilt phase. Bardwell thereafter became counsel for the penalty phase.

At the time of the Porter trial, Bardwell was an experienced criminal trial attorney. Bardwell had served as an assistant state attorney and then as a private criminal defense attorney who accepted conflict cases from the public defender. Prior to his representation of Porter, Bardwell had received five appointments to represent defendants in capital cases. Porter's penalty phase was the first penalty phase in which Bardwell had been involved as defense counsel.

Bardwell testified that, during the preparation for the penalty phase, Porter was very "fatalistic." Bardwell stated that Porter instructed him not to discuss the case with his wife or son. He did not want them brought into the case. Bardwell also stated that Porter refused to talk to a medical doctor, whom Bardwell wanted to evaluate Porter's alcohol use.

Following two days of evidence, the trial court entered a detailed order. In this order the trial court found that Porter had significantly limited his trial counsel in both the preparation for and presentation of the penalty phase defense. In footnote 4 of the order, the trial court stated:

This Court also finds that it is important to note here that had the Defendant cooperated with Defense Counsel's efforts to develop the statutory mitigator alleged above, this Court would not now be in the position of having to determine whether or not true statutory mitigating evidence existed at the time of trial. Indeed, the Defendant gave Defense Counsel instructions not to speak to members of his family (See Exhibit "A", Transcript at pages 77-80, 90-92) and he refused to speak to the doctor who Defense counsel sent to the jail (See Exhibit "A", Transcript at pages 55, 70-76). This total lack of cooperation with Defense Counsel, therefore, leaves this Court now in a somewhat precarious position in regards to the true existence of this statutory mitigating evidence and thus the Court finds this aspect of the Defendant's claim to be nothing more than speculation.

State v. Porter, No. 85-5546-CFA, order at 8 n. 4 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. order filed May 10, 1996). The lack of cooperation by Porter at the time of the trial is...

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