Portland Silk Co. v. City of Middletown

• Decision Date: 07 February 1939
• Citation: 4 A.2d 422,125 Conn. 172
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: PORTLAND SILK CO. v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN.

4 A.2d 422

125 Conn. 172

PORTLAND SILK CO. v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 7, 1939

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Edward J. Quinlan Judge.

Proceeding by the Portland Silk Company against the City of Middletown wherein plaintiff sought reduction of valuation and assessment of land and buildings belonging to plaintiff. The Board of Relief of the City of Middletown refused to make the reduction, and plaintiff appealed to the superior court where the matter was referred to the Honorable Frederick M Peasley, state referee. From judgment on report reducing the valuation, the defendant appeals.

No error.

Don Cambria, of Middletown, for appellant.

Lawrence A. Howard and Julius G. Day, Jr., both of Harford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS, JJ.

JENNINGS, Judge.

The report of the referee finds the following facts: In October, 1936, the plaintiff owned land in Middletown on which stood three factory buildings assessed together at $104,500. The board of relief, on appeal, refused to reduce this assessment. The plaintiff's principal stockholder died in 1935 and the Chemical Bank and Trust Company of New York made every effort to sell the property. It was finally sold in separate parcels for a total of $33,500 after much bargaining and correspondence with interested buyers. The market for manufacturing buildings in Middletown has been poor for many years but on the date in question there was a market for factory plants in Connecticut and there had been several sales in Middletown and nearby cities. The then present true and actual value and fair market value of the property was $45,000. The details of construction, cost of replacement and labor and flood conditions in the neighborhood were also found.

The defendant's remonstrance attacks the report of the referee as finding numerous facts without evidence and claims that many facts should be added as admitted and undisputed. The purpose of this wholesale attack is to undermine the finding of the ultimate fact that the property of the plaintiff had a fair market value. An examination of the evidence certified, with the assistance of the table provided in the plaintiff's brief, shows that no correction in the report can be made which will advantage the defendant. The finding that the factory of the Hartford Battery Company was sold for $15,000 is not supported by the evidence and the finding that the Pratt & Whitney Company sold a factory for $28,500 is only supported by hearsay evidence of little intrinsic value. The trial court evidently did not use these figures in determining the value of the property here in question but only as evidence that there was a market for such property and any correction as regards these findings would not be material to the result.

The defendant contends that, in the absence of proof of other sales of like property in the open market, there can be no finding of market value. Section 1149 of the General Statutes provides that, ‘ the present true and actual value of any estate shall be deemed by all assessors and boards of relief to be the fair market value thereof, and not its value at a forced or auction sale.’ In Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Hartford, 99 Conn. 329, 336, 122 A 91, 93, we said: ‘ It is also evidence that the words ‘ market value’ in this statute mean a value in a market, in a place or conditions in which there are, or have been, or will be, within a reasonable time, willing sellers and able and ready buyers of property like that to be assessed, and in which sales are or have been made, or may fairly be expected, in the usual and natural way of business.' A generally accepted definition of market value is ‘ the price that would in all probability-the probability being based upon the evidence in the case-result from fair negotiations, where the seller is willing to sell and the buyer desires to buy.’ Sharpe v. United States, 3 Cir., 112 F. 893, 898, 57 L.R.A. 932; Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Blair, 7 Cir., 20 F.2d 10, 13; Lawrence v. Boston, 119 Mass. 126, 128, 132; Ligare v. Chicago, M. & N. R. Co., 166 Ill. 249, 263, 46 N.E. 803; People ex rel. Sebring v. Dowd, 206 A.D. 727, 200...