Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-1107.,05-1107.
• Citation: 449 F.3d 751
• Parties: Ahmmad POURGHORAISHI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLYING J, INCORPORATED, Steve Lindgren, Larry Williams, City of Gary, Indiana, Nakon Security, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 751

449 F.3d 751

Ahmmad POURGHORAISHI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLYING J, INCORPORATED, Steve Lindgren, Larry Williams, City of Gary, Indiana, Nakon Security, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-1107.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 8, 2005.

Decided April 20, 2006.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing May 25, 2006.

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Ivan E. Bodensteiner (argued), Valparaiso, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Edward G. Bielski (argued), Stewart & Irwin, Andrew P. Wirick (argued), Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons, Indianapolis, IN, Michael J. Rappa, Johnson & Rappa, Merrillville, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Following his arrest for disorderly conduct and trespass, Ahmmad Pourghoraishi, a truck driver of Middle Eastern descent accused of trying to leave a gas station without paying for fuel, sued the gas station, its manager, the off-duty police officer employed as a security guard, the security company, and the City of Gary, Indiana, for intentional discrimination in a place of public accommodation (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a), for interfering with his right to make and enforce a contract (42 U.S.C. § 1981), for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by arresting him without a warrant or probable cause (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and for various injuries addressed by Indiana state tort law. The district court dismissed the public accommodation claims as moot and untimely, granted summary judgment on the § 1981 and § 1983 claims, and dismissed the state law claims. Pourghoraishi appealed all but the public accommodations claims. On appeal of the remaining claims, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

The facts as presented by the parties lay before us in a tangled web. As we have noted before, summary judgment briefs that present multiple versions of the facts arouse our attention at the outset because under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a judge may grant summary judgment for a moving party only where there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.2003). Because our only task upon review of a summary judgment motion is to determine "whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial," (Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994)), multiple versions of the facts increase the chances that at least one of those conflicting facts will be material to the outcome of the case. With this in mind, we review the facts stated in the light most favorable to Pourghoraishi, (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), F.T.C. v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir.2005)), noting where appropriate conflicting facts presented by the defendants.¹

Mr. Pourghoraishi, a truck driver and native of Iran, drove into a Flying J truck stop in Gary, Indiana, on the morning of November 28, 2001, to pump fuel into his truck. As was his usual practice, Pourghoraishi pulled up to an open pump, called the fuel desk for authorization to pump fuel, provided the requested information, and began pumping gas. When he finished, he went inside to pay for the fuel and use the restroom. After standing in line for some time, he decided to leave the line and go to the bathroom before paying. According to Pourghoraishi, two white truckers also left the cashier line to go to the restroom. On his way to the restroom, Steve Lindgren, the manager of Flying J, approached Pourghoraishi and, according to Pourghoraishi's account, told him, in a hostile tone, that he had to leave the facility and could not use the bathroom. According to the defendants, Lindgren believed that Pourghoraishi had provided false information during his call to the fuel desk, although he testified at his deposition that he could not recall what false information he believed Pourghoraishi had provided. Although we must take the facts in the light most favorable to Pourghoraishi, we can accept Lindgren's explanation for his initial interaction with Pourghoraishi. Pourghoraishi does not deny that Lindgren thought the former had provided false information (how could he?), rather, he denies only that he did provide false information. Lindgren's explanation merely provides a background explanation as to why the manager approached Pourghoraishi in the first instance. Pourghoraishi does not allege that anyone knew his race or singled him out prior to the time he entered the Flying J to pay for his fuel. In fact, Pourghoraishi claims that prior to his encounter with Lindgren on the way to the restroom, Pourghoraishi had never spoken to the Flying J manager before.

Once confronted by Lindgren, Pourghoraishi claims that he told the manager that he could not leave the facility because he still had to pay for the gasoline he pumped into his truck. Pourghoraishi alleges that, while Lindgren approached him "aggressively" with a raised voice, he responded non-offensively without raising his voice or using profanity.

During Pourghoraishi's and Lindgren's exchange, Officer Larry Williams, an auxiliary City of Gary, Indiana, police officer, approached the two disputing men. Williams was at the Flying J that day as an employee of Nakon Security, Inc., the security company hired by the Flying J. Williams told Pourghoraishi to leave the Flying J and again Pourghoraishi responded that he had to pay his bill and use the restroom. According to Pourghoraishi, Williams called Pourghoraishi a "motherfucker," handcuffed him, placed him under arrest, and told him that he was going to send him "back to his country." But for a brief interaction regarding payment and some questions regarding the information Pourghoraishi had provided to the fuel desk, Pourghoraishi's interaction with Lindgren primarily ended when Officer Williams arrived on the scene.

Williams escorted Pourghoraishi to a manager's office where he was detained for a couple of hours and questioned primarily by Williams. During this time, Pourghoraishi claims that Williams took his truck key and searched his vehicle returning with a registration form. He also claims that, while he was handcuffed and without his consent, Williams removed $160.00 from Pourghoraishi's pocket which he gave to Lindgren who then took the money to a cashier and returned with a receipt. Officer Williams prepared an offense report and an arrest report on Gary Police Department forms. At some point he also prepared a probable cause affidavit, signed by Lindgren, for each of the two misdemeanor charges — disorderly conduct and criminal trespass. These documents indicate that Pourghoraishi was not born in the United States and state that his race is "Persian."

Eventually a transporting officer from the Gary Police Department arrived to take Pourghoraishi to the Gary City Jail. He was released after posting bond. While at the bond office, Pourghoraishi noticed Williams on the sidewalk and approached him to ask about his truck and key. Williams stated that he did not know the location of the truck or key, but agreed to drive Pourghoraishi back to the Flying J. Pourghoraishi claims that during this trip, he asked Williams why he had arrested him for trespass and Williams indicated that he had done so under Lindgren's direction.²

Later Pourghoraishi negotiated a "deferred prosecution" agreement with the local prosecutor whereby the criminal charges against him were dismissed after six months.

Before the district court, Pourghoraishi claimed that the Flying J, Lindgren, and Nakon Security had intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin in a place of public accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a and had interfered with his right to make and enforce contracts on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He charged the City of Gary and Officer Williams, in his official capacity as a City of Gary police officer, for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly arresting Pourghoraishi without probable cause in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Pourghoraishi lodged pendant state law claims against all five defendants for false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a business relationship. In the face of a motion for summary judgment filed by the Flying J, Lindgren, and Nakon Security, the district court dismissed Pourghoraishi's public accommodation claims for lack of jurisdiction after he failed to meet the procedural prerequisites of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and granted summary judgment on the § 1981 claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Officer Williams and the City of Gary on the § 1983 claims, and dismissed all of the pendant state law claims. Pourghoraishi appeals to this court to reverse the grant of summary judgment on the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims as well as the district court's dismissal of the state law claims. Pursuant to this request, we review his claims de novo. Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir.2005).

II.

A. Section 1981 claims.

Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . ." and defines making and enforcing of contracts as "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981. More commonly litigants invoke § 1981 to assert their rights to be free from discrimination while making and enforcing employment contracts, but this court and others have...