Portugal v. Portugal
Decision Date | 01 May 2002 |
Citation | 798 A.2d 246 |
Parties | Lorie PORTUGAL, Appellee, v. Howard PORTUGAL, Appellant. Lorie Portugal, Appellant, v. Howard Portugal, Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Mark A. Momjian, Philadelphia, for Howard Portugal.
Terry W. Vanderpool, West Chester, for Lorie Portugal.
Before FORD ELLIOTT, JOYCE and BECK, JJ.
¶ 1 Wife, Lorie Portugal, appeals from the order entered on July 10, 2001, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, directing her Husband, Howard Portugal, to make monthly support payments on behalf of their two minor children. Husband also files a cross-appeal from the same order. Upon review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. The relevant facts and procedural history, as aptly stated by the trial court, are as follows.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/01 at 3-4. On July 10, 2001, the trial court entered an order that directed Husband to pay $1599.00 in child support per month from September 27, 2000 until December 31, 2000 and to pay $1625.00 per month thereafter. The trial court also ordered Husband to provide health insurance for the parties' children and to pay fifty-six percent (56%) of the children's unreimbursed medical expenses. Furthermore, since Wife admitted that she was cohabitating with another man while receiving spousal support payments from Husband, the trial court ordered Wife to reimburse Husband at the rate of $200.00 per month. This appeal and cross appeal followed.
¶ 2 In her timely appeal, Wife raises the following issues for our review:
Appellant's Brief, at 3 (full capitalization omitted).
¶ 3 In his timely cross-appeal, Husband raises the following issues:
Cross-Appellant's Brief, at 6.
¶ 4 In child support cases, our standard of review is as follows:
The amount of a support order is largely within the discretion of the trial court, whose judgment should not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but rather a misapplication of the law or an unreasonable exercise of judgment. A finding that the trial court abused its discretion must rest upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court will be upheld on any valid ground.
Kessler v. Helmick, 449 Pa.Super. 113, 672 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1996) (quoting Griffin v. Griffin, 384 Pa.Super. 188, 558 A.2d 75, 77 (1989) (en banc)). For our purposes, "an abuse of discretion requires proof of more than a mere error of judgment, but rather evidence that the law was misapplied or overridden, or that the judgment was manifestly unreasonable or based on bias, ill will, prejudice or partiality." Kersey v. Jefferson, 791 A.2d 419, 423 (Pa.Super.2002) (citations omitted).
¶ 5 In her first issue, Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it based her monthly income for support purposes on her earning capacity rather than on her actual monthly income. Appellant's Brief, at 18. After the parties' hearing, the trial court determined that an individual of Wife's qualifications could earn $55,000.00 per year as an associate veterinarian in an established clinic. Wife argues, however, that the trial court should not have charged her with this earning capacity because she never actually held such a position and because her husband supported her decision to open her own clinic. Id. Additionally, Appellant maintains that her future earnings as a self-employed veterinarian will eventually surpass those of her colleagues and will make up for her current limited income. Id.
Kersey, 791 A.2d at 423. Accord DeMasi v. DeMasi, 366 Pa.Super. 19, 530 A.2d 871, 877 (1987) )
¶ 7 In the instant case, the parties stipulated that Wife would earn $55,000.00 per year if she worked as an associate veterinarian at an established clinic. N.T. Support Hearing, 6/13/01 at 69. Nonetheless, Wife opted to establish her own clinic and currently earns $25,000.00 as its proprietor. Although we recognize that Wife did not voluntarily depart from an associate position that paid $55,000.00 and that Husband supported Wife's decision to open the clinic, the income Wife currently receives is simply not commensurate with her admitted earning potential.
¶ 8 Our court's decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Raitt v. Raitt, 203 Pa.Super. 226, 199 A.2d 512 (1964) is instructive. In Raitt, a father possessing a doctorate degree in pharmacology voluntarily assumed a position as a local pharmacist instead of seeking a higher paying position with a pharmaceutical research company. Id. at 513. Finding that the father's actual earnings did not equal his earning potential, the trial court based the father's support obligation on his earning capacity. Id. On appeal, a panel of our Court provided:
¶ 9 Like the father in Raitt, Wife voluntarily assumed a lower paying position in the face of more lucrative opportunities. Therefore, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion when it based Wife's income for support purposes on her earning capacity. To hold otherwise would permit Wife to subordinate the immediate financial needs of her children to her own aspirations. See Kersey, 791 A.2d at 424.
¶ 10 In her second and third issues, Wife maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider that Husband's earning capacity/income is enhanced by certain "corporate perquisites." Appellant's Brief, at 20-1. Specifically, Wife argues that the reimbursement Husband received from Microsoft for his relocation expenses, Husband's bonuses, Husband's contributions to his 401(k) and Microsoft's matching contribution to Husband's 401(k) should have been considered as income for support purposes. Id. We will discuss each of these perquisites in turn.1
¶ 11 In 2000, Appellant left his...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Cavanagh v. Cavanagh
...would effectively permit an employee to shield his income in an effort to reduce his child support obligation." Portugal v. Portugal, 798 A.2d 246, 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). Permitting such shielding of resources would violate the public policy of the Commonwealth. We therefore conclude th......
-
Isralsky v. Isralsky
...overridden, or that the judgment was manifestly unreasonable or based on bias, ill will, prejudice or partiality." Portugal v. Portugal, 798 A.2d 246, 249 (Pa.Super.2002) (citations omitted). Mindful of our standard of review in cases of child support, we will now review Husband's assertion......
-
Barr v. Bartolo
...ill will, prejudice or partiality." Kersey v. Jefferson, 791 A.2d 419, 423 (Pa.Super.2002) (citations omitted). Portugal v. Portugal, 798 A.2d 246, 249 (Pa.Super.2002). ¶ 5 Appellant raises the following two 1. Is Appellee's claim for child support and Petition for DNA Testing barred by the......
-
K.D. v. E.D.
...trial court will be upheld on any valid ground. Johnson v. Johnson , 222 A.3d 787, 789 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting Portugal v. Portugal , 798 A.2d 246, 249 (Pa. Super.2002) ). Moreover, past conditions, such as those present when Judge Hamill presided over the custody litigation, are relevant......