Potter v. United States

Decision Date17 April 2018
Docket NumberNo. 16-6628,16-6628
Citation887 F.3d 785
Parties Anthony T. POTTER, Petitioner–Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

887 F.3d 785

Anthony T. POTTER, Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 16-6628

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: April 17, 2018


ON BRIEF: Patrick E. O'Neill, Jackson, Kentucky, for Appellant. Michael A. Rotker, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before: GUY, SUTTON, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a 15–year mandatory minimum sentence on repeat offenders—those who have three or more previous convictions for a "violent felony." After the district court sentenced Anthony Potter as a repeat offender, Johnson v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), held that one feature of the Act (the residual clause) violates the Constitution's prohibition against vague criminal laws. Potter asked to be resentenced in a successive § 2255 motion, claiming he did not qualify as a repeat offender. The district court declined the request on the ground that he sentenced Potter under a different clause (the enumerated-crimes clause) of the Act. We affirm because the same district court judge who sentenced him was in a better position than anyone else to know why he applied the Act and because at all events Potter did not meet his burden of showing that the court used the residual clause to increase his sentence.

887 F.3d 787

In 2003, Potter pleaded guilty to a slew of drug and gun crimes, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Felon-in-possession convictions normally carry a 10–year maximum penalty. Id. § 924(a)(2). But the Armed Career Criminal Act prescribes a 15–year mandatory minimum sentence for defendants who have three prior convictions for a "violent felony." Id. § 924(e)(1). The Act defines "violent felony" as any crime punishable by imprisonment of over a year that:

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another [the elements clause]; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives [the enumerated-crimes clause], or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another [the residual clause].

Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).

Potter's presentence report identified three prior state convictions that qualified as violent felonies under the Act: a Georgia conviction for burglary, a Georgia conviction for obstruction of an officer, and a Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault. The report did not spell out whether the convictions counted as violent felonies under the elements clause, the enumerated-crimes clause, or the residual clause. Potter did not challenge this part of the report. The district court thus accepted the report's conclusion that Potter qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 225 months in prison.

Potter filed his first § 2255 motion in 2013, which the district court denied because it was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations. After the Supreme Court decided Johnson in 2015, this court granted Potter permission to file a second collateral attack on his sentence. His second § 2255 motion argued that his Georgia burglary conviction no longer qualified as a violent felony after Johnson . The district court rejected the motion, reasoning that the burglary conviction still qualified as a violent felony under the enumerated-crimes clause.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act generally gives federal prisoners one shot to attack their sentences in federal court. The Act permits a second collateral attack only if it rests on new facts or "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases...

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74 cases
  • Moody v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • 13 Diciembre 2018
    ...491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)). In § 2255 proceedings, it is the movant's burden to show his entitlement to relief. Potter v. United States, 887 F.3d 785, 787-88 (6th Cir. 2018). "A § 2255 motion may not be used to relitigate an issue that was raised on appeal absent highly exceptional circum......
  • Raines v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 31 Julio 2018
    ...improbable task of proving that his sentencing judge "relied only on the residual clause in sentencing" him. Potter v. United States , 887 F.3d 785, 787 (6th Cir. 2018). See also Dimott v. United States , 881 F.3d 232, 234, 241–42 (1st Cir. 2018), pet. for cert. filed sub nom. Casey v. Unit......
  • Williams v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 11 Junio 2019
    ...in a comparable case, because this is a second or successive motion under § 2255 , Williams "needs new law." Potter v. United States , 887 F.3d 785, 787 (6th Cir. 2018). "In one sense, he has it. Johnson [II] announced a new rule of constitutional law when it invalidated the residual claus......
  • Waagner v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 20 Agosto 2020
    ...factor lends support to Mr. Waagner's contention that his original sentence was based on the residual clause. See Potter v. United States , 887 F.3d 785, 788 (6th Cir. 2018) ("[T]he judge who reviewed his § 2255 motion is the same judge who sentenced him. It is difficult to think of a bette......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Possible Reliance: Protecting Legally Innocent Johnson Claimants.
    • United States
    • Michigan Law Review Vol. 119 No. 2, November 2020
    • 1 Noviembre 2020
    ...(11.) See infra Part II. (12.) See, e.g., Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 234, 241-42 (1st Cir. 2018); Potter v. United States, 887 F.3d 785, 788 (6th Cir. 2018); see also infra Section (13.) See, e.g., Dimott, 881 F.3d at 234, 241-42; Potter, 887 F.3d at 787. (14.) See, e.g., United......

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