Poston v. Gaddis
| Decision Date | 28 April 1976 |
| Citation | 335 So.2d 165 |
| Parties | James E. POSTON and Anna Poston v. Hubert D. GADDIS and Martha A. T. Gaddis. Civ. 688. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Joe S. Pittman, Enterprise, for appellants.
Cassady & Fuller, Enterprise, for appellees.
Judgment for damages in the sum of $8,888.74 for breach of contract against defendant James E. Poston was rendered by the court sitting without a jury. Judgment denying counterclaim for abuse of process was rendered against defendant Anna Poston. Defendants each appeal. We reverse.
Plaintiffs and defendant James E. Poston entered into a contract for the construction and sale of a house in consideration of payment by plaintiffs of $38,500.00. During construction certain changes were made departing from the original plans and specifications. Such changes resulted in an overrun from the contract price. The authorization for many of the changes was disputed in the evidence. Defendant presented plaintiffs a statement for the increased price due to the alleged overrun. Plaintiffs disputed the overrun and authorization of the changes in construction. Defendant refused to convey to plaintiffs unless paid some $43,000.00, and placed the house on the market for sale.
Plaintiffs brought suit against Poston and his wife for specific performance and damages for breach of contract, requesting trial by jury. Lis pendens was filed. Defendants each filed counterclaims for damages. Defendant Anna Poston counterclaimed for attorney fees and costs for defending plaintiffs' suit when she was not a party to the contract between plaintiffs and James Poston.
Subsequent to plaintiffs filing suit, defendants sold and conveyed the property to James and Charlotte Oliver. Plaintiffs amended suit and added the Olivers as defendants for specific performance. In said amendment plaintiffs withdrew their jury demand. Defendants then filed jury demands. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss defendants' jury demands.
The learned trial judge granted the motion to dismiss defendants' jury demands. The judgment discussed at some length the application of Rule 38 ARCP to the issues presented in the case. The court stated that the main thrust of action was specific performance, though elements of damage were claimed by various parties. Therefore, it was concluded that as no right to a jury trial was known at common law on a bill for specific performance, no rights existed under Rule 38, ARCP.
The matter proceeded to trial on complaint and counterclaims. Judgment was entered denying specific performance to plaintiffs, denying relief on defendants' counterclaims but granting damages to plaintiffs for breach of contract.
Plaintiffs do not appeal from denial of specific performance. Defendants Poston appeal.
The first and primary issue presented by defendants' appeal is that the court erred in denying the right to a jury trial on the cause of action of breach of contract and on the counterclaims.
Rule 38(a) ARCP provides:
'The right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution of Alabama or as given by a statute of this State shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.'
The Committee Comment to Rule 38 states that the rule is intended to preserve the same right to jury trial as was known under prior practice. Prior practice gave the right to a jury trial in all cases permitted at common law and by statute at the time of the adoption of the state constitution. W & H Machine & Tool Co. v. National Distill. & C. Corp., 291 Ala. 517, 283 So.2d 173.
With the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the common law forms of actions at law and in equity were abolished. Actions and defenses of a legal and equitable nature may now be joined and intermingled in the one form of 'Civil Action.' Rule 2, ARCP. Thus the right to trial by jury is not now determined by the common law form of action but by the issues presented by the pleadings in the 'Civil Action.' This is made clear by the phrasing of the following partial quote from Subsection (b) of Rule 38: 'Any party may demand a trial by jury of any Issue triable of right by a jury . . ..' (Emphasis ours.)
The trial court was correct in its observation that there was no common law right to a trial by jury in the solely equitable action for specific performance. However, the action before it included legal claims for damages for breach of contract and abuse of process. These issues of fact, though joined with a claim for specific performance, are purely legal matters over which common law equity had no jurisdiction.
Under our new rules of practice and procedure it will not be unusual for the court to be trying equitable issues and legal issues in the same action. The court in most instances decides the first without the assistance of a jury. A jury, if requested, must try the latter.
Under the prior system equity assumed jurisdiction when there was no adequate remedy at law. It was often said that equity having assumed jurisdiction properly, it would proceed to do complete justice between the parties though there might be an invasion into areas of law. Alabama, Tenn. & Northern Ry. Co. v. Aliceville Lumber Co., 199 Ala. 391, 74 So. 441. This principal was espoused to prevent multiplicity of actions. It was upon this principle that a court of equity would in some instances augment recognized equitable relief by granting damages incidental to such relief. Swofford v. B & W, Incorporated, 336 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1964). Such damages were granted by the court without a jury, even though the granting of damages was recognized as peculiarly within the province of a jury trial at law. Stow v. Bozeman's Executors, 29 Ala. 397; Whaley v. Wilson, 112 Ala. 627, 20 So. 922.
However, we know of no case of the granting of damages by a court of equity except as determined to be incidental and augmental to the equitable relief primarily sought and upon which the equitable jurisdiction was founded.
In the instant case, though requesting specific performance in a first claim, plaintiffs proceeded in other claims to seek a determination of breach of contract and damages therefor. Such damages were not incidental to the granting of specific performance but...
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...provisions, the principal opinion goes seriously awry. "The Seventh Amendment is not materially different from Section 11." Poston v. Gaddis, 335 So.2d 165, 167 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied, 335 So.2d 169 (Ala.1976). Both constitutional provisions preserve the right to trial by jury "as it ......
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