Potts v. Potts
Decision Date | 30 August 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 20170606-CA,20170606-CA |
Citation | 436 P.3d 263 |
Parties | Kathleen O. POTTS, Appellee, v. Duane E. POTTS, Appellant. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
David Pedrazas, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant
Emilie A. Bean, Layton, Attorney for Appellee
Opinion
¶1 This case involves not the benefit of the doubt, but some doubt as to the benefit. After separating in 1992, the court entered a decree of divorce based in part on Duane1 and Kathleen’s stipulation. The decree awarded a portion of each party’s retirement benefits to the other party. The decree directed the parties to cooperate in obtaining qualified domestic relations orders (QDRO)2 to effectuate the property distribution of the retirement accounts. Kathleen filed the QDRO related to her retirement account in 1995, but Duane waited until 2000 to file his corresponding QDRO. As it turned out, just before Duane filed, the Utah Retirement Systems’ rules regarding retirement benefits changed, providing Duane with the advantage of new distribution rules. In 2015, Kathleen filed a motion to amend her 1995 QDRO to reflect the updated rules. Duane objected, but the district court granted the motion. Duane then filed a motion to reconsider, which the court also denied. Duane appeals those rulings. We affirm.
¶2 When the parties divorced in November 1992, they both were employees of the State of Utah. Pursuant to the decree of divorce, each party was awarded a Woodward share of the other’s retirement benefits: 50% of the retirement benefits that accrued during their marriage. See Woodward v. Woodward , 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982) ( ). The decree directed the parties to cooperate in obtaining QDROs to effectuate the property distribution of the retirement accounts.
¶4 Sometime in 2000,3 a URS rule revision occurred which, according to Kathleen, "changed the manner of distribution to more fully reflect Utah law on division of retirement property to what is common[ly] referred to as a separate interest." Under these rules, Duane’s account would no longer be a shared-interest account, but instead would be divided into two separate accounts proportional to Kathleen’s marital interest. Alteration of the 1995 QDRO would ultimately change the potential payout to the parties, depending upon who predeceases whom. If Kathleen were to predecease Duane under these rules, Kathleen’s payout would no longer revert to Duane, essentially divesting him of that benefit.
¶5 In September 2000, Duane filed his own qualified domestic relations order (2000 QDRO). Because he filed after the rule change, Duane received the benefit of the new, separate account distribution rules. Duane’s 2000 QDRO had no effect on Kathleen’s 1995 QDRO, which was still subject to the old rules. In December 2015, Kathleen filed a Motion for an Amended Qualified Domestic Relations Order (Motion to Amend) requesting alteration of the 1995 QDRO "on the ground that the rules for Utah Retirement Systems [had] changed since the entry of the [1995 QDRO]."
¶6 After lengthy objections from Duane, the district court conducted a telephone conference in September 2016 and thereafter granted Kathleen’s Motion to Amend, stating, "It seems like the orders were meant to divide each of the [parties’] retirements in the same way." The court held that Kathleen should "be granted the same benefits on the method of division as Duane." That same day, Duane filed a motion to reconsider, but the district court denied the motion. Duane appeals.
¶7 Duane appeals on three bases. First, he argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend the 1995 QDRO. "Whether the district court has jurisdiction is a question of law that we review for correctness, giving no deference to the lower court." State v. Norris , 2007 UT 6, ¶ 10, 152 P.3d 293.
¶8 Second, Duane contends that even if the district court had jurisdiction to amend the 1995 QDRO, Utah Code section 68-3-3, which governs the effect of retroactive code provisions, prevents the court from doing so. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (LexisNexis 2016). "The [district] court’s interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness." Cox v. Cox , 2012 UT App 225, ¶ 10, 285 P.3d 791.
¶9 Third, Duane asserts that it was inequitable for the district court to allow amendment of the 1995 QDRO. A district court’s equitable orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion and should be "accorded substantial deference," with the court being given "considerable latitude." Kidd v. Kidd , 2014 UT App 26, ¶ 15, 321 P.3d 200 (cleaned up).
¶10 Duane contends that the district court "did not have the jurisdiction and/or the ability to amend" the 1995 QDRO because Kathleen failed to file a petition to modify, which, he alleges, is a requirement to retain jurisdiction. Duane’s argument fails for three reasons.
¶11 First, Kathleen did not seek modification of the decree and therefore was not required to file a petition to modify, which must be based on a change in circumstance. See Durfee v. Durfee , 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). While Duane is correct in asserting that succeeding on a petition to modify a divorce decree typically depends upon the moving party showing that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree, Fish v. Fish , 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 17, 379 P.3d 882, that proposition has no bearing on this case. Here, Kathleen seeks not to modify the decree, but only to alter the 1995 QDRO—an order collateral to the decree. In reality, Kathleen’s motion sought to enforce the identical treatment of the parties’ retirement accounts as expressly provided for in the decree. Therefore, Duane’s contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to Kathleen’s failure to file a petition to modify is incorrect.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). Pursuant to the statute, the award of retirement funds—a property distribution made by the court, see Woodward v. Woodward , 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982) —is properly subject to the court’s continuing jurisdiction, so long as the "subsequent changes or new orders" are "reasonable and necessary," Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) ; see also A.S. v. R.S. , 2017 UT 77, ¶¶ 2, 4, 416 P.3d 465 ( ); Johnson v. Johnson , 2014 UT 21, ¶ 31, 330 P.3d 704 ( ); Murphy v. Moyle , 17 Utah 113, 53 P. 1010, 1012 (1898) (); Osborne v. Osborne , 2011 UT App 150, ¶ 4, 260 P.3d 202 ( ); Bayles v. Bayles , 1999 UT App 128, ¶ 14, 981 P.2d 403 ( ). Therefore, having determined that it was reasonable and necessary to effectuate the terms of the decree, the court had jurisdiction to amend the 1995 QDRO.
¶13 Third, Duane fails to recognize that divorce courts are well established as courts of equity, see Dority v. Dority , 645 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982), that retain jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter for the purposes equity may demand, see Salt Lake City v. Ohms , 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994) ; Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. v. Kay , 81 Utah 595, 21 P.2d 836, 840 (1933) ( ). The court in this instance was exercising its equitable jurisdiction.
¶14 Utah courts have long held that district courts retain jurisdiction to remedy scenarios exactly like the...
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