Poullard v. Jones
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-2439-B |
| Citation | 596 F.Supp.3d 729 |
| Parties | Makeliah POULLARD, Plaintiff, v. Randy JONES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Mark V. Maguire, Pro Hac Vice, McEldrew Young & PurtelI, Philadelphia, PA, L. Stacy L. Merritt, McEldrew Young Purtell Merritt, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Thomas P. Brandt, John F. Roehm, III, Christopher Thomas Brandt, Fanning Harper Martinson Brandt & Kutchin PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant Randy Jones ("Jones")’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 62). For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the motion.
This is a civil-rights case. Plaintiff Makeliah Poullard ("Poullard"), who alleges she is innocent, was arrested by Defendant Jones for fraudulent use of another's identifying information and detained until the charge against her was eventually dropped. The instant suit is premised on this arrest.
In April 2018, Jane Doe, an unidentified black female, purchased a truck from Gateway Buick GMC ("Gateway") using false credentials. Doc. 57, 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 7–8, 12. Later, a gentleman named Alvin Sanders was discovered in possession of the truck and was prosecuted for conspiring with Jane Doe to fraudulently purchase the truck. Id. ¶ 10. At this point, Jane Doe was still unidentified and at large. See id.
Jones, a lieutenant for the City of Fate Police Department, was the detective charged with investigating the fraudulent purchase of the truck. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11. Poullard alleges that "Jones focused his investigation on [her] because she was a relative of Alvin Sanders and a black female." Id. ¶ 13. According to Poullard, "[t]his scrutiny was baseless [and] unjustified because [she] did not have a close relationship with Sanders" and, in any event, she was working a shift at Waffle House at the time the truck was fraudulently purchased. Id. ¶¶ 13, 23. Poullard also alleges that "[a]t the conclusion of her shift at Waffle House, surveillance video shows [her] entering her home ... in Lancaster, Texas." Id. ¶ 24.
It is undisputed that the Gateway employee who sold the vehicle to Jane Doe, Eric Brown ("Brown"), positively identified Poullard as Jane Doe when shown a photo of Poullard by Jones. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17; see Doc. 62, Def.’s Mot. However, Poullard contends that this identification resulted from a "coercive and inherently unreliable" process. Doc. 57, 2d Am. Compl., ¶ 19. Specifically, Poullard alleges that Jones generated "a single[,] isolated image of [her]" to show Brown, which prompted Brown to "conclude[ ] that [Poullard] must have been Jane Doe because [her photo] was the only image presented." Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. Brown's identification, Poullard claims, was "the only inculpatory evidence against [her]." Id. ¶ 19.
Following Brown's identification of Poullard, Jones swore to an arrest-warrant affidavit and obtained a warrant for Poullard's arrest. Id. ¶¶ 18–19; see Doc. 62-1, Jones Aff.; Doc. 62-2, Arrest Warrant. In his affidavit, Jones swore that "Brown picked Poullard out of a photo lineup that ... consisted of six black females of similar characteristics." Doc. 62-1, Jones Aff., 2 (emphasis added).1 Poullard claims that this "misrepresentation tainted the magistrate's determination of probable cause," causing her to be wrongfully arrested and "charged with multiple felonies, including Fraudulent Use of Identifying Information, Forgery[,] and Tampering with Governmental Records." Doc. 57, 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 19–21. Sometime thereafter, Poullard was indicted by a Rockwall County grand jury on the same charges. See id. ¶ 28; Doc. 62-3, Indictment. In total, Poullard spent nine months in jail awaiting trial—"maintain[ing] her innocence [throughout] and reiterat[ing] [her alibi] to Jones"—before "all charges against [her] ... were dismissed and [she] was freed." Doc. 57, 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 30, 33.
On August 21, 2020, Poullard filed the instant suit bringing claims against Gateway, Jones, the City of Fate, Texas, and Lorne Megyesi (then-Mayor of Fate).2 See Doc. 1, Original Compl. Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Doc. 15, Gateway's Mot.; Doc. 17, City of Fate's Mot.; Doc. 18, Jones's Mot.; Doc. 19, Megyesi's Mot.; Doc. 20, Jones & Megyesi's Jt. Mot.
The Court granted the motions in their entirety but also granted Poullard leave to amend certain claims. See Poullard v. Gateway Buick GMC LLC , 2021 WL 2376721, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2021). Poullard then filed an amended complaint alleging claims against Gateway and Jones only. Doc. 42, 1st Am. Compl. Gateway and Jones again filed motions to dismiss. Doc. 45, Gateway's Mot. Dismiss; Doc. 46, Jones's Mot. Dismiss. Once again, the Court granted the motions to dismiss in their entirety but granted Poullard leave to amend; this time, Poullard was permitted to amend her claims against Jones only. Poullard v. Gateway Buick GMC LLC , 2021 WL 4244781, at *7–8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2021).
On October 1, 2021, Poullard filed her Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading in this case. Doc. 57, 2d Am. Compl. Poullard now brings a single claim against Jones for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 34–43. Jones then filed the instant motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 62, Def.’s Mot. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. The Court considers it below.
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). If a plaintiff's complaint fails to state such a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he ‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ " In re Katrina Breaches Litig. , 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) ). The Court will "not look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine whether relief should be granted based on the alleged facts." Spivey v. Robertson , 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). However, the Court may also consider "matters of public record" and documents attached to a motion to dismiss to the extent they "are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claims." Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist. , 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff "must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility." Johnson v. City of Shelby , 574 U.S. 10, 12, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014). That means "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). This standard "is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. When pleaded facts fail to meet this standard, "the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Ramirez v. Martinez , 716 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2013). Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must then negate the qualified immunity defense. See Newman v. Guedry , 703 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2012). To overcome a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must "demonstrate[ ] that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation." Cowart v. Erwin , 837 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2016). Courts have discretion in deciding which of the two prongs should be addressed first. Darden v. City of Fort Worth , 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ).
A motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is evaluated under the same pleading standards as a traditional motion to dismiss. Terwilliger v. Reyna , 4 F.4th 270, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2021). Ultimately, the court is charged with determining "whether the complaint pleads facts that, if true, would permit the inference that [the defendant is] liable under [ 42 U.S.C.] § 1983 ... and would overcome their qualified immunity defense." Id. at 280 (quoting Hinojosa v. Livingston , 807 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2015) ).
Jones claims that Poullard's Second Amended Complaint must be dismissed because (1) he is entitled to qualified immunity, and (2) Poullard's indictment by a grand jury triggers the independent-intermediary doctrine, barring her false-arrest claim. The Court proceeds by first considering the extent to which it may take judicial notice of the documents attached to Jones's motion to dismiss. Next, the Court reviews Jones's claim to qualified immunity and determines that Poullard has sufficiently pled that Jones can be held liable under Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d...
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