Post v. Anderson, 37.
| Decision Date | 27 September 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 37.,37. |
| Citation | 168 A. 622 |
| Parties | POST v. ANDERSON, Mayor, etc., et al. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. An appeal will not lie to review the decision of the Supreme Court refusing to allow a writ of certiorari, such an allowance not being a matter of right, but resting in the discretion of the court.
2. The amendment of section 4 of the Walsh Act (P. L. 1915, c. 275, p. 494 [Comp. St. Supp. § **136—8]) takes from the board of commissioners jurisdiction to try charges against a police officer and vests such jurisdiction in the director of public safety.
3. The admission of illegal evidence in a case tried by a special tribunal, such as a director of public safety, will not invalidate the finding and conviction, so long as it appears that there was competent evidence before the tribunal to support such finding and conviction.
Appeal from Supreme Court.
Certiorari proceedings by John Post against James S. Anderson, Mayor and Director of Public Safety of the Village of Ridgewood, and the Board of Commissioners of the Village of Ridgewood, to review a conviction of John Post of conduct unbecoming an officer in violation of a rule of the Police Manual. From a judgment (163 A. 666, 11 N. J. Misc. 1), denying writ of certiorari, John Post appeals.
Appeal dismissed.
Jerome J. Dunn, of Ridgewood, for appellant.
Thomas L. Zimmerman, Jr., of New York City, for respondents.
The appellant, John Post (hereinafter called defendant), was a member of the police department of the village of Ridgewood and was dismissed therefrom by James S. Anderson, the mayor and director of public safety of the village, after due notice, hearing, and conviction upon a charge of conduct unbecoming an officer, in violation of the Police Manual, in that he did have intercourse with a named girl causing her to become pregnant.
The defendant applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review such conviction and that court denied the application. From that decision the defendant appeals. But an appeal will not lie to review the decision of the Supreme Court refusing to allow a writ of certiorari, such allowance not being a matter of right, but resting in the discretion of the court. State v. Wood, 23 N. J. Law, 560; Daniel B. Frazier Co. v. Long Beach Tp., 110 N. J. Law, 221, 164 A. 278. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.
Since the right of appeal was not raised or discussed by either counsel, it may not be amiss for us now to point out that the action of the Supreme Court was quite justified.
The Supreme Court rightly considered that the director of public safety was empowered by statute to try the charge. The amendment of section 4 of the Walsh Act, P. L. 1911, p. 465 (P. L. 1915, p. 494 [Comp. St. Supp. § **136—8]), takes from the board of commissioners jurisdiction to try charges against a police officer and vests such jurisdiction in the director of public safety. Foley v. City of Orange, 91 N. J. Law, 554, 103 A. 743.
At the trial there was admitted in evidence the dying declaration of the girl in question to the effect that the defendant "got her in a family way." The Supreme Court held that such evidence was inadmissible. We find it unnecessary in this proceeding to determine that question, because, as we find as the Supreme Court found, that there was other evidence amply sufficient to justify the conviction. The Supreme Court further rightly held that the admission of illegal evidence in cases tried by a special tribunal, such as a director of public safety, as here, will not invalidate the finding and conviction, so long as it appears that there was competent evidence before the tribunal to support such finding and conviction. Crane v. Jersey City, 90 N. J. Law, 109, 103 A. 678. That here there was such competent evidence does not admit of doubt.
The sister of the girl testified, without objection, that on ...
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