Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:02CV1302(DJS).,3:02CV1302(DJS). |
| Citation | 292 F.Supp.2d 374 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Shawn POULIOT, Plaintiff, v. PAUL ARPIN VAN LINES, INC. and Arpin Logistics, Inc. v. Festo Corporation, Michael D. Kovac, D/B/A Trans-Expo International and Erica Ramirez in Her Capacity as Employee of Trans-Expo International Defendants. |
Joel Thomas Faxon, Michael A. Stratton, Stratton Faxon, New Haven, CT, Roland F. Moots, Jr., Moots, Pellegrini, Spillane & Mannion, New Milford, CT, for Plaintiff.
Thomas J. Grady, Lenihan, Grady & Steele, Westerly, RI, James R. Oswald, John A. Tarantino, Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, Inc., Providence, RI, Susan J. O'Donnell, Halloran & Sage, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Shawn Pouliot ("Pouliot") brings this action against Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc. and Arpin Logistics, Inc. (hereafter "Arpin") and third-party defendants Festo Corporation ("Festo"), Michael D. Kovac ("Trans-Expo") and Erica Ramirez ("Ramirez") based on state torts sounding in negligence and recklessness. The parties are present in this court on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Arpin filed a motion to dismiss [doc. # 89] Pouliot's claims against it on the ground that the claims are pre-empted by federal laws that statutorily classify Pouliot as an employee covered by the worker's compensation exclusivity provision of Rhode Island law. Defendant's motion is DENIED.
The following facts are alleged in the complaint. On or about October 23, 2001, Shawn Pouliot, a truck driver, was hired by Arpin to pick up a Learnline 2000 unit from Festo Corporation in Hauppauge, New York, and deliver the equipment to Nuagatuck Valley Community College in Waterbury, Connecticut. Pouliot is an independent truck driver-he leases his truck to a commercial shipper such as Arpin and works on its behalf under conditions determined in his lease agreement. On the night of October 23, Pouliot was not driving a truck owned by him but rather was driving a truck provided by Arpin. Pouliot picked-up the Learnline 2000 in New York and safely delivered the equipment to Waterbury. During the course of unloading the Learnline 2000 unit, the device fell onto Pouliot causing permanent and severe injuries to his spinal cord and rendering him paraplegic.
At the time, Pouliot was a resident of South Carolina. Arpin is a Rhode Island corporation, registered to do business in Connecticut.
Defendant submits its motion to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Arpin seems to be arguing that Pouliot's claims are barred by a state exclusivity provision that acts to divest this court of subject matter jurisdiction. This argument is without merit. Pouliot's case is present in federal court on diversity jurisdiction. The standard for diversity jurisdiction is well known, and it contains only two components-that the amount in controversy be greater than $75,000 and that the parties be citizens of different states. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. No party to this case claims that these requirements have not been satisfied.
Further, it is a basic tenet of the law that "`[i]n determining its own jurisdiction, a District Court of the United States must look to the sources of its power and not to the acts of states which have no power to enlarge or to contract the federal jurisdiction.'" Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir.1977) (quoting Markham v. Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 713 (4th Cir.1961)). A state "door closing" statute cannot divest the district court of jurisdiction when the statutory and constitutional requirements of diversity jurisdiction are satisfied. Elgard Corp. v. Brennan Construction Co., 157 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.Conn.1994). Similarly, Rhode Island's exclusivity provision cannot supercede federal law and the Constitution of the United States. Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction would thus be an inappropriate action where the parties are properly present under diversity jurisdiction.1
The fact that Arpin's motion is procedurally flawed does not mean that the court should deny its motion without further discussion, although that is an option. The Second Circuit has held that district courts may construe an untimely Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir.2001). Arpin has, substantively, motioned the court to dismiss Pouliot's claims on the grounds that federal and state law render Arpin immune from suit. Such issues are sufficiently important at this stage of the proceedings to warrant a full and fair hearing by the court. Therefore, the court will construe Arpin's improper Rule 12(b)(1) motion (analogous to an improper Rule 12(b)(6) motion) as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).
The standard for reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion is identical to the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Patel 259 F.3d at 126. The court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 126. The case will not be dismissed unless the complaint cannot state any set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 126.
Arpin argues that federal regulations and the law of the Rhode Island operate to create an exclusive remedy for Pouliot in the form of worker's compensation, thus barring Pouliot's common law claims. Arpin asks the court to find, as a matter of law, that Pouliot is an "employee" of Arpin and, therefore, is limited to that recovery provided by Rhode Island's worker compensation scheme.
The basis for Arpin's claim is a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation definition of the term "employee".2 Arpin argues that a clause in the contract between Arpin and Pouliot expressly incorporates this definition of "employee" and that as a result of this definition Arpin and Pouliot have agreed to be bound by an alleged Congressional intent to abolish the distinction between an independent contractor and an employee.3 Arpin makes a further argument that 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 governs the contract and that compliance with § 376.12 imposes a "statutory employee" regime on Pouliot and Arpin. The court will address each argument in turn.
The core of Arpin's argument is that Shawn Pouliot meets the definition of an "employee" in the federal regulations governing motor carriers and is thus barred, by operation of Rhode Island law, from pursuing this lawsuit. To decide this, the court must first analyze the federal regulations to determine whether they clearly apply to the facts of this case. If the regulations are ambiguous, the court must consider to what extent they are applicable in the present circumstances.
The starting point for any interpretive inquiry of this nature must be the language of the statute (or rule). As Arpin notes, other courts have already adopted a "plain language" approach to interpreting the reach of § 390.5 and this court will follow that path. The critical portion of § 390.5 reads as follows: "Employee ... includes a driver of a commercial motor vehicle (including an independent contractor while in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle)" (emphasis added). This sentence reveals critical information about how this regulation should be interpreted. Arpin is incorrect in its assertion that these regulations eliminate the distinction between an independent contractor and an employee. Although some courts have suggested that the distinction does not exist, the plain language of the regulation preserves this distinction.4
The finding that "employee" and "independent contractor" remain distinct concepts does not mean that they are of equal value under § 390.5. The language of the regulation is clear-the "independent contractor" is treated as an "employee" under this section when certain conditions are satisfied. Specifically, independent contractors are deemed "employees" while in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle. Thus, the information necessary to determine whether § 390.5 is operative in this case is not the language of incorporation in the contract between Arpin and Pouliot. Instead, the court must determine what "operating a commercial motor vehicle" means for purposes of this regulation to determine whether or not it will apply in this case.
Initially, the court looks to the remainder of § 390.5 to determine whether the regulation defines the necessary term. Unfortunately, the language of § 390.5 is not clear. The definition of "operator" contains only a cross-reference to "driver", which is defined as "any person who operates any commercial motor vehicle." Section 390.5 does include a catch-all definition that instructs interpreters to read undefined terms according to a "commonly accepted meaning",5 and the court will follow this instruction. Accordingly, the Court interprets the common meaning of "operating a motor vehicle" as driving a motor vehicle, not merely operating some mechanical apparatus attached to the vehicle. However, the Court has an obligation to ensure that this reading of the regulation is consistent with the governing statutory authority, the language of 49 C.F.R. Ch. III and the application of § 390.5 by other courts.6
The transportation statutes of Title 49 of the United States Code are complex and far-reaching, but the language of the sections operative for the promulgation of 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 supports the court's reading of "operating" to mean only "driving" in the context of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. Specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(1) reads in part that "[a]t a...
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...an "employee" pursuant to Section 390.5, for purposes of finding coverage. 579 F.3d at 474; see also Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378-79 (D. Conn. 2003) (noting that while there is, in fact, a distinction between an "employee" and an "independent contractor," ......
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Great W. Cas. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co.
...2007) (independent contractor not a statutory employee because not driving/operating the equipment); Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc., 292 F.Supp.2d 374 (D.Conn.2003) (“ Pouliot ”)(concluding that independent-contractor lessor-owner who was unloading his trailer was not “operating” the......
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...created by Congress plainly accepts a distinction between employees and independent contractors. See Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc., 292 F.Supp.2d 374, 383 (D.Conn.2003) ("the existence of a lease under regulations impose liability between the carrier-lessee and the public does not h......
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Great W. Cas. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co.
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