Potts v. Chrans
| Decision Date | 27 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1021,89-1021 |
| Citation | 911 F.2d 736 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. Derrick POTTS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James CHRANS, Warden and the Attorney General of Illinois, Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Before CUDAHY, FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
A state prisoner who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in an Illinois court filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the writ. It found that the proceeding before the state trial judge, which the Illinois courts treated as a stipulated bench trial, was actually a guilty plea proceeding. Having made that determination, the district judge found that the plea was not knowing and voluntary because the state trial court failed to ensure that the defendant knew all of the elements of the crime to which he pleaded. We remand for further factfinding and, if necessary, an evidentiary hearing.
The facts in this case are extensive and are set forth at length in the district court's memorandum opinion. 1 We will only summarize them here.
Derrick Potts was involved in a shooting incident in Chicago in February of 1983. A man died from "multiple gunshot wounds"--a total of five--which he received in the incident. The wounds were caused by at least two bullets fired from a .38 caliber pistol and at least one bullet from a .38 caliber semi-automatic weapon. Potts admitted he took a .38 caliber pistol away from another man and fired three shots at the victim and hit him at least once. At least one of the .38 caliber bullets removed from the victim came from the weapon Potts fired. The state indicted Potts and two others on multiple charges, including murder. On July 23, 1983, a pretrial conference was held wherein Potts, the state, and the state trial judge reached an arrangement on how the matter was to be submitted for adjudication.
The trial judge informed Potts that evidence would be provided to the court by stipulation and if he (the judge) found it warranted a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, then Potts would be convicted of that offense and given a sentence of twelve years. If the judge felt the evidence warranted a conviction for murder, he would declare a mistrial and send the case to another judge. Based on an analysis of the evidence presented in the pretrial conference, the judge preliminarily determined that voluntary manslaughter was appropriate. The judge stated he would again make an independent judgment of the evidence presented in open court.
A colloquy between the judge and Potts ensued. Potts stated he understood the arrangement. The judge then asked Potts whether he understood that the best result he could get was to be found guilty of manslaughter. Potts answered in the affirmative. The judge proceeded to question Potts regarding whether he understood the charges against him, the rights he was giving up by agreeing to this arrangement, and the voluntariness of his assent. Included was the following dialogue:
THE COURT: You understand you are giving up the presumption of innocence because what you're asking me to do in effect is to presume you guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Do you understand you're giving up the presumption of innocence?
You understand that?
DEFENDANT POTTS: Yes, I do.
Potts responded that he understood each of these aspects of the arrangement and that he entered into it voluntarily. The state called one witness to testify and submitted stipulations containing facts to which its other witnesses would have testified if called. Potts's counsel did not present evidence and waived closing argument. The judge did not ask Potts if he understood each element of the offense of voluntary manslaughter. There is no indication in the record as to what Potts's counsel discussed with him concerning the elements of voluntary manslaughter.
The trial judge ruled that Potts was "clearly" proven guilty of a homicide and that he would find Potts guilty of voluntary manslaughter. As for sentencing, the parties rested on the information disclosed during pretrial conference. Potts was sentenced to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections for twelve years.
Within thirty days, Potts filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the motion, he essentially challenged the factual basis to support his plea by alleging there were fingerprints on the "murder weapon" which were not his. Potts also questioned the assistance of his counsel. The trial judge stated that the proceeding was not a guilty plea but was a stipulated bench trial. Accordingly, the court treated the motion as one for a new trial and denied the motion.
Potts appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because there was no proof of causation and that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not contest the cause of death. The state responded that the evidence was sufficient because it easily supported the verdict under a theory of accountability. 2 The appellate court, in an unpublished opinion, stated that the failure to charge accountability at trial did not preclude the state from raising it on appeal. The appellate court treated the proceeding as a stipulated bench trial and ruled there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Because of this ruling, the appellate court summarily found counsel was not ineffective. The Illinois Supreme Court refused further review.
Potts then filed a petition in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1982) and making virtually the same arguments he made in the state appellate court. The district judge found that the pretrial arrangement and subsequent colloquy constituted a submission of a guilty plea. The district judge reasoned:
[Potts] did not explicitly plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, but he stipulated to a bench trial in which, at best, the court would find him guilty of this crime. [Potts] thus waived not only the right to contest the facts, but also the right to challenge the inferences to be drawn from those facts, the application of the facts to the relevant law, and the right to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a guilty plea, the procedures used by the state trial judge in accepting the plea were found to be deficient. The district judge held that because the state judge made no effort to ascertain whether Potts understood the nature of the voluntary manslaughter charge, the plea was neither intelligently made nor voluntary. 3 The district judge also found that Potts received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.
Each court which has examined the arrangement and the dialogue between Potts and the state trial judge has indicated that the proceeding had characteristics of both a guilty plea and a stipulated bench trial. The Illinois state courts considered the proceeding to be a bench trial. The federal district court determined it was a guilty plea. We agree with the district court that the proceeding and arrangement constituted a guilty plea. The state trial judge made the required finding that there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea when he found a conviction for voluntary manslaughter was "appropriate." Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110A, p 402(c) (Smith-Hurd 1989). After this determination was made, the judge made it clear that the best Potts could do was to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter. He did not receive the presumption of innocence, the right to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to challenge the inferences drawn from the facts, nor the right to challenge the application of the facts to the law. These characteristics suggest the proceeding was a guilty plea and not a bench trial. Therefore, we agree with the finding of the district court that Potts entered a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter.
Because the proceeding at issue was a guilty plea, Potts was entitled to constitutionally adequate protections. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Under Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 651 (1976), Potts was entitled to be advised of the elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. The district court found that the state trial court "made no effort [ ] to determine whether defendant [Potts] understood the nature of the voluntary manslaughter charge...." 700 F.Supp. at 1514. The court concluded that Potts had not effectively admitted guilt.
The State makes two objections to this conclusion. First, it argues that this issue is waived because Potts never alleged it in the state courts. A claim which is not fairly presented to the state courts is waived unless the petitioner can show cause for and prejudice from his procedural default. Sotelo v. Indiana State Prison, 850 F.2d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir.1988). A petitioner "has 'fairly presented' a claim to a state court if he has clearly informed the state court of the factual basis of that claim and has argued to the state court that those facts constituted a violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights." Vernell v. Young, 839 F.2d 1245, 1248 (7th Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
Here, Potts's motion to withdraw his plea included an affidavit which alleged as the reasons to grant him leave to withdraw his guilty plea the following:
The reason why I would like to withdraw my guilty plea is on account of my attorney...
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