Potter v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees

• Decision Date: 28 February 1882
• Citation: Potter v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 10 Ill.App. 343, 10 Bradw. 343 (Ill. App. 1882)
• Parties: JOHN M. POTTER ET AL.v.BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES, etc.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

10 Ill.App. 343

10 Bradw. 343

JOHN M. POTTER ET AL.

v.BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES, etc.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

February Term, 1882.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ERROR to the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. AMOS WATTS, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed April 14, 1882.

Mr. HENRY C. GOODNOW, for plaintiffs in error; that the petition must conform to the statute, cited School Trustees v. The People, 71 Ill. 559; Trustees of Schools v. The People, 76 Ill. 623.

The powers of school trustees are limited to those expressly granted: Stevenson v. School Directors, 87 Ill. 255; Clark v. School Directors, 78 Ill. 474; School Directors v. Fogleman, 76 Ill. 189.

Certiorari will lie in this case: Miller v. Trustees, 88 Ill. 27; Com'rs v. Harper, 38 Ill. 103; Donahue v. County of Will, 100 Ill. ____.

Mr. J. B. KAGAY, and Mr. H. C. FELTMAN, for defendants in error; that the petition is a substantial compliance with the statute, cited Thompson v. Beaver, 63 Ill. 353; School Directors v. Trustees, 66 Ill. 247.

The statute requiring the filing of a map is directory merely: Munson v. Miller, 22 Ill. 594; School Directors v. School Directors, 73 Ill. 249.

The statute gives an appeal in such cases to the county superintendent: Laws 1877, 200.

Laying off territory into school districts is not a judicial, but ministerial act: C. D. & V. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268.

Certiorari will not lie where there is a right of appeal: The People v. Wilkerson, 13 Ill. 660; Doolittle v. G. & C. R. R. Co., 14 Ill., 381; C. & R. I. R. R. Co. v. Whipple, 22 Ill. 105.

WALL, J.

The plaintiff in error filed in the Circuit Court of Marion county their petition for a common law writ of certiorari for the purpose of testing the validity of the proceedings of Trustees of Schools, T. 4, R. 3, etc., detaching certain territory from school districts No. 2 Union and No. 5, and adding the same to No. 1 Union. The circuit court held the petition insufficient and the propriety of this ruling is the only question for present consideration. It is alleged that this action of the trustees was invalid because no sufficient petition was presented to them for that purpose, and because there was not filed in the office of the county clerk, within ten days, a map showing the new arrangement, together with a list of tax. payers resident in the newly arranged districts. It is well settled, and no authorities need be cited in support of the proposition, that school officers derive all their authority from the statute, and must exercise no power not granted, and that they must be governed by the provisions of the statute.

At the time the order in question was made, the statutory provision in force on the subject was Sec. 33 of the school law, as amended by the act of 1877. The section permits the trustees to change districts in six enumerated cases, the third of which reads as follows: “Upon petition of two-thirds of all the voters in any territory, containing not less than five families, representing that they are not properly accommodated with school privileges, but will be by being added to another district, or formed into a new district, and upon a petition of a majority of the voters of such district, if any, it shall be the duty of the trustees of the township or townships in which said territory and district are situated, to set off such territory, provided that such change shall not be made when the district from which the petitioners desire to be severed, has a bonded debt.”

The petition presented to the trustees in this instance, was signed by five persons representing that they were residents within said territory, and that they had families and children to send to school, but it does not aver that they constitute two-thirds of the legal voters of the territory, nor that the districts from which they wish to be severed, have no bonded debt. Nor does it show in the language of the statute that they are not properly accommodated with school privileges, but will be by the proposed change, saying merely that they “are without convenience to public schools.” This is hardly equivalent to the expression used in the statute, but were the petition otherwise good, possibly the subsequent proceedings should not be held invalid for this cause alone. We think, however, that the other two objections are important and that the petition is radically defective. As was said by the Supreme Court in School Trustees v. The People, 71 Ill. 561, “every petition of this nature seeking to effect a division of a long-established school district, should make a case within the express provision of the statute, before the trustees can be required to act;” and in ...