Postal Tel. Cable Co v. Farmville & P. R. Co

• Decision Date: 26 January 1899
• Citation: 96 Va. 661,32 S.E. 468
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: POSTAL TEL. CABLE CO. v. FARMVILLE & P. R. CO.

32 S.E. 468

(96 Va. 661)

POSTAL TEL. CABLE CO.

v.FARMVILLE & P. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 26, 1899.

Stake Decisis—Statutes—Construction—Telegraph Companies — Right of Way — Railroads—Appeal—Review.

1. Where a decision of the highest court which has been followed in no other case, was rendered by a bare majority, and, in the opinion of the court in a subsequent case, the decision construes a statute erroneously and contrary to public policy, the decision is not binding.

2. Code, § 1287, authorizes a telegraph company to construct its line along county roads, railroads, and streets. Sections 1288 and 1289 authorize such a company to obtain its right of way by contract or condemnation. Section 1290 groups the three preceding sections, and authorizes their repeal or modification. Held, that such statutes are in pari materia, and are to be construed together.

3. Where a word is used in different places in a statute, and its meaning in one instance is clear, it must be given the same meaning elsewhere, unless it clearly appears that a different meaning was intended.

4. Every part of a statute is presumed to be necessary, and no part can be rejected, unless, on a consideration of all the language, it is impossible to give it a rational effect.

5. Code, §§ 1287-1289, authorize a telegraph company to construct its line "along" state or county roads, "along and parallel to" any railroads, and "along or over" city streets, and to contract with any person or corporation, the owner of lands, over which the line is proposed to be constructed, for a right of way, and provide that, if the company and such owner cannot agree, the former shall be entitled to the right of way making just compensation to such owner. Held, that a telegraph company may construct its line on a railroad right of way.

6. Where an application by a telegraph company for appointment of commissioners to as-certain the compensation to be paid to landowners for construction of its line is denied, on the ground that the company has no right to construct its line, and on appeal the judgment is reversed, the measure of damages will not be considered.

Appeal from Chesterfield county court.

Proceedings by the Postal Telegraph Cable Company for ascertainment of damages for constructing its line over the right of way of the Parmville & Powhatan Railroad Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

J. R. Mcintosh, for plaintiff in error.

S. D. Davies and T. M. Miller, for defendant in error.

KEITH, P. The Postal Telegraph Cable Company served notice upon the Farmville & Powhatan Railroad Company that it would apply to the county court of Chesterfield, at its November term, 1898, for the appointment of commissioners to ascertain and report what would be a just compensation to the railroad company for the right to construct, maintain, and operate a telegraph line of the Postal Telegraph Cable Company along its right of way. The railroad company appeared, and upon its motion the notice was quashed. Thereupon the Postal Telegraph Cable Company applied for a writ of error to the judge of the circuit court, who refused it, and the case is now before us upon a writ of error.

The judgment complained of is in accordance with the decision of this court in the case of Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 88 Va. 920, 14 S. E. 803. Plaintiff in error urges us to inquire into the correctness of that decision; while upon the part of the defendant it is earnestly contended that the reported case was correctly decided, and, if it were not, we are bound to adhere to and respect it as an authority binding upon us. We recognize the value of the principle invoked. The rule of stare decisis is entitled to the greatest respect, and, under our system of jurisprudence, is an essential feature of the administration of justice. Where a decision, and especially a line of decisions, has been acquiesced in, where it has been followed in other cases, and has become a rule of property, and men have, in the conduct of affairs, learned to respect and conform to it, it becomes of especial, and indeed of binding, force, and should not be disturbed except by the interposition of legislative power. But we do not consider that the circumstances adverted to as lending force to a judicial interpretation of a statute, and which may be of so strenuous a nature as to preclude further inquiry into the correctness of the adjudication, apply to the case before us. We have here a single judgment followed in no other case, rendered by a bare majority of the court, two of the judges dissenting, and placing a construction upon the statute law involved in it which we think palpably erro neous and contrary to public policy, as tending to foster and promote a monopoly.

The sections of the Code to be considered are 1287, 1288, and 1289. These sections are taken from the act of assembly found in Acts 1879-80, p. 53, and cover substantially the same ground. The revisers, for the sake of perspicuity and convenience, divided the subject treated of in that statute, and it now appears in the Code in the three sections referred to. These sections are in pari materia, and each and all can and should be looked to in order to reach the right interpretation of them. They are as follows:

"Sec. 1287. Every telegraph and every telephone company incorporated by this or any other state, or by the United States may construct, maintain, and operate its line along any of the state or county roads or works and over the waters of the state, and along and parallel to any of the railroads of the state, provided the ordinary use of such roads, work, railroads and waters be not...