Pouliot v. Town of Fairfield, CIV.01-179-B-K.

• Citation: 226 F.Supp.2d 233
• Decision Date: 04 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.01-179-B-K.,CIV.01-179-B-K.
• Parties: Jean Francois POULIOT, Plaintiff, v. The TOWN OF FAIRFIELD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

226 F.Supp.2d 233

Jean Francois POULIOT, Plaintiff, v. The TOWN OF FAIRFIELD, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.01-179-B-K.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

September 4, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Warren M. Silver, Warren Silver, P.A., Bangor, ME, for Jean Francois Pouliot, plaintiff.

Mark V Franco, Lisa Fitzgibbon Bendetson, Esq., Thompson & Bowie, Portland, ME, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION¹ ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KRAVCHUK, United States Magistrate Judge.

Jean Francois Pouliot is pursuing a suit against the Town of Fairfield and Dawnalysce Clifford and Richard Spear in their individual capacities² in a seven-count second amended complaint seeking federal and state law remedies stemming from Pouliot's termination of employment as the Chief of the Fairfield, Maine Police Department.³ (Docket No. 20.) Before me now is the defendants' motion for summary judgment in which they argue their entitlement to a summary disposition from several different vantage points.⁴ (Dockets Nos. 24 & 25.) Pouliot has responded (Docket Nos. 26, 27, 28 & 29) and defendants have replied. (Docket Nos. 30 & 31.) I now GRANT the motion for summary judgment for the reasons that follow.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A material fact is one which has the `potential to affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law.'" FDIC v. Anchor Properties, 13 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993)). The Court views the record on summary judgment in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Levy v. FDIC, 7 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1st Cir.1993).

However, summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has presented evidence of the absence of a genuine issue, the nonmoving party must respond by "placing at least one material fact in dispute." Anchor Properties, 13 F.3d at 30 (citing Darr v. Muratore, 8 F.3d 854, 859 (1st Cir. 1993)).

Facts

The following facts are taken from the statements of material fact submitted by the parties, as presented in the light most favorable to Pouliot on disputed issues of material fact. Defendants do dispute some of these facts, but for the purpose of this motion I accept the facts as put forth by Pouliot. Jean Pouliot began working for the Fairfield Police Department on March 25, 1974 and became the Chief of Police on October 1, 1989. Beginning in January, 1999, it was observed that the police department budget was approximately 9% over budget. The department continued to function without major incident and Pouliot was routinely and without discussion reappointed to his position as police chief in May, 1999. The total budget overrun as of the end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1999) was $32,000.00.

By memo dated July 27, 1999, Chief Pouliot appointed Captain John Emery as the financial officer and purchasing agent for the police department. On August 3, 1999, Pouliot met with Terry York, the Town Manager, to discuss the overdraft in the police budget. The next day, on August 4, 1999, Emery found what he considered to be personal charges made by Pouliot and charged to the Town on the credit card that was used for official police business. On August 9, 1999, a member of the press approached Pouliot to discuss his personal use of a "town credit card." The press had learned of the situation by way of a "leak" that originated with Captain Emery. On August 18, 1999, Pouliot met with York, admitted he had made a mistake, and reimbursed the Town $115.00 for personal purchases on the Town credit card. After the meeting, he returned to York's office and disclosed to her that he was experiencing a list of problems, including diabetes. Thereafter, he went to Dawnalysce Clifford, Chairperson of the Town Council, and revealed to her that he had diabetes, stress, mood swings, and a lack of sleep. On August 20, 1999, area newspapers carried articles detailing the police department budget overrun and the personal purchases made by the Chief with the Town's credit card. Eventually Pouliot attended a public Special Council Meeting on August 24, 1999, for the purposes of explaining the overage in his budget, the use of the credit card, an issue related to his use of a home office, and an issue concerning the use of police cruisers off duty. Prior to the meeting, Pouliot met and talked with York and Clifford about his diabetes and depression. At the August 24 Special Council meeting, Pouliot read a statement in which he took full responsibility for the budget and its overdraft and attributed some of the problems and issues to "underlying medical, health and personal issues which were being currently addressed." (Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ("DSMF") ¶ 42.) The Town Council, on recommendation from the Town Manager, voted to impose a disciplinary sanction on Pouliot consisting of (1) two weeks of suspension without pay; (2) loss of Pouliot's 3% raise; (3) attendance at workshops on budget preparations; (4) attendance at counseling at the Town's expense; and (5) restitution for any as of yet undiscovered purchases on the Town's credit cards. Pouliot accepted the Town Council's vote to impose these disciplinary sanctions.

After the Town Council's vote on August 24, the media reported petition drives circulating in the community seeking the ouster of both the Chief and the Town Manager. Clifford, one of the defendants, was quoted in one article as stating that Pouliot's conduct was caused in part by a medical condition and complications with medications. Although Pouliot had told Clifford of his diabetes, she did not mention it in any conversation with the media or anyone else. On September 1, 1999, Pouliot met with the Town Council in executive session. At this meeting, Clifford told Pouliot to share with the Council what he told her about his medical condition. Pouliot then informed the entire Town Council of his diabetes and also explained to them that he was experiencing depression and that he felt his medical problems were one reason for his budgeting and spending problems. He requested that the information be kept confidential. At least one Town Councilor, Bill Bois, was aware of Pouliot's diabetes before the meeting and in fact Pouliot told him of the condition well before Bois was ever elected to the Town Council. During this executive session, Pouliot discussed the possibility of his voluntary resignation. York responded that she would accept his resignation and gave him until noon on Friday, September 3 to think about it.

On September 2, 1999, Pouliot saw a physician and obtained from the physician a "To Whom It May Concern" note. The note stated: "This letter is in regard to Jean Pouliot who is currently treated for a serious medical condition. He will continue to receive medical treatment over the next several months. At this time, Mr. Pouliot is unable to perform his job duties." On the same day Pouliot saw a lawyer. Pouliot's attorney wrote to the Town Manager and told her that Pouliot needed additional time to respond to her "ultimatum" that came from the September 1 meeting that would have required him to submit his resignation by "Friday noon." The defendants dispute that any such ultimatum issued from the September 1 meeting.

At some point after the September 1 executive session, Council member Bouchard disclosed to the press that Pouliot has diabetes. Two newspapers subsequently reported that Pouliot was being treated for diabetes. Prior to the executive session, Bouchard was not aware that Pouliot was diabetic.

By September 7, 1999, no further formal action had been taken in regard to Pouliot's status and the Town Manager had not yet decided what additional action she would take. On that date the Town's attorney wrote to Pouliot's attorney to advise him of the scheduling of a disciplinary hearing on Thursday, September 9, 1999. The disciplinary hearing's agenda was not limited to the discussion of the issue of Pouliot's purchase of personal items, but also included five other issues. Pouliot was sent a letter outlining those issues. His attorney responded to the notification on September 8, 1999, stating that Pouliot was in no medical condition to deal with this hearing at this time and that following the two-week suspension without pay imposed at the August 24 meeting Pouliot intended to take his accumulated sick leave. Pouliot's attorney asked whether the Town was willing to "put [the] hearing off for some time to enable [Pouliot] to follow through with the recommended counseling." (Ex. 31.) The attorney's letter was accompanied by the "To Whom It May Concern" physician's note, dated September 2, 1999.

At some point, the Town rescheduled the disciplinary hearing to September 15, 1999. Either before or soon after the hearing was rescheduled for September 15, Pouliot's attorney met with the Town's counsel, informed him that Pouliot was not in any condition to attend a disciplinary hearing, and again requested that the hearing be put off. Specifically, he requested that the disciplinary hearing not be scheduled until Pouliot's two-week suspension and his sick time expired. This request was denied. At some point, Pouliot's attorney was led to believe that if Pouliot did not attend the September 15 hearing and fight the charges, he would be terminated.

It was not until September 13 or 14 that Pouliot's attorney realized that Pouliot was...