Pouech v. Pouech, 2004-423.

Decision Date12 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. 2004-423.,2004-423.
Citation2006 VT 40,904 A.2d 70
CourtVermont Supreme Court
PartiesNatacha POUECH v. Phillip POUECH.

Mark J. Keller, J.

John R. Durrance, Jr. of Gaston, Durrance & Fairbanks, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christopher L. Davis and Devin McLaughlin of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ., and ALLEN, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

REIBER, C.J.

¶1. Wife appeals the family court's decision refusing to allow her to amend her divorce complaint to seek maintenance. We conclude that the family court applied the wrong standard in determining whether to consider her request for maintenance in light of the stipulated settlement that the parties had filed. Accordingly, while we affirm the divorce decree, we reverse the family court's August 5, 2004 decision and remand the matter for the court to reconsider wife's maintenance request and whether to accept or reject the parties' stipulation in whole or in part.

¶ 2. The parties were married in 1981 and separated in 2003. They have three children, born in October 1982, May 1986, and February 1993. After the parties separated, they negotiated a settlement between themselves with the help of a mediator and then a lawyer, who assisted both parties in finalizing a stipulation drafted by husband. The lawyer advised the parties to consult independent counsel. Husband did, but wife did not. On October 20, 2003, the parties signed a document entitled "Stipulation for Temporary and Final Order and Decree of Divorce." The document contains twenty-five paragraphs that deal with, among other things, parental rights and responsibilities, child support, marital property, and marital debt. The agreement is silent with respect to maintenance.

¶ 3. On October 27, 2003, one week after the document was signed, wife filed the parties' stipulation along with her divorce complaint. She did not check the box on the complaint form that would have indicated she was seeking maintenance. Approximately five months later, before the final divorce hearing, an attorney entered an appearance on behalf of wife and filed a motion to amend the complaint to allow wife to seek maintenance. Husband opposed the motion, arguing that the court should not permit wife to present evidence on the issue of spousal maintenance, and, in the alternative, that maintenance should not be awarded because the stipulation was not inequitable. Over two days in late May 2004, the court held a hearing on wife's motion, and both parties testified.

¶ 4. At the hearing, wife's attorney stated that wife was not asking the court to set aside the whole stipulation. Nevertheless, when the court expressed its belief that opening up the issue of maintenance would effectively require it to consider all financial aspects of the parties' divorce, wife's attorney still insisted that wife wanted maintenance, even if it meant that the stipulation would have to be set aside. On direct examination, wife stated that she knew she had a right to maintenance, but did not ask for it when the parties negotiated the stipulation because of feelings of guilt about leaving her family. Husband testified that wife told him she did not expect him to pay her anything. In a post-hearing memorandum in support of her motion to amend, wife argued that the stipulation should be interpreted to allow her to request maintenance, and that, in the alternative, there was a mutual mistake regarding the issue of maintenance. The principal thrust of her first argument was that, although the parties' stipulation was a binding contract, the absence of any provision on maintenance did not permit the court to assume that the parties had an agreement regarding maintenance. She also contended, however, that the family court had an independent obligation to assure that the stipulation was equitable.

¶ 5. Following the hearing, in an August 2004 order, the family court denied wife's motion to amend. In arriving at its decision, the court noted that wife's attorney had explicitly indicated that wife was not seeking to set aside the agreement on the grounds that its terms were unfair or unconscionable, but rather was arguing only that: (1) because the agreement was silent on the issue of maintenance, the court had the authority to impose maintenance; and (2) the court could void the agreement based on mutual mistake. With respect to wife's mutual mistake argument, the court found that wife knew she had a right to maintenance but did not ask for it, and that even if she had mistakenly believed she could seek maintenance at the final divorce hearing notwithstanding the absence of a provision on maintenance in the parties' stipulation, it was a unilateral mistake on her part. Further, the court found that the parties intended their stipulation to be a final, complete resolution of their divorce and that the stipulation unambiguously omitted any mention of maintenance. Hence, the court refused to allow wife to seek maintenance over and above the terms of the agreement. On August 26, 2004, the court entered a decree of divorce incorporating the parties' stipulation into the final order. Wife appeals, raising several interrelated arguments.

¶ 6. Wife first argues that, by stating in their stipulation that the terms and conditions of the agreement "may constitute the basis for" a final order and decree of divorce, the parties intended to resolve only those matters explicitly dealt with in the stipulation, but not to the exclusion of other unmentioned matters over which the court had jurisdiction. According to wife, the stipulation's silence on the issue of maintenance demonstrated that the parties had not come to any agreement on that issue, and therefore the court was free to consider it.

¶ 7. We reject this argument because it is contrary to the family court's findings and conclusions, which are supported by the evidence. The court found that wife knew she had a right to maintenance, but nevertheless did not ask for it in the stipulation, and that the parties intended the stipulation to be a complete, final agreement on their divorce.1 Both the language of the parties' stipulation and the circumstances surrounding its execution support the court's determination that the stipulation unambiguously excluded maintenance as part of the parties' intended final divorce settlement. See Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 579, 556 A.2d 81, 84 (1988) (court may consider circumstances surrounding making of agreement in determining whether agreement is ambiguous).

¶ 8. The evidence showed that: (1) the parties signed a twenty-five-paragraph agreement entitled "Stipulation for Temporary and Final Order and Decree of Divorce," which dealt with parental rights and responsibilities, child support, marital property, and marital debt; (2) wife filed the stipulation along with her divorce complaint, in which she did not check the box indicating that she was seeking maintenance; (3) wife testified that she knew she had a right to maintenance but did not ask for any because she felt guilty for having left her family; and (4) husband testified that wife indicated to him that she did not expect him to pay her anything. Given this evidence, the family court did not err in determining that the parties' stipulation unambiguously represented a comprehensive agreement on their divorce. Cf. Meier v. Meier, 163 Vt. 608, 609, 656 A.2d 212, 213 (1994) (mem.) (finding no ambiguity in separation agreement that was silent with respect to maintenance).

¶ 9. Further, wife's reliance on the language "may constitute the basis for" in the stipulation is misplaced. Use of the word "may" merely recognized the family court's ultimate authority to resolve matters concerning the parties' divorce and had nothing to do with whether the parties intended their agreement to be final and comprehensive.

¶ 10. Next, wife argues that the family court was obligated to determine whether the parties' stipulation was fair and equitable before incorporating it into its final divorce order. Along these lines, wife also argues that the court should have assured itself that the provisions of the stipulation were within the general parameters of other cases involving similarly situated individuals. According to wife, the instant stipulation provides her with far less than what other litigants have received in comparable situations. Wife contends that if the court had made adequate findings, it would have concluded that the parties' stipulation was unfair and inequitable. Husband responds that wife waived this argument by expressly disavowing it below and by failing to present evidence to back it up.

¶ 11. Before addressing the substance of wife's argument, we reject husband's contention that wife waived it. To be sure, wife stated at the hearing on her motion to amend that she was not asking the family court to set aside the parties' entire stipulation or claiming that the stipulation was unconscionable. She also acknowledged in her follow-up memorandum of law that the final stipulation was a binding contract between the parties. Nevertheless, when the family court warned her at the hearing that her request for maintenance would most likely require it to open up all aspects of the financial matters contained in the parties' stipulation, she acknowledged that possibility. Further, she argued in her memorandum of law that the family court had an obligation, before the final judgment issued, to consider her request for maintenance, regardless of whether its absence in the stipulation was by mistake or design. In making this argument, wife noted that a separation agreement is fundamentally different from a regular contract because it concerns a relationship that is sanctioned, promoted, and protected by the state. Thus, according to wife, the court had an obligation to consider her request for maintenance as...

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18 cases
  • Mortner v. Thompson
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 7 March 2018
    ...the court can set aside only for grounds sufficient to set aside a contract." (quotation omitted) ), overruled by Pouech v. Pouech, 180 Vt. 1, 904 A.2d 70, 77 (2006), and Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 342, 285 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1972) ("Because the separation agreement [between husband and ......
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    ...stipulated agreement incorporated into a court order has the same preclusive effect as a final judgment on the merits. See, e.g., Pouech v. Pouech, 2006 VT 40, ¶ 20, 180 Vt. 1, 904 A.2d 70 ("Once a stipulation is incorporated into a final order, concerns regarding finality require that the ......
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    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 29 October 2021
    ...of law. She argues that if the agreement is enforceable, the family division is the proper forum for conducting a hearing to consider the Pouech ¶ 8. We reject wife's arguments that the special administrator lacks standing to pursue this appeal, and conclude on the merits that the family di......
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    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 1 August 2014
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