Portland Gaslight Co. v. Ruud

Decision Date01 July 1922
Citation242 Mass. 272,136 N.E. 75
PartiesPORTLAND GASLIGHT CO. v. RUUD. RILEY v. SAME. FOURNIER v. SAME.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John A. Aiken, Judge.

Three actions-by the Portland Gaslight Company, by Andrew Riley, and by Walter Fournier-against Gabriel A. Ruud, for damages to a coal truck owned by the Gaslight Company and personal injuries sustained by the other two plaintiffs in a collision with defendant's automobile. Verdicts for plaintiffs, and defendant brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

The declarations in the actions by Riley and Fournier alleged that the actions were brought in the names of such plaintiffs for the benefit of the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York and the Portland Gaslight Company. Subject to defendant's exception, he was cross-examined as to his conveyance of the house in which he lived to his daughter after learning of plaintiffs' intent to sue for the damages suffered because of the collision. In the Gaslight Company action, defendant requested a ruling that plaintiff could not recover any sums of money paid by it or by the Fidelity & Casualty Company to Fournier and Riley. In the other two actions defendant requested rulings that on all the evidence plaintiff had assigned his right of action to the Gaslight Company and to the Fidelity & Casualty Company, and that plaintiff could not recover under the form of declaration. Defendant excepted to the refusal of these requests. The court charged that evidence concerning payments by the insurance company should be disregarded, and defendant excepted thereto. Defendant also excepted to the court's direction that certain insurance papers should not be sent to the jury. The jury returned verdicts of $850 in favor of the Gaslight Company, $1,500 in favor of Riley, and $200 in favor of Fournier.Samuel D. Elmore, of Boston, for plaintiffs.

Obert Sletten and William W. Risk, both of Boston, for defendant.

BRALEY, J.

We assume from the recitals in the record that on conflicting evidence the jury could find that the defendant's negligence in the operation of his car caused the collision between the car and the gaslight company's coal truck while they were passing ‘on the main highway * * * in the town of Dunstable, Maine,’ damaging the truck, and causing personal injury to the plaintiff Fournier, the driver, and the plaintiff Riley, the helper, employees of the company.

The plaintiffs' counsel before suit wrote the defendant that he had a claim against him, and requested him to call at his office. In response the defendant called. It is stated as a fact, that--

‘as a result of said call the defendant * * * had knowledge that his car was the car which the plaintiffs believed had been in collision with the truck, * * * and that the plaintiffs intended to bring suits * * * for damages * * * because of said collision.’

In cross-examination of the defendant the plaintiff was permitted to show that immediately after his interview he conveyed his homestead to his daughter, for which on his own evidence the jury could say no valuable consideration for the conveyance was ever agreed upon by the parties. The defendant, who continued in occupation of the premises, testified that, while no money was paid, the understanding in part was that he should pay rent which was to be deducted from the purchase price, and that the conveyance also was in the nature of a distribution of his estate in accordance with the wish of his deceased wife who at her death was ‘a part owner,’ although by operation of law he had become the sole owner when the transfer was made. But his credibility and the effect of his evidence was for the jury. The defendant, who did not call the attention of the judge at the trial to the...

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14 cases
  • Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 14, 2013
    ...right to payment from the decedent, survival was not an issue. See id. at 220, 184 N.E. 670. Compare Portland Gaslight Co. v. Ruud, 242 Mass. 272, 274–275, 136 N.E. 75 (1922) (describing conveyance of defendant's home to his daughter to avoid paying damages in anticipated tort suit). Here, ......
  • Nolan v. Borkowski
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 15, 1988
    ...p. 322; see, e.g., Poston v. Gaddis, 372 So.2d 1099, 1102 (Ala.1979); Bush v. Jackson, , 552 P.2d 509 (1976); Portland Gas Light Co. v. Ruud, 242 Mass. 272, 136 N.E. 75 (1922); Cox v. Wright-Hennepin Cooperative Electric Assn., 281 Minn. 228, 161 N.W.2d 294 (1968)." Batick v. Seymour, supra......
  • Batick v. Seymour
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 6, 1982
    ...e.g., Poston v. Gaddis, 372 So.2d 1099, 1102 (Ala.1979); Bush v. Jackson, 191 Colo. 249, 552 P.2d 509 (1976); Portland Gas Light Co. v. Ruud, 242 Mass. 272, 136 N.E. 75 (1922); Cox v. Wright-Hennepin Cooperative Electric Assn., 281 Minn. 228, 161 N.W.2d 294 (1968). 2 While it is true "that ......
  • Becker v. Eastern Massachusetts St. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1932
    ...the cause of action is set forth completely. Hall v. Henry Thayer & Co., 225 Mass. 151, 153, 113 N. E. 644;Portland Gas Light Co. v. Ruud, 242 Mass. 272, 276, 136 N. E. 75. See, also, Kelly v. Greany, 216 Mass. 296, 103 N. E. 779. There is nothing to the contrary in Turnquist v. Hannon, 219......
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