Portis v. Rapelje

• Decision Date: 10 June 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 11-CV-10614
• Parties: ROY LEE PORTIS, Petitioner, v. LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

ROY LEE PORTIS, Petitioner,

v.LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.

CASE NO. 11-CV-10614

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: June 10, 2013

HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Roy Lee Portis ("Petitioner") was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 450 grams or more but less than 1000 grams of cocaine, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401(2)(a)(ii), possession of marijuana, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7403(2)(d), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b, following a joint jury trial before separate juries with co-defendant Maria Carroll, in Oakland County Circuit Court. He was sentenced as a second habitual offender, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.10, to 15½ to 30 years imprisonment on the cocaine conviction, a concurrent term of 192 days on the marijuana conviction, and a consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the felony firearm conviction in 2008. In his pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the conduct of the prosecutor. For the reasons set forth, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and grants leave toproceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II. BACKGROUND

Petitioner's convictions arise from the police seizure of drugs and a gun from a home in Pontiac, Michigan during the execution of a search warrant on October 12, 2007. The Michigan Court of Appeals described the facts, which are presumed correct on habeas review, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009), as follows:

On October 12, 2007, Pontiac police executed a search warrant at a two-story house, located at 58 Nelson. When the officers entered the house, defendant Carroll was at the top of the stairs holding defendant Portis's four-year-old child and defendant Portis was exiting the master bedroom.

In the master bedroom, the officers found a digital scale with cocaine residue, a corner tie plastic bag containing more than three grams of marijuana, and a pipe on top of a dresser. A Metro PCS cellular telephone was also on the dresser. ^FN1

The top drawer of the dresser contained 14 loose nine-millimeter rounds, an empty nine-millimeter shell box, and a Metro PCS receipt in the name of "William Sullivan" that corresponded with the cellular telephone found on top of the dresser. FN2 In the top drawer of a nightstand, the officers discovered 12 individually wrapped rocks of cocaine. On top of another nightstand was an opened Ajax false bottom can that contained two corner tie bags of crack cocaine; one bag had one rock of cocaine and the other had 13 individually wrapped rocks of crack cocaine. Inside that nightstand were several forms of correspondence to defendants Portis and Carroll. "Just inside" the bedroom closet, the officers found a nine-millimeter highpoint rifle with eight rounds in the magazine that were consistent with ammunition found in the dresser drawer. A brick of cocaine in a gallon-size Ziploc bag wrapped in duct tape and a corner tie bag containing three individually wrapped rocks of cocaine were also in the closet.

FN1. An officer monitored the cellular telephone that was confiscated from the master bedroom. When the telephone rang, the caller asked for "Jay" and requested narcotics.

FN2. An officer explained that it is not difficult to obtain a Metro PCS cellular telephone using a false name, because it can be paid for in cash and no identification is required. The officer further explained that individuals involved in drug trafficking often use this method to prevent their cellular telephones from being traced back to them.

Large male clothing, along with size 13 male shoes, and petite female clothingwere found in the master bedroom. According to one of the officers, the large male clothing was consistent with defendant Portis's quite larger physique and the petite female clothing was consistent with defendant Carroll's smaller size. In the pocket of a 5XL sweatshirt, the officers found a corner tie of crack cocaine. A framed photo of defendant Portis sat on top of one of the dressers.

People v. Portis, No. 286423, 2009 WL 3837339, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2009) (unpublished).

Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising several claims of error, including the same claims raised on habeas review. The court denied relief and affirmed Petitioner's convictions. Id. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Portis, 779 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 2010).

Petitioner thereafter instituted this federal habeas action, raising the following claims:

I. The prosecution failed to submit sufficient evidence to prove he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses of possession with intent to deliver cocaine and felony firearm.

II. He was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct for arguing facts not in evidence.

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied for lack of merit.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., governs this case because Petitioner filed his petition after the AEDPA's effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless theadjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).

"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, "[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862(2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n.7); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

The Supreme Court recently held that "a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.

Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court "has held on numerous occasions that it is not 'an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court"). Section 2254(d) "does not require a state court to give reasonsbefore its decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785. Furthermore, it "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537...