Poulin v. Custom Craft Inc

Decision Date16 June 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2009-160-Appeal.,2009-160-Appeal.
Citation996 A.2d 654
PartiesPhilip POULINv.CUSTOM CRAFT, INC., et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Bruce P. Gladstein, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Meghan E. Siket, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice SUTTELL, for the Court.

The plaintiff, Philip Poulin, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Custom Craft, Inc., and its president, Gerard Auclair. The plaintiff's complaint alleged unlawful discrimination by the defendants, his former employers, on the basis of a disability. The plaintiff contends that an unresolved issue of material fact precluded summary judgment, and that the hearing justice failed to draw all reasonable inferences in his favor in deciding the motion. This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After reviewing the record and considering the parties' submissions, we are satisfied that the appeal may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Procedural History

The defendant Custom Craft is a family-owned business that manufactures cushions, umbrellas, and related products for patio specialty stores and furniture manufacturers. The business employs approximately twenty-five people and is located in West Warwick, Rhode Island. Mr. Auclair, also a named defendant, is the president of Custom Craft. The plaintiff was employed at Custom Craft from 1983 until 2004, most recently as plant manager. As plant manager, plaintiff was the company's second-in-command after Mr. Auclair.

Mr. Poulin testified at a deposition that since at least 1998 he has suffered from anxiety and depression, for which he sought medical treatment. He did not recall anyone employed at Custom Craft telling him that he could not attend medical appointments for his anxiety and depression during the first several years he received such treatment.

On March 12, 2002, Mr. Poulin suffered what the parties term a “nervous breakdown” at work and subsequently was out of work for two weeks. After this episode, he attended appointments with Paul Hoffman, a social worker, once or twice a week, and occasionally with a psychiatrist. On June 4, 2002, however, plaintiff had a second “nervous breakdown” in Mr. Hoffman's office. As a result, he was admitted to Butler Hospital for several days and was out of work for two weeks.

Thereafter, Mr. Poulin continued to attend therapy appointments for his anxiety and depression. According to plaintiff, around this time, Mr. Auclair questioned him on three or four occasions as to why he was absent from work to attend medical appointments so frequently, and as to the length and the scheduled times of his appointments. Mr. Auclair told him, however, to take whatever time he needed. Mr. Poulin also acknowledged that Mr. Auclair did not question him further about such appointments between July 2002 and July 2004. Mr. Poulin testified that, notwithstanding his need to attend these appointments, he was able to perform his job and that he did not request any special accommodations.

The plaintiff alleges that, beginning in 2002, Mr. Auclair reprimanded him on numerous occasions for his job performance and changed his job duties “for the sole purpose of harassing and discriminating against” him. Further, in October 2002, plaintiff received a discretionary bonus that was substantially less than bonuses given to two other employees.1

The defendants maintain that Mr. Poulin's job performance had deteriorated and that he had engaged in “acts of insubordination.” The defendants claim Mr. Auclair needed to have weekly or biweekly conversations with plaintiff concerning his job performance. The plaintiff admits to having had such conversations, but suggests such meetings were rare and “either were very short and insignificant” or did not involve important issues.

The defendants specifically assert that plaintiff delegated work poorly. Further, defendants contend that plaintiff let supplies run low, did not do a good job of organizing the “filling” department, and secretly checked the payroll for executive bonus information when he did not have authorization to do so.

Additionally, defendants allege that plaintiff instigated “verbal altercations” on numerous occasions with several coworkers. While plaintiff admitted to contentious conversations with at least two coworkers, plaintiff claims he did not instigate these disputes. Mr. Auclair additionally indicated that plaintiff complained about him to several employees and that he also had heard that plaintiff told several employees that he (plaintiff) “didn't care anymore.”

Mr. Auclair testified that in May 2004 he met with plaintiff to specifically address plaintiff's attitude and performance problems. A few months later, on July 27, 2004, Mr. Auclair received a faxed note from Dr. Michael Martin. The letterhead of the note indicated that Dr. Martin was a doctor of osteopathic medicine who was board certified in internal medicine. The note simply stated that plaintiff would not be able to return to work until August 9, 2004; it did not provide any reason necessitating the absence. It is undisputed, however, that the condition diagnosed by Dr. Martin was high blood pressure.

A short time after receiving the faxed note, and while Mr. Poulin still was out of work, Mr. Auclair ran into Mr. Poulin at a comedy show on a Friday night. Mr. Auclair told plaintiff to come see him at work the next morning and, when plaintiff complied, he terminated plaintiff's employment. Mr. Auclair stated that he could no longer tolerate plaintiff's lack of respect for him as his employer. He explained that plaintiff showed his lack of respect in the following ways:

“By faxing in his doctor's papers, saying he was going to be out for two weeks. He made absolutely no effort to contact me to tell me what was wrong with him. He made no effort whatsoever to contact anyone at Custom Craft to discuss how we were going to cover for him for two weeks while he was out. He showed absolutely no concern, no caring whatsoever for the company at our busiest time of the year, our most critical time of the year. In my 40 years of experience, I haven't had an employee at any level show such disregard to fax in, never mind someone second in command.”

Mr. Auclair testified that the fax was not the only reason for the termination; rather, he described it as “the straw that broke the camel's back.” Mr. Auclair was upset when he saw plaintiff at a comedy show, as it distressed him that apparently plaintiff was well enough to attend the show and yet had not called into work all week.

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a petition with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, claiming discrimination by defendants based on his alleged “mental disability.” The commission issued a notice of right to sue to plaintiff in September 2005. The plaintiff then filed the instant action in Superior Court on October 7, 2005.

Mr. Poulin alleged that he is disabled because he has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression. His complaint included counts for discrimination under the State Fair Employment Practices Act, G.L.1956 chapter 5 of title 28 (FEPA), and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, G.L.1956 chapter 112 of title 42 (RICRA).2 The defendants answered the complaint on December 14, 2005.

Thereafter, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendants asserted that plaintiff's claims of discrimination could not succeed because he was not, in fact, disabled under the law. The defendants also maintained that plaintiff failed to establish a nexus between his alleged disability and his termination.

A hearing on defendants' motion for summary judgment was held on August 5, 2008. In her bench decision, the hearing justice did not decide whether plaintiff was disabled within the meanings of FEPA and RICRA.3 Instead, the hearing justice ruled that, even assuming plaintiff was disabled, there was no evidence supporting his claim that defendants took adverse employment action against him because he suffered from anxiety and depression.

The hearing justice noted [t]here were definitely issues as to [Mr. Auclair's] job satisfaction with [plaintiff] unrelated to the * * * doctor appointments.” Ultimately, however, the hearing justice determined plaintiff was terminated because of the faxed note and because Mr. Auclair saw him at a comedy show during the two-week period he was on medical leave in July 2004. Further, the hearing justice concluded that “the [medical] note did not in any way, shape or form connect * * * the depression [or] the anxiety to the absence from work.” Additionally, she noted that “the timing of his termination dictates against concluding that [plaintiff's] anxiety and his depression caused the termination.” Thus, the trial justice granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case that he was terminated because of a disability.

The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on August 20, 2008. Final judgment was entered on March 23, 2009.4

IIStandard of Review

We review a trial justice's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Credit Union Central Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1267 (R.I.2009). [W]e will affirm a summary judgment if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 638 (R.I.2005) (quoting...

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