Porterfield v. Brinegar

• Decision Date: 19 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. C-5123,C-5123
• Citation: Porterfield v. Brinegar, 719 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1986)
• Parties: Janice Williams PORTERFIELD, Administratrix of the Estate of Walter C. Williams, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Lorene BRINEGAR, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 558

719 S.W.2d 558

Janice Williams PORTERFIELD, Administratrix of the Estate of Walter C. Williams, Deceased, Petitioner, v.Lorene BRINEGAR, Respondent.

No. C-5123.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Nov. 19, 1986.

James N. Haltom, Hubbard, Atton, Peek, Haltom & Roberts, Texarkana, for petitioner.

Donald B. Friedman, Friedman & Hooper, Texarkana, for respondent.

WALLACE, Justice.

This is an appeal from the granting of an instructed verdict.The suit is for damages arising out of a one car accident in which the driver, Walter C. Williams, was killed and the passenger, Lorene Brinegar, was injured.The trial court granted an instructed verdict for Janice Williams Porterfield, the Administratrix of the Estate of Walter C. Williams, Deceased.The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for trial.705 S.W.2d 236.We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Brinegar and Williams were returning to Atlanta, Texas, from an evening of dancing in Texarkana, Arkansas.Brinegar was asleep, Williams was killed upon impact, and there were no other witnesses to the accident.

Department of Public Safety OfficerLarry Aycock testified his investigation of the accident revealed no skid marks, which indicated that Williams had not hit his brakes.Aycock found no indication that the automobile had made contact with any object other than the ground.He further testified there was heavy fog, the road was dry, and the auto had travelled approximately 100 feet after leaving the roadway, turning over as it did so.

Brinegar testified that: (1) Williams had been awake since 5:30 a.m. of the prior day, the accident occurred approximately 3:30 a.m.; (2)she had driven the automobile several times and it appeared to function properly; (3) Williams was 46 years old and in excellent health; and (4) Williams was familiar with the road since he travelled it on a daily basis going to and from work.

The issue before us is whether the above testimony precludes an instructed verdict against Brinegar.On appeal from an instructed verdict the task of an appellate court is to determine whether there is any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue.The court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was instructed, discarding all the contrary evidence and inferences.Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65(Tex.1978).The trial court may properly withdraw a case from the jury and instruct a verdict only if there is no evidence to support a material issue.SeeNajera v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 207 S.W.2d 365(Tex.1948).

Brinegar contends her testimony entitled her to a jury issue on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.Mrs. Porterfield, as Administratrix of the Estate of Williams, contends: (1) proof of an automobile accident is no proof of negligence; (2) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked only upon a showing of negligence coupled with the further showing that the instrument which caused the injury was within the control of the defendant; and (3) it was the burden of Ms. Brinegar to negate all possible causes of the collision other than the negligence of Williams.At trial Mrs. Porterfield suggested a number of causes of the accident, chief of which could have been an oncoming automobile or animal in Williams' lane of traffic which caused him to swerve sharply to the right to avoid a collision.She correctly points out that the courts of this State have not previously applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a fact situation like this.

Res ipsa loquitur means simply that the nature of the occurrence itself furnishes circumstantial evidence of negligence.Porterfield's contention that res ipsa loquitur applies only upon a showing of specific negligence would render the doctrine meaningless.The test to be applied was set out by this court...