Potts v. Buckley

• Decision Date: 05 January 1922
• Citation: 97 Conn. 174,115 A. 726
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: POTTS v. BUCKLEY.

115 A. 726

97 Conn. 174

POTTS v. BUCKLEY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 5, 1922

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; John E. Keeler, Judge.

Action by Virginia Potts against Benjamin A. Buckley to recover for personal services. Verdict for plaintiff, motion to set aside the verdict was denied, and judgment for plaintiff rendered from which defendant appeals. Error, and case remanded.

The plaintiff was the wife of Clearmont Potts, and they were married in 1869. The defendant owned a large farm at Southport, and in 1905 engaged Potts to manage this farm for definite compensation, and Potts continued to manage the farm until about July, 1920, residing on the farm with his wife. At first there was but one cow on the farm, but the number was steadily increased, and the plaintiff made butter and turned over the proceeds to the defendant. It was the claim of the plaintiff that " in 1910 the number of cows had so increased, and the labor in making the butter had become so burdensome, that the plaintiff notified the defendant that she would be no longer responsible for the same, and the defendant promised to pay her for her services telling her to wait that good things come slow, but she would be fully paid," and she claimed that under such an arrangement she made and sold butter and cared for the milk from January 1, 1910, to and including July, 1920, 10 years and 7 months, and that her services were worth $15, no part of which had been paid. She further claimed that this work was performed by her as a separate and independent business not connected with or proceeding from any business controlled by her husband. The defendant denied that any such agreement had ever been made between them, and claimed that the milk and butter were products of the farm, and that whatever the plaintiff did was part of the services usually rendered by a farmer's wife and in connection with other farmwork to be done by the husband, and that this work was not plaintiff's separate and independent business. The defendant, in addition to a general denial, pleaded payment by the use of butter and milk, and also pleaded the statute of limitations as to all services rendered prior to August 1 1914. The plaintiff replied by a denial of payment and a new promise. These defenses were all in issue upon the trial. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff covering the entire period. Other facts are stated in the opinion.

William B. Boardman and Jonathan Grout, both of Bridgeport, for appellant.

Henry E. Shannon and Frank L. Wilder, both of Bridgeport, for appellee.

GAGER J.

Error is assigned on the denial of the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict as against the law and the evidence and the weight of evidence. The record shows that there was a substantial conflict of evidence, and that it was such that the jury might have reasonably and fairly found the issues for the plaintiff. In such case the court could not under our settled rule have granted the motion, and there was no error in the denial complained of.

Three errors are claimed in the charge:

The plaintiff requested the court to charge that-

" One who assents or acquiesces in the rendition of beneficial services for him by another is liable to pay what they are reasonably worth."

The court so charged with the following comment:

" But, in order to apply this principle, it is necessary that the plaintiff should show that the services were not included in any arrangement or bargain between other parties. I say it is necessary that the plaintiff should show it. I don't know whether the burden is on the plaintiff, but it is necessary that it should appear at the end of the case."

This comment was undoubtedly made in view of the defendant's claim that plaintiff's services were rendered as wife of the farmer, and not by virtue of any separate arrangement, or as a separate business of hers. What the defendant objects to, conceding the correctness of the general proposition, is that the court, after saying, " I say it is necessary that the plaintiff should show it," interpolated the command:

" I don't know whether the burden is on the plaintiff, but it is necessary that it should appear at the end of the case."

The court at the beginning and end of the charge had correctly stated the rule as to the burden of proof. The defendant complains that here is an incorrect instruction as to this point as to proof of separate business, which was confusing and misleading, and that under the circumstances the court committed a reversible error in saying it did not know whether the burden was on the plaintiff; that the clear effect of this was to counteract the rest of the charge as to burden of proof. The language might very naturally be construed by the jury as a weakening in this particular of the requirement elsewhere stated as a fair preponderance of the evidence. The particular referred to was a vital point, and we cannot say that the distinction apparently drawn, though probably inadvertent, may not have prejudiced the defendant's defense in this particular, and therefore the charge on this point was erroneous.

The court, also referring to the same point as to when the services were rendered, said:

" But, if you find, gentlemen, that these services all came in naturally and properly and in a normal way with the bargain that was made with the husband, then it would be understood that they were rendered gratuitously or under circumstances which imply the gratuitous rendition

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