Portland Trust Co. v. Coulter

• Decision Date: 31 October 1892
• Citation: 31 P. 280,23 Or. 131
• Parties: PORTLAND TRUST CO. et al. v. COULTER et al.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

31 P. 280

23 Or. 131

PORTLAND TRUST CO. et al. v. COULTER et al.

Supreme Court of Oregon

October 31, 1892

Appeal from circuit court, Multnomah county; L.B. STEARNS, Judge.

Action by the Portland Trust Company, of Oregon, E.S. Rash, and S.S Warner against Samuel Coulter and Howard H. Palmer to enjoin the prosecution of actions for the possession of real estate and for a decree that plaintiffs are the owners of the land in controversy. From a decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

For a statement of facts not contained in the opinion, see Coulter v. Portland Trust Co., 26 P. 565.

George H. Williams, for appellants.

W.W Thayer and E.B. Watson, for respondents.

BEAN, J.

On June 26, 1890, Samuel Coulter, defendant in this suit, brought certain actions at law against the plaintiffs to recover possession of about 11 1/2 acres of land in Multnomah county. These actions were tried before the court without a jury, and the findings of facts and conclusions of law were in favor of the defendants, from which Coulter appealed to this court. After an able and exhaustive argument, the judgment of the court below was reversed, and a new trial ordered, ( Coulter v. Portland Trust Co., 20 Or. 469, 26 P. 565, and 27 P. 266;) pending which this suit was brought to stay the proceedings at law, and for a decree that plaintiffs are the owners in fee of the land in controversy. This suit was referred to Judge CATLIN to report the law and the facts, which report, being in favor of the defendants, was confirmed by the trial court, and plaintiffs appeal.

The facts in this case, for the purpose of this appeal, are identical with those in Coulter v. Portland Trust Co., and fully appear in that case as reported, and therefore need not be detailed here. The important question on this appeal is the same as in the former case, and is the proper construction of the power of attorney from Howard H. Palmer to his wife, Rhoda A. Palmer, and whether this power of attorney authorized her to convey the land in controversy to W.G. Jenne, for the consideration and in the manner attempted. These questions were all fully argued by able counsel, orally and in elaborate briefs, in Coulter v Portland Trust Co., and this court held, Chief Justice STRAHAN delivering the opinion, that under the power of attorney and the facts in the case the deed to Jenne was unauthorized and did not convey the title, and this decision was recognized as the settled law of this case by the learned referee and court below. Counsel for appellants now earnestly insists in an able and learned argument that this court erred in so holding, and that the decision in Coulter v. Portland Trust Co. ought to be revised, and many cogent reasons are suggested in support of this contention. If this was an open question on this appeal, in view of counsel's argument, we might feel induced to carefully re-examine the question, but the law is well settled that a decision of this court upon a point distinctly made becomes in all subsequent proceedings between the same parties, concerning the same subject-matter, and upon the same facts, the law of the case by which we are bound, whatever our views might be upon an original consideration of the matter. Wells, Res Adj. c. 44. "A previous ruling by the appellate court upon a point distinctly made," says Mr. Chief Justice FIELD, "may be only authority in other cases, to be followed and affirmed, or to be modified or overruled, according to its intrinsic merits, but, in the case in which it is made, it is more than authority; it is a final adjudication, from the consequences of which the court cannot depart, nor the parties relieve themselves." Phelan v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 39. So in Stacy v. Railroad Co., 32 Vt. 552, the law is thus stated by PIERPOINT, J.: "The question then is, will this court revise a former decision made by the same court in the same cause, and on substantially the same state of facts? Such a decision presses itself upon the consideration of the court with a twofold force--First, as an authority, as though it was a decision made in any other case; second, as an adjudication between the same parties,--not as one that is conclusive, as a matter of law, for the court may revise and reverse it, but an adjudication that practically is to be regarded as having much the same effect. The rule has long been established in this state, often declared from the bench, and we believe uniformly adhered to, that in the same case this court will not revise or reverse their former decisions. It is urged, (and the same argument is made in the case at bar,) and there is force in the argument, that if there is error in the decision, and it is ever to be reversed, it should be done in the same court. Although this position may be sound in theory, as applicable to a single case, yet, as a rule to be acted upon in all cases, it would lead to incalculable mischief. If all questions that have ever been determined by this court are to be regarded as still open for discussion and revision in the same cause, there would be no end to their litigation, until the ability of the parties or the ingenuity of their counsel was exhausted. A rule that has been so long established and acted upon, and that is so important to the practical administration of justice in our courts, we think should not be departed from. And whatever views the different members of this court may entertain as to the soundness of the former decision, we all agree that the doctrine there enunciated is to be regarded as the law of this case." This question was presented to and considered by the supreme court of the United States in the case of Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413, and, although the question was the important one of jurisdiction, it was, notwithstanding, held that the former decision of the court in the same case was conclusive of the rights of the parties, and could not be reconsidered upon a second appeal; such an appeal bringing under review only the proceedings of the circuit court subsequent to the mandate. To the same effect are Davidson v. Dallas,

15 Cal 75; Kibler v. Bridges, 5 S.C. 335; Huffman v. State, 30 Ala. 532; Hawley v. Smith, 45 Ind. 183; Parker v. Pomeroy, 2 Wis. 84; Page v. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100; Thomson v. Albert, ...