Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt
| Decision Date | 29 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-CV-1021-B.,92-CV-1021-B. |
| Citation | 834 F. Supp. 358 |
| Parties | POWDER RIVER BASIN RESOURCE COUNCIL, Plaintiff, v. Bruce BABBITT, Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, Harry M. Snyder, Director of the Office of Surface Mining, United States Department of the Interior, Dennis Hemmer, Director, Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming |
Jon B. Huss, Casper, WY, for plaintiff.
Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Atty. Gen., State of Wyo., Cheyenne, WY, for defendant Dennis Hemmer, Director, WY DEQ.
Carol A. Statkus, Asst. U.S. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, WY, for federal defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court upon plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants' memoranda in opposition thereto, defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, and plaintiff's memoranda in opposition thereto, and the Court having reviewed the materials on file herein, having heard argument from the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, FINDS and ORDERS as follows:
Background
The main issue in this case is whether rules adopted by the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council on October 22, 1992, pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (1988), should be applied retroactively to May 20, 1983.
Section 503(a) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a), provides that a state may assume exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations upon submission to, and approval by, the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) of the state program. In 1979, Wyoming submitted to the OSM a proposed state program for state enforcement of the SMCRA. In 1980, the OSM determined that part of the state's proposed program could not be approved. The State of Wyoming revised and resubmitted its proposed program. The OSM conditionally approved the revised program, subject to the correction of several minor deficiencies. One of these deficiencies was that the state had not adopted a provision parallel to the federal regulation allowing an award of attorneys' fees. 43 C.F.R. 4.1294(b), (c) and (d) (1991). The OSM gave the state several extensions within which to satisfy this deficiency, the final deadline being May 20, 1983.
During the winter of 1991, plaintiff, Powder River Basin Resource Council (PRBRC), participated in an administrative action under the SMCRA involving the renewal and revision of a coal permit of the Black Thunder Mine in Campbell County, Wyoming. The parties settled the administrative action. On June 4, 1991, plaintiff petitioned the DEQ for an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees. Defendant Hemmer, the Director of the DEQ, denied PRBRC's petition because at that time the DEQ rules did not authorize the award of attorneys' fees. The Environmental Quality Council affirmed the decision on February 3, 1993. That decision has been appealed to the Wyoming state courts.
On March 31, 1992, the plaintiff gave the federal defendants notice of its intent to sue as required by SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1201, et seq. Upon notification, the Wyoming agency and the OSM began rulemaking procedures to correct the deficiency. On October 22, 1992, the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council adopted rules permitting the assessment of attorneys' fees against the state.
Nonetheless, plaintiff brought this suit claiming first, that the OSM failed to withdraw approval of Wyoming's state program and substitute federal enforcement as required by 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) and 30 C.F.R. § 732.13(j) (1991), and second, that the Wyoming DEQ violated its agreement to correct deficiencies by May 20, 1983. Plaintiff asks the Court to compel the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior and the Director of the OSM (1) to prepare, promulgate and implement a federal program for Wyoming, retroactive to May 20, 1983; or (2) to substitute direct federal enforcement of the portions of SMCRA regarding attorneys' fees, retroactive to May 20, 1983. In the alternative, plaintiff asks the Court to compel the Director of the Wyoming DEQ to satisfy the deficiencies in the State program with an effective date retroactive to May 20, 1983, so that plaintiff can be compensated for attorneys' fees from the SMCRA administrative action. Plaintiff also seeks an award of costs and attorneys' fees in this action.
The plaintiff, as well as the federal defendants, Manual Lujan, Secretary of the Interior, Harry Snyder, Director of the Office of Surface Mining, and the state defendant, Dennis Hemmer, Director of the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, have moved for summary judgment.
"By its very terms, the Rule 56(c) standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original).
The trial court decides which facts are material as a matter of law. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; see also Carey v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir.1987). Summary judgment may be entered "against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Carey, 812 F.2d at 623. The relevant inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Carey, 812 F.2d at 623. In considering a party's motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Barber v. General Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 1272, 1276 n. 1 (10th Cir.1981).
This Court's jurisdiction in this case rests on § 520(a) of the SMCRA which provides:
30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (emphasis added). Defendant Hemmer argues that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the Eleventh Amendment renders the state immune from suit. This Court finds his argument persuasive.
The Eleventh Amendment states:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the terms of the Amendment do not prohibit the suit of a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that unless a state has consented to be sued, the state and its agencies are immune from suits brought in federal courts by the state's own citizens as well as by citizens of other states. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3146, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355-56, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). Further, the state's immunity cannot be circumvented merely by naming the state's officials in the suit when the state is the real party in interest. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. at 1356. The Supreme Court has stated:
when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. at 1355.
The Court finds instructive two Supreme Court cases which are very similar on their facts to the case at bar. In the first case, Edelman v. Jordan, the plaintiff challenged Illinois' administration of federal-state programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, as being inconsistent with federal regulations. Id. at 654-55, 94 S.Ct. at 1351-52. The state regulations gave the state agency a longer period of time to determine eligibility for assistance than did the federal regulations. Id. The plaintiff, a recipient of assistance, sought injunctive relief and requested that the state pay benefits retroactively for the time it had not complied with the federal regulations. Id. at 653, 94 S.Ct. at 1351. The Supreme Court rejected the request of retroactive payment of fees on the grounds of sovereign immunity. Id. at 662-65, 94 S.Ct. at 1355-57.
In the second case, Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981), the State of Florida had...
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Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, 93-97
...of WYO.STAT. § 35-11-437(f) and the precedent discussed above that EQC's contention that no legal authority exists to award attorney fees to PRBRC is without merit. It is also noted that since EQC's decision, a rule authorizing such an award against the Department has been promulgated and a......