Powder Run At Deer Valley Owner Ass'n v. Black Diamond Lodge At Deer Valley Ass'n of Unit Owners & Park City Mun. Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 20120611–CA.,20120611–CA.
• Citation: 320 P.3d 1076,754 Utah Adv. Rep. 36
• Parties: POWDER RUN AT DEER VALLEY OWNER ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BLACK DIAMOND LODGE AT DEER VALLEY ASSOCIATION OF UNIT OWNERS and Park City Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

320 P.3d 1076

754 Utah Adv. Rep. 36

POWDER RUN AT DEER VALLEY OWNER ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.BLACK DIAMOND LODGE AT DEER VALLEY ASSOCIATION OF UNIT OWNERS and Park City Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20120611–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Feb. 21, 2014.

Eric P. Lee, Park City, and Kathleen E. McDonald, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellant.

Laura S. Scott, Elizabeth A. Schulte, Salt Lake City, and Joseph E. Tesch, Park City, Attorneys for Appellee Black Diamond Lodge at Deer Valley Association of Unit Owners.

Mark D. Harrington, Park City, and Polly Samuels McLean, Attorneys for Appellee Park City Municipal Corporation.

Senior Judge RUSSELL W. BENCH authored this Opinion, in which Judges JAMES Z. DAVIS and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.¹

Opinion

BENCH, Senior Judge:

¶ 1 This case involves a challenge to the dedication of an easement as a public street in Park City. The easement crosses property owned by Powder Run at Deer Valley Owner Association (Powder Run). Powder Run appeals the district court's ruling that the statute of limitations in Utah Code section 10–9a–801 bars its quiet title action and declaratory judgment claim. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 10–9a–801 (LexisNexis 2012). We affirm.

BACKGROUND ²

¶ 2 In June 2001, Black Diamond Lodge at Deer Valley Association of Unit Owners (Black Diamond) submitted a letter to Park City Municipal Corporation (the City) offering to dedicate as a public street a portion of a seventy-eight-foot-wide easement that crossed Powder Run's property.³ On the day of the public hearing, Powder Run submitted a letter to the City stating that it was “not going to oppose” the dedication but requesting that the City defer action while Powder Run considered its options. The City Council acknowledged the request for delay at the hearing but proceeded to consider the dedication. The City Council then adopted an ordinance, published June 27, 2001, accepting the limited dedication of a thirty-foot-wide portion of the easement as a public street. Among other things, the ordinance required Black Diamond to pave and maintain the public street.

¶ 3 In the fall of 2001, Black Diamond built a road across the easement and had underground utilities installed within the easement. In late 2002 or early 2003, Black Diamond had a monument sign erected on the easement. Since late 2001, the public has used the road to access the Black Diamond Lodge and another adjoining development.

¶ 4 On September 15, 2010, over nine years after the ordinance became effective, Powder Run filed a complaint against Black Diamond and the City. The complaint was styled as a quiet title and declaratory judgment action. ⁴ Powder Run alleged that Black Diamond and the City “claim a right or interest in the Easement Parcel adverse to the rights and interests of [Powder Run].” Powder Run later moved to amend the complaint by adding as defendants the individual unit owners of the Black Diamond Lodge. The City moved to dismiss the action and Black Diamond moved for summary judgment, both on the basis of the thirty-day statute of limitations in Utah Code section 10–9a–801(2)(a). The district court granted the defendants' motions and denied Powder Run's motion to amend as futile. Powder Run appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Powder Run contends that the statute of limitations in Utah Code section 10–9a–801 does not bar its quiet title action and that the district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Black Diamond and in dismissing the suit against the City. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, “[a]n appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness.” Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).⁵

¶ 6 Powder Run also contends that given the district court's allegedly erroneous ruling on the statute of limitations issue, the district court erred in denying, on the basis of futility, Powder Run's motion for leave to amend its complaint. While we review for abuse of discretion a ruling on a motion for leave to amend a pleading, we review a futility determination for correctness. Shah v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App 261, ¶ 6, 314 P.3d 1079.

ANALYSIS

I. Statute of Limitations

¶ 7 Powder Run advances four arguments challenging the district court's ruling that its quiet title action was barred by section 10–9a–801. First, it argues that the statute, by its terms, does not apply to this case. Second,Powder Run argues that regardless of the limitations period in the statute, a void ordinance may be challenged at any time. Third, Powder Run argues that its quiet title action is a true quiet title action to which statutes of limitations do not apply. Fourth, Powder Run argues that the statute of limitations does not apply, because Powder Run is in actual possession of the easement under a claim of ownership.

A. Applicability of the Statute

¶ 8 The Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act (MLUDMA) places a thirty-day limit on challenges to municipal land use decisions:

Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision is final.

Utah Code Ann. § 10–9a–801(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). “Based on [MLUDMA's] plain language, a party is affirmatively entitled to judicial review of any final [municipal] land use decision whenever (A) the decision adversely affects the party's interests, (B) the decision was made in the exercise of or in violation of provisions of [MLUDMA], and (C) the party files a petition for review within thirty days of the date the [municipality's] decision is final.” Gillmor v. Summit County, 2010 UT 69, ¶ 18, 246 P.3d 102 (interpreting a parallel provision in the County Land Use, Development, and Management Act (CLUDMA)).⁶

¶ 9 Powder Run does not argue that the ordinance is not a “decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of [MLUDMA].” SeeUtah Code Ann. § 10–9a–801(2)(a). Rather, Powder Run argues that the statute should not apply to its suit because it is not seeking “review” of the City's decision to accept the dedication. See id. As Powder Run has characterized its claim, it argues that because Black Diamond did not have any legal right to dedicate the easement to the City, the district court should “conclude that in fact no dedication occurred,” declare the dedication void ab initio, and quiet title to the easement in Powder Run.

¶ 10 Powder Run's argument ignores the fact that the City accepted the allegedly invalid dedication and passed an ordinance making a portion of the easement a public street. In its complaint, Powder Run acknowledges that the City, and not only Black Diamond, “claims a right or interest in the Easement Parcel adverse to the rights and interests of [Powder Run].” Powder Run asks for an order quieting title in Powder Run and decreeing that Black Diamond, the City, “and all persons or entities claiming by, through or under them have no rights or interest in or to the Easement Parcel.” Powder Run also alleges that it is entitled to a “declaration establishing that the public dedication by Park City was void ab initio, and that Black Diamond, its members, the public and all persons or entities claiming by, through or under them have no right to traverse or otherwise occupy the Easement Parcel.” (Emphasis added.) We see no way to read Powder Run's complaint other than as a request for the district court to review the City's decision to accept the dedication of a portion of the easement as a public street.

¶ 11 Powder Run also argues that the statute does not apply to its suit because Powder Run is not “adversely affected” by the City's ordinance. See id. § 10–9a–801(2)(a). Powder Run argues that because the dedication is invalid, it had no impact on Powder Run's property rights.

¶ 12 Regardless of the validity of Black Diamond's offer to dedicate, the City's decisionto accept that dedication adversely affected Powder Run. The City enacted an ordinance making a portion of the easement a public street. Black Diamond built a road across that portion of the easement in 2001, and since that time, the public has continually used that road to access the Black Diamond Lodge and another adjacent development. As mentioned above, Powder Run alleges in its complaint that the City claims a right adverse to Powder Run. It asks the district court for a declaration that those using the public street have no right to do so. Powder Run's complaint thus belies the argument that Powder Run is not adversely affected by the ordinance.

B. Void Ordinance Exception

¶ 13 Next, Powder Run argues that statutes of limitations do not apply to void ordinances. Powder Run relies on cases holding that challenges to void judgments are not subject to time limitations. See, e.g., Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290–91 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Powder Run argues that “[t]here is no meaningful difference between the application of a time bar to the void judgment of a district court and the void action of a municipal body.”

¶ 14 Our supreme court was presented with a similar argument in Gillmor v. Summit County, 2010 UT 69, 246 P.3d 102, but the court did not resolve the issue. Seeid. ¶ 17. We need not determine whether the rule governing void judgments applies to void ordinances in general, because we conclude that section 10–9a–801 contemplates a limitation on the type of suit brought by Powder Run in this case.

¶ 15 In addition to setting forth exhaustion requirements and time limitations, section 10–9a–801 states that courts are limited to determining “only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” Utah Code Ann. § 10–9a–801(3)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2012...