Poulos v. Poulos
Decision Date | 13 January 1967 |
Parties | Katherine Snowden POULOS v. George POULOS. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Richard K. Donahue, Lowell, for defendant.
Russell S. Riley, Weymouth, (Roland E. Shaine, Boston, with him) for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, CUTTER and REARDON, JJ. SPALDING, Justice.
The declaration in this action of tort contains three counts. Count 1 is against George Poulos, alleging loss of consortium and alienation of the affections of the plaintiff's husband, Peter Poulos. Count 2, containing similar allegations, is against Georgia G. Poulos. Count 3 is against George and Georgia, alleging that the loss of consortium and alienation of affections was accomplished pursuant to a conspiracy. There was a verdict for the plaintiff on each count. The third count having been waived, the questions for decision are whether the judge erred in denying the defendants' motion for a directed verdict and their motion for a new trial.
We summarize the evidence as follows: The plaintiff first met Peter Poulos, the defendants' son, in September, 1956. Peter told her that he was twenty-eight years old. The plaintiff, a divorcee and the mother of two children, was then aged thirty-one. Peter at that time was a student and shared an apartment in Boston with three other men. The plaintiff also lived in an apartment in Boston which she shared with another woman. In January, 1957, the plaintiff and Peter began 'going steady.' While the plaintiff was in Florida in early March, Peter sent her many letters expressing his love for her. They made plans to get married in May and Peter told the plaintiff that he would like to adopt her four year old daughter. On one occasion in the latter part of March the plaintiff and Peter had sexual relations.
On April 26, 1957, the couple applied for a marriage license in Hyannis, stating, which was not the fact, that they resided there. On May 2, they returned to Hyannis. On the following day, because the plaintiff believed she was pregnant, she and Peter consulted a physician, who confirmed her belief. Later that day they were married. They remained in Hyannis until Sunday, May 5, when they returned to an apartment in Boston which they had rented.
In the early afternoon of May 5, two days after the marriage, Peter stated that he was going to visit his parents and would return at 3:30 P.M. He left the apartment but did not return. After numerous calls to the defendants' home in Belmont, the plaintiff reached Peter by telephone at nine thirty that evening. During the conversation, which was admitted in evidence only to show Peter's state of mind, Peter said to the plaintiff,
Peter never lived again with the plaintiff, although he did make sporadic support payments to her. The plaintiff gave birth to a daughter, Mary Ann, in December, 1957. The first time Peter saw Mary Ann was in June, 1961, and he continued to see the child weekly until August, 1962. Shortly thereafter, in a conversation admitted only to show Peter's state of mind, Peter told the plaintiff that 'he was sorry, but * * * he was not going to see * * * (the plaintiff or Mary Ann) any more, that his father found out that he had been coming down to see Mary Ann and that he was wild about it * * * (Peter) was sorry and he said * * * '(T)hat's the way it's got to be, Kay."
1. We deal first with the count against Georgia Poulos, Peter's mother. The evidence against Georgia is as follows: On Saturday, May 4, 1957, the day after the marriage, the plaintiff and Peter were on the beach near the cottage where they were staying. Georgia appeared on the beach and said to the plaintiff, She then said to her son, After the plaintiff and Peter had returned to the cottage, Georgia again appeared and said to Peter, Peter said, 'We'll come home when our honeymoon is over,' and Georgia left. She returned to the cottage seven times, however, to implore that Peter listen to her and go home to his father. Later that day, Georgia called the plaintiff and asked her to promise that they 'would leave the next morning and have Peter come home to his father.' The next evening, when the plaintiff was trying to reach Peter by telephone at his parents' home, Georgia answered and told her not to call again and not to come to their home, and that Peter was going away with his father for a few days. After that time, Georgia made no attempt to see or speak with either the plaintiff or Mary Ann. Georgia contends that this evidence was insufficient to show that her actions were motivated by anything more than a natural parental duty, or that her actions caused Peter to separate from the plaintiff.
In an action of this kind, it must be shown that the defendant intended to cause a separation between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's spouse. Proof that the defendant only gave honest advice is not enough. Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 150, 26 N.E. 417, 10 L.R.A. 468. Geromini v. Brunelle, 214 Mass. 492, 102 N.E. 67. And because the rights and the corresponding duties of a parent are much greater than those of a stranger, stronger evidence is required to maintain an action against a parent. Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556, 79 N.E. 762, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 322. There it was said by Sheldon, J., at page 557, 79 N.E. at page 762, that, 'It is proper for * * * (a parent) to give to his * * * (child) such advice and to bring such motives of persuasion or inducement to bear upon * * * (him) as he fairly and honestly considers to be called for by * * * (the child's) best interests.' Thus a parent in situations of this sort has a privilege. But, as Professor Prosser has said, Prosser, Torts (3d ed.) pp. 901--902. And the burden of proving that the defendant acted from improper motives is upon the plaintiff. There is, to be sure, language in our cases (see e.g. Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556, 558--559, 79 N.E. 762) to the effect that the parent's privilege may be destroyed only by proof of malice or ill will. But, as the quotation from Prosser shows, the privilege may be destroyed by proof that it has been seriously abused. With this view we agree. Cf....
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