Pouzbaris v. Prime Healthcare Services-Anaheim, LLP

• Decision Date: 23 April 2015
• Docket Number: G048891
• Citation: 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 314,236 Cal.App.4th 116
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Asma POUZBARIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES–ANAHEIM, LLP, Defendant and Respondent.

236 Cal.App.4th 116

186 Cal.Rptr.3d 314

Asma POUZBARIS, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES–ANAHEIM, LLP, Defendant and Respondent.

G048891

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

Filed April 23, 2015

Goldsman Law Offices, Evan A. Blair, Gene J. Goldsman, Santa Ana, and Aron M. Goldsman for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Carroll, Kelly, Trotter, Franzen, McKenna & Peabody, Thomas M. Peabody, David P. Pruett and Michael E. DeCoster, Long Beach, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P.J.

Plaintiff Asama Pouzbaris appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Prime Healthcare Services–Anaheim LLP dba West Anaheim Medical Center. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that while she was a patient at defendant's hospital, she slipped and fell on a recently mopped floor that lacked any warning signs. Defendant obtained summary judgment on the ground plaintiff's action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations period imposed by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) (Stats. 1975, 2d Ex.Sess., ch. 1, § 25, pp. 3969–3970, § 1.192, pp. 3991–3992) under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 (all further undesignated statutory references are to this code).

The question on appeal is whether a hospital's purported conduct in mopping a floor and failing to provide warning signs constitutes “professional negligence” within the meaning of section 340.5 rather than ordinary negligence subject to the two-year limitations period under section 335.1. The California Supreme Court recently granted review of a case involving the similar issue concerning a hospital's alleged negligence in allowing a patient's bed rail to collapse. (Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1386, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 413, review granted May 22, 2013, S209836.) We conclude the current action falls within the two-year statute.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 13, 2010, plaintiff was admitted to defendant after complaining of “chest tightness with shortness of breath.” She was placed in a room with a private bathroom. Two days later, while still in defendant's care, she used the bathroom to freshen up and change her clothes. Walking back her bed, she slipped and fell, injuring herself. Plaintiff claimed the floor was wet and appeared to have been recently mopped. No warning cones were present. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that shortly after her fall, the cleaning lady said, “ ‘Oh, I know that you fell. I'm so sorry. I'm so sorry.’ ”

Plaintiff admitted she knew of the alleged negligence on June 15, 2010, but did not file her complaint until June 11, 2012. The complaint sought damages for personal injury with a cause of action for premises liability.

Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's action was time-barred by section 340.5. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. It ruled the action was one “for professional negligence” because the negligence was “committed in the act of rendering services for which the hospital is licensed,” which was namely “to use reasonable care and diligence in safeguarding a patient committed to its charge. So whether [p]laintiff fell because she was not supervised or assisted on her trip to the restroom, or because a ‘cleaning lady’ mopped her room while she was in the restroom is irrelevant for this analysis: in either event, the claim concerns [d]efendant's duties to take appropriate measures for patient safety, and concerns rendering of services for which [d]efendant is licensed.” Thus, “under Murillo v. Good Samaritan Hospital (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 50, 160 Cal.Rptr. 33 [ (Murillo ) ] and its progeny, because the claim is one brought by a patient against a hospital for an alleged injury sustained in the course of the hospital's care for her it is a claim for professional negligence.”

We disagree with defendant's analysis and reverse the judgment.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that ‘one or more elements of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question ‘cannot be established’ or,” as with the statute of limitations defense here, that there is a complete defense to the action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) We “consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all [uncontradicted] inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence” (§ 437c, subd. (c)), and “are not bound by the trial court's stated reasons or rationale. Instead, we review the summary judgment without deference to the trial court's determination of questions of law.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 66.)

2. Inadequate Record

Defendant asserts plaintiff provided an inadequate record on appeal to support her claim an objection to defendant's separate statement of undisputed material facts should have been sustained. That may be true but it is immaterial.

3. Which Limitations Period Applies Under the Facts Alleged

3.1 Statutes

MICRA's limitations period, section 340.5, states: “In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” Under this statute, “ ‘Professional negligence’ means a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (§ 340.5, subd. (2), italics added.)

The statute on which plaintiff relies, section 335.1, is outside of MICRA and pertains to ordinary negligence claims for personal injury. It provides that “[a]n action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” must be commenced “[w]ithin two years.” (§ 335.1.)

The various statutes comprising MICRA were enacted because of the rapidly rising costs of medical malpractice insurance. (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 33–34, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986.) The legislative intent in shortening the statute of limitations for MICRA cases “was to give insurers greater certainty about their liability for any given period of coverage, so that premiums could be set to cover costs.” (Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 900, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909.)

Thus, the applicable statute of limitations depends on how the negligence is characterized. The determinative question is whether plaintiff's slip and fall occurred as a result of professional negligence, as that term is defined by section 340.5, or ordinary negligence, in which case the action is governed by the two-year limitations period under section 335.1.

3.2 Pre–MICRA Case Law

The main pre-MICRA case discussed by the parties is Gopaul v. Herrick Memorial Hosp. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 1002, 113 Cal.Rptr. 811 (Gopaul ). In that case, a plaintiff left unattended fell off a gurney to which she had not been strapped. At the time, the period for filing an action for ordinary negligence ran from the time of the negligent act, while a suit based on professional negligence ran from when the plaintiff should have discovered the cause of the injury. The trial court granted a nonsuit judgment against the plaintiff following its determination that “ ‘professional malpractice’ was not involved in the defendant hospital's tortious conduct, and that the reasons for the extended statute of limitations for such malpractice were wholly inapplicable here. The need to strap plaintiff to the gurney while she was ill and unattended would have been obvious to all. The situation required no professional ‘skill, prudence and diligence.’ It simply called for the exercise of ordinary care.” (Id. at p. 1007, 113 Cal.Rptr. 811.)

In affirming, Gopaul explained “that inherent in the concept of ‘professional malpractice’ is that it must have occurred in the ‘performance of professional or fiduciary duties.’ It follows that not every tortious injury inflicted upon one's client or patient or fiducial beneficiary amounts to such malpractice. No reasonable person would suggest that ‘professional malpractice’ was the cause of injury to a patient from a collapsing chair in a doctor's office, or to a client from his attorney's negligent driving en route to the court house, or to a hospital patient from a chandelier falling onto his bed. Such injuries would, no doubt, have proximately resulted from ‘ordinary negligence,’ but they would not be brought about from ‘professional malpractice.’ ” (Groupal, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1005–1006.)

3.3 Post–MICRA Case Law

Discussed extensively by both parties is Murillo, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 50, 160 Cal.Rptr. 33. There, the plaintiff fell out of her bed due to the hospital's alleged failure to raise the bed rails. Murillo reversed a summary judgment in the defendant hospital's favor, but stated: “the question whether it was negligent to leave the bedrails down during the night while plaintiff was asleep is a question involving hospital's duties to recognize the condition of patients under its care and to take appropriate measures for their safety. Thus, the question is squarely one of professional negligence [citation] and section 340.5 governs the running of the...