Poteet v. Rodgers (In re I.I.P.)

• Decision Date: 31 January 2018
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 63A01–1706–JP–1265
• Parties: In re: The PATERNITY OF I.I.P.: Kailei L. Poteet, Appellant–Petitioner, v. Justin RODGERS and Nathan T. Poteet, Appellees–Respondents.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

92 N.E.3d 1158

In re: The PATERNITY OF I.I.P.: Kailei L. Poteet, Appellant–Petitioner,

v.Justin RODGERS and Nathan T. Poteet, Appellees–Respondents.

Court of Appeals Case No. 63A01–1706–JP–1265

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED January 31, 2018

Attorneys for Appellant : Kristin T. Morrison, Joann Jacob Krantz, Fine & Hatfield, P.C., Evansville, Indiana

Attorney for Appellee : Jason M. Spindler, Princeton, Indiana

Riley, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant–Petitioner, Kailei L. Poteet (Mother), appeals the trial court's dismissal of her petition to establish paternity of her minor child.

[2] We reverse and remand.

ISSUE

[3] Mother raises three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Mother's petition to establish paternity.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On November 21, 2012, Mother gave birth to I.I.P. (the Child). Near the time of the Child's conception, Mother was in a relationship with Appellee–Intervening Respondent, Nathan T. Poteet (Legal Father). Around that same time, Mother also had an intimate relationship with Appellee–Respondent, Justin A. Rodgers (Biological Father), and ended her relationship with Legal Father. When the Child was approximately four months old, Mother and Legal Father resumed their relationship and eventually began cohabiting. On September 13, 2014, they married. Legal Father established a bond with the Child and provided care for her. On January 13, 2015, Legal Father executed a paternity affidavit to establish his paternity of the two-year-old Child. Mother also signed the paternity affidavit identifying Legal Father as the Child's father. During the parties' marriage, Mother gave birth to another child. Shortly after their first anniversary, on November 30, 2015, Legal Father filed a petition in the Pike County Circuit Court to dissolve his marriage to Mother.

[5] On March 15, 2016, the trial court issued a provisional order regarding certain aspects of the parties' dissolution. In particular, the trial court found "that the paternity affidavit signed by both parties on January 13, 2015 [,] regarding [the Child] is valid and was not signed by [Mother] under fraud, duress, or mistake of fact and therefore [Legal Father] is the father of [the Child] with all attendant rights and responsibilities." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 17). Accordingly, the trial court granted Legal Father the right to exercise parenting time with the Child during the pendency of the divorce.

[6] On September 9, 2016, Mother—who had rekindled her relationship with Biological Father—filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity,¹ identifying Biological Father as the Child's biological father. Mother also filed a motion for genetic testing and moved to join Legal Father as a party to the paternity action. On October 14, 2016, Legal Father filed a motion to intervene in the paternity proceedings, identifying himself as the Child's father based on a validly executed paternity affidavit. Legal Father simultaneously moved to dismiss the paternity action, contending that there was no basis to rescind the paternity affidavit, that res judicata barred re-litigating the issue of paternity, and that the time for contesting paternity had passed. On October 19, 2016, Mother submitted the results of a DNA analysis, which established, with a 99.99% probability, that Biological Father is the Child's biological parent. That day, the trial court joined Legal Father as an intervening respondent in the paternity action.

[7] On February 14, 2017, Legal Father filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition to Establish Paternity, alleging that the petition to establish paternity fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations; is barred by laches, estoppel, and res judicata ; and is contrary to the Child's best interests. Legal Father further contended that Mother frivolously filed the paternity action as an apparent "means to obtain leverage in the dissolution action." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 57). Accordingly, Legal Father requested an award of attorney fees for having to defend his paternity. On February 16, 2017, Biological Father filed a motion to establish his paternity and simultaneously disestablish Legal Father's paternity.

[8] On March 14, 2017, the trial court conducted a paternity hearing. On May 9, 2017, the trial court issued Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in which it granted Legal Father's motion to dismiss Mother's petition to establish paternity. The trial court determined that Legal Father had executed a paternity affidavit, and no party timely challenged his paternity or otherwise alleged fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact in the execution of the affidavit. The trial court further concluded that, by signing the paternity affidavit, Mother was estopped from attempting to establish paternity in another man. In addition, the trial court noted that Biological Father never filed a petition to establish paternity to be declared the Child's father and that the time for doing so has expired. Finally, the trial court determined that nobody filed "a petition as next friend on behalf of the [C]hild to establish paternity in [Biological Father]." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 14).

[9] Mother and Biological Father now appeal.² Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[10] In this case, Legal Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother's petition to establish paternity, which the trial court granted. However, because the trial court held an evidentiary hearing prior to ruling, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 56. See Drake v. McKinney , 717 N.E.2d 1229, 1230–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Upon review of a grant of summary judgment, we employ the same standard utilized by the trial court. In re Paternity of R.M. , 939 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We must carefully consider a summary judgment ruling "to ensure that a party was not improperly denied its day in court." Id. Review is limited to the evidentiary materials designated to the trial court. Id. Based on the designated facts, "we must determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. We construe all factual inference in favor of the non-moving party "and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party." Id. The moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, at which point, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Upon Mother's request, the trial court issued special findings of fact and conclusions thereon. While neither required nor binding on appeal, special findings and conclusions "offer this court valuable insight into the trial court's rationale for its review and facilitate appellate review." First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley , 891 N.E.2d 604, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied .

II. Establishing and Disestablishing Paternity

[11] The Indiana General Assembly has specifically stated that it "favors the public policy of establishing paternity under [Indiana Code article 31–14] of a child born out of wedlock." Ind. Code § 31–14–1–1. The ultimate goal of allowing paternity suits "is to promote the welfare of the child." Drake , 717 N.E.2d at 1231. In this case, Mother claims that the trial court erroneously dismissed her petition to establish Biological Father's paternity of the Child. Under our summary judgment standard of review, we must determine whether Legal Father, as the moving party, established that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Mother was precluded from challenging his paternity as a matter of law.

[12] The resolution of this matter hinges on an interpretation of Indiana's paternity statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the courts. In re Paternity of E.M.L.G. , 863 N.E.2d 867, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, we independently review a statute's meaning and apply it to the facts of the case. Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc. v. Stanley , 744 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. 2001). Where a statute is unambiguous, we "must give the statute its clear and plain meaning." Id.

Conversely, for an ambiguous statute—i.e. , a statute that is susceptible to more than one interpretation—"we must ascertain the legislature's intent and interpret the statute so as to effectuate that intent." Id.

[13] A man's paternity may only be established by either filing a paternity action under Indiana Code article 31–14 or by executing a paternity affidavit. I.C. § 31–14–2–1. A paternity affidavit executed in accordance with Indiana Code section 16–37–2–2.1"conclusively establishes the man as the legal father of a child without any further proceedings by a court." I.C. § 31–14–2–2.1(p). "A man is a child's legal father if the man executed a paternity affidavit ... and the paternity affidavit has not been rescinded or set aside under [ Indiana Code section] 16–37–2–2.1." I.C. § 31–14–7–3. There are two statutory mechanisms for rescission of a paternity affidavit. First, the man who signs the paternity affidavit has sixty days after executing the paternity affidavit to request a genetic test through the court, and if he is excluded as the biological father, the trial court may set the paternity affidavit aside. I.C. § 16–37–2–2.1(k), (n). Second, if more than sixty days have passed since the execution of the paternity affidavit, it may only be rescinded if a court:

(1) has determined that fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact existed in the execution of the paternity affidavit; and

(2) at the request of [the man who signed the paternity

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