Potter v. Cabello
| Decision Date | 19 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-1330-G |
| Parties | CHASE POTTER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF CHRISTOPHER POTTER, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL CABELLO AND FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court is the motion of the plaintiff, Chase Potter ("Chase" or "the plaintiff"), to remand this case to the state court from which it was removed. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (docket entry 11). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's motion is granted.
This action arises from the death of the plaintiff's father, Christopher Potter ("Christopher" or "the decedent"), during the course of Christopher's employment with the defendant FedEx Freight, Inc. ("FedEx"). Christopher was hit and fatally injured by a trailer that was driven by the defendant Michael Cabello ("Cabello"), while in the course and scope of Christopher's and Cabello's employment at FedEx. Notice of Removal ("Notice") (docket entry 1), Exhibit A ("Petition") at 1. The incident occurred on or around the evening of November 16, 2018 while Christopher and Cabello were working at the FedEx premises located at 3100 South Belt Line Rd., Irving, Texas. Id. Cabello reversed a yard mule1 and connected trailer up to a loading dock in the FedEx loading facility while Christopher was standing behind the yard mule and trailer. Id. at 2-3. Christopher was crushed between the loading dock and the trailer and sustained fatal injuries as a result; he was taken to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. Id. at 3.
The plaintiff initially filed suit against FedEx in a Texas state court on February 25, 2019, asserting a claim of gross negligence for FedEx's role in the death of his father. Notice at 1-2. Cabello was not a party to this case. FedEx removed that case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas on April 1, 2019. Id. at 2. On April 3, 2019, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Id.
The plaintiff then filed his original petition in the present case on May 8, 2019, in the 101st Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. Id. In his petition, the plaintiff asserts several claims in his individual capacity and on behalf of the estate of Christopher Potter, including a claim for gross negligence against FedEx,and a claim for negligence and gross negligence against Cabello. Petition at 3-6. FedEx removed the case to this court on June 3, 2019. See Notice. Cabello did not join in the removal, and FedEx contends that Cabello was not required to do so because he was improperly joined. Id. at 2. FedEx asserts that the plaintiff only joined Cabello as a defendant to destroy complete diversity between the parties, and that the court should therefore disregard Cabello's citizenship and exercise diversity jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. at 2-4. The plaintiff and Cabello are residents of Texas.2 Id. at 3. FedEx is a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Arkansas with its principal place of business in Arkansas. Id.
The plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand on July 9, 2019, asserting that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff and Cabello are both citizens of Texas. See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion to Remand ("Motion") (docket entry 12). On July 22, 2019, FedEx filed a response, reiterating its argument that Cabello's citizenship should be disregarded because he was improperly joined. Defendant FedEx Freight's Brief in Support of its Responseto Plaintiff's Motion to Remand ("Response") (docket entry 14). The plaintiff filed a reply on August 5, 2019. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of His Reply to Defendants Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (docket entry 15-1). The plaintiff's motion is therefore fully briefed and ripe for decision.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) permits the removal of "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The statute allows a defendant to "remove a state court action to federal court only if the action could have originally been filed in federal court." Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the removal statute must be strictly construed because "removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns." Gutierrez v. Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "any doubt as to the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand." Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Willy v. Coastal Corporation, 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988).
There are two principal bases upon which a district court may exercise removal jurisdiction: the existence of a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and completediversity of citizenship among the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Here, federal question jurisdiction is not at issue. Rather, FedEx asserts that the court may properly exercise diversity jurisdiction over this case. See Notice at 2-3. A federal court can properly exercise jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship only if three requirements are met: (1) the parties are of completely diverse citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); (2) none of the properly joined defendants is a citizen of the state in which the case was brought, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); and (3) the case involves an amount in controversy of more than $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this case, there does not appear to be complete diversity between the parties because the plaintiff and Cabello appear to be citizens of Texas. See Notice at 3. FedEx, however, contends that removal is proper because the plaintiff improperly joined Cabello. Id. Thus, before determining whether the exercise of removal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship would be proper in this case, the court must first determine whether Cabello was properly joined as a party. See Myers v. Allstate Texas Lloyd's, No. 1:10-CV-172, 2011 WL 846083, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2011) (citation omitted)("Citizenship of an improperly joined party is totally disregarded in determining the court's subject matter jurisdiction.").
Even if a defendant has the same citizenship as the plaintiff, a federal court can still exercise removal jurisdiction over an action if the court finds that theplaintiff improperly joined the nondiverse defendant. See McDonal v. Abbot Laboratories, 408 F.3d 177, 183 (5th Cir. 2005). "The party seeking removal bears [the] heavy burden of proving that the joinder of the in-state party was improper." Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 385 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 992 (2005). This burden requires the trial court to "resolve any contested issues of material fact, and any ambiguity or uncertainty in the controlling state law, in the [plaintiff's] favor." Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1999).
To establish improper joinder, a defendant must demonstrate either "(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court." Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573 (quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir. 2003)). This latter method, the only one at issue in the present case, requires the defendants to establish that "there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant." Id. "Most often, the improper joinder determination must focus on whether the [p]laintiff['s] alleged facts raise an inference that a recovery is possible[.]" McGinnis v. Interoceanica Agency, Inc., No. CA G-11-214, 2011 WL 13340805, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2011). In this case, however, there exists a legitimate dispute between the parties as to whether the plaintiff's claim against Cabello is recognized by Texas law. Accordingly, the courtmust make a threshold inquiry as to "whether the [p]laintiff['s] alleged cause of action. . . is even cognizable under Texas law." See id.
FedEx argues that the plaintiff's claim against Cabello is deficient as a matter of law under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act ("TWCA", or "the Act"), which, in FedEx's view, prevents the survivor of a deceased employee from bringing a claim against the decedent's co-employee whose gross negligence caused the decedent's death. See Response at 7-8. The plaintiff maintains that his claim is not barred by the TWCA, and cites several cases from the Texas court of appeals in support of his argument. See Motion at 4. Thus, the issue before the court is whether Chase's claim against Cabello, the decedent's co-employee, is barred by the TWCA.
In applying Texas law, [federal courts] look first to the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court. If the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on an issue, [the federal court] make[s] an Erie guess, predicting what the Texas Supreme Court would do if faced with the same facts. In doing so, [federal courts] typically treat state intermediate courts' decisions as the strongest indicator of what a state supreme court would do, absent a compelling reason to believe that the state supreme court would reject the lower courts' reasoning.
Ironshore Europe DAC v. Schiff Hardin, L.L.P., 912 F.3d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). The parties do not cite, and the court is not aware of, any case in which the Texas Supreme Court has addressed the specific issue presented here. Accordingly, the court must make an Erie guess todetermine whether it is likely that the Texas Supreme...
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