Posey v. Pruger
| Decision Date | 22 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10 C 3574 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | TYWON POSEY, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER ROCCO PRUGER and CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendants. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Tywon Posey ("Posey" or "Plaintiff") brought this action against the City of Chicago ("the City"), Chicago police officer Rocco Pruger ("Pruger"), and various other Chicago police officers and Cook County defendants concerning his arrest on June 13, 2009. Claims against officers other than Pruger, as well as all allegations against the Cook County defendants, were disposed of earlier in the litigation. Only claims against Officer Pruger and the City remain. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges in Count I that Pruger violated Posey's Fourth Amendment rights by falsely arresting and detaining him in June 2009. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts III and IV of the Complaint also assert claims of malicious prosecution and false arrest against Pruger under Illinois state law. Plaintiff seeks indemnification in Count V against the City pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102.
The parties originally consented to proceed before Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) and N.D. Ill. R. 73.1(c). The case was then reassigned to this Court on October 1, 2012 upon Judge Denlow's retirement. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on Counts I, III, IV, and V. Plaintiff has filed amotion for partial summary judgment on Count I. Plaintiff's motion is denied. Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Posey and Laura Williams were driving east down Fulton Street in Chicago at 1:20 a.m. on June 13, 2009. Ms. Williams, who owned the car that Posey was driving, was seated in the passenger's seat. Posey was traveling towards the intersection of Fulton Street and Kilpatrick Street. Fulton is a one-way street that runs west to east. Kilpatrick is a one-way street that runs south to north. Unfortunately, what happened as Posey arrived at the intersection of these streets is exceptionally unclear under the current record. It is undisputed that two Chicago police cars were traveling toward the intersection of Fulton and Kilpatrick by moving in the wrong direction along Kilpatrick. Officer Posey was in one of the vehicles with his partner Anthony Keany. Two other officers were in the second car. Posey claims the police cars were traveling at a high speed. Neither of them had their headlights or sirens on.1 Posey was only able to recognize that they were police squad cars because the street lights were sufficient to reveal the police insignia ordinarily placed on such vehicles. Plaintiff alleges that he stopped at the stop sign before he first saw the police vehicles coming the wrong way down Kilpatrick. He then began to move forward but stopped again as "soon as I come out the stop sign" and after he had "crossed . . . the second line" painted on the intersection's cross-walk. (Defs. SOF, Ex. 2 at 25-26, 28, 29). Posey testified that he then proceeded through the intersection once the policecars slowed down as they approached the intersection he was trying to cross.
Several competing versions of these events are also present in the record. Ms. Williams stated at a 2010 state court proceeding that Posey stopped only once at the stop sign and then proceeded through the intersection. (Pls. Resp. to Defs. SOF, Ex. C at 11). Officer Pruger told the same state court that Posey never stopped at the Fulton/Kilpatrick stop sign at all; instead, he allegedly went through it at a speed of 20 to 30 miles per hour. (Id. at 32-33). Pruger's arrest report makes the same claims. (Defs. SOF, Ex. 7). Officer Keany agreed in an affidavit given five years later that Posey never stopped at the intersection. (Dckt. 234, Ex. 1).
To complicate matters further, Pruger has now submitted a new account of what happened. Contrary to his earlier testimony and Keany's recent affidavit, Pruger states in his Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts that Posey did, in fact, stop at the sign "and then drove through the intersection on Fulton." (Defs. SOF No. 6). Defendants claim that Posey did not see the squad cars until after he proceeded "through the intersection." (Id. No. 7). That, of course, would mean that Posey saw the police only after he was already driving on Fulton on the other side of the intersection he allegedly had just passed through. As a final twist, Defendants also claim that Posey did not simply drive through the intersection after stopping at the sign. Instead, he stopped at the sign, halted in the middle of the intersection when he saw the police (presumably before he went "through" the intersection), and then proceeded east on Fulton when he noticed that the cars had slowed down. (Id. No. 8)
As he approached the middle of the next block on Fulton, Posey claims that he approached a speed bump. He looked in his rear-view mirror at that point and noticed thetwo police cars "just sitting" behind him on the corner of Fulton and Kilpatrick. (Id., Ex.2 at 33-34). When his car had gone over the speed bump, however, Posey stated that he saw the two cars coming towards him from the rear with their sirens on. He then pulled over to the side along a ramp that abutted a warehouse. (Id. at 34-35). Officer Pruger and the other Chicago police officers approached Posey's car. Posey testified that an officer asked while Posey was still in the vehicle if he had a driver's license. (Id. at 35). He did not. Pruger then removed him from the car and placed him in handcuffs. (Id. at 37-38). Officer Pruger stated the same. (Pls. Resp. to Defs. SOF, Ex. C at 34-35). In contradiction Ms. Williams claimed that Pruger took Posey out of the car before questioning him about the license and insurance. (Id. at 26-28). After Posey had been arrested Pruger searched the car he had been driving. Twelve zip-lock baggies containing crack cocaine were discovered on the driver's side of the car. Pruger was transported to a police station. A custodial search disclosed additional bags of cocaine. Posey was subsequently charged with two felony counts of possession of narcotics with intent to deliver. (Defs. SOF, Ex. 12).
Plaintiff later moved to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence. Cook County Circuit Judge Rickey Jones held a hearing on the matter on February 10, 2010. Pruger, who was represented by a law student, did not testify. Officer Pruger and Ms. Williams did. Pruger stated that he removed Posey from the car after Plaintiff said that he did not have a driver's license or insurance. Pruger testified that he returned from his squad car to Posey's vehicle, where he saw the bags of cocaine lying on the floorboard in plain view. Ms. Williams, who had been detained outside the car by another officer, testified that thedrugs were produced only after a 40 minute search. (Id. at 15). Pruger also wrote in his police report that he had carried out a thorough search of the vehicle. (Defs. SOF, Ex. 4 at 39). Notwithstanding his own prior statement, Pruger told Judge Jones that he had not carried out a comprehensive search before locating the drugs. He also told the state court that the search was done to ensure the officers' safety after Pruger saw Posey make furtive gestures with his hands.
The state court judge was unimpressed by Pruger's testimony. Judge Jones found that Posey's alleged furtive gestures were insufficient to permit the officers to search his car. He also noted that Pruger's written report concerning the vehicle's search contradicted his court testimony that he saw the bags of drugs in plain view. Finding the State's evidence to be non-credible, Judge Jones concluded that no probable cause existed for stopping or arresting Posey. The arrest was quashed; the evidence was suppressed. (Id., Ex. 4 at 66-67). The State later dismissed charges against Plaintiff nolle prosequi on February 24, 2010. Plaintiff brought the instant civil rights suit against Pruger, the City, and various other defendants who are no longer part of the case.
Summary judgment is warranted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Such a fact issue exists only where a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 324. The evidence, together with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, must be viewed in the light most favorableto the nonmoving party. Miller v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000).
The nonmoving party cannot overcome a summary judgment motion by relying on unsubstantiated facts or by resting on its pleadings. See Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007). Instead, the party that bears the burden of proof on an issue must demonstrate by means of admissible evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists on a particular issue that requires a trial. Id. A court neither weighs conflicting evidence nor resolves factual disputes in deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate. Miranda v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 1996).
Posey argues that Defendants are collaterally estopped from disputing his Fourth Amendment claims in this case because the state court granted his motion to quash the arrest. Findings in state criminal proceedings can have an estoppel effect in § 1983 civil rights cases because federal courts give full faith and credit to state judicial findings. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); El Ranchito, Inc. v. City of Harvey, 207 F. Supp.2d 814, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2002). State law applies when federal courts consider...
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