Powell v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 24 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-2218.,02-2218. |
| Citation | 391 F.3d 1 |
| Parties | Walter J. POWELL, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Kathleen ALEXANDER, Defendant, Appellant, City of Pittsfield, Edward M. Reilly, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Kathleen Alexander, with whom Thomas C. Foley was on brief, for appellant.
David P. Hoose, with whom Howard S. Sasson and Katz, Sasson, Hoose, & Turnbull were on brief, for appellee.
Before SELYA, LYNCH, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.
In response to a judgment entered pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendant Kathleen Alexander, former City Solicitor of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, appeals from the district court's $10,000 punitive damages award against her. First, Alexander argues that the court's specific factual determinations underlying the award of punitive damages are clearly erroneous and that the evidence in its totality does not meet the legal standard for such an award. Second, Alexander argues that punitive damages are unavailable against her in any event because neither Powell's complaint nor the course of subsequent proceedings adequately put her on notice that she was being sued in her individual capacity and was therefore subject to personal liability for punitive damages.
After considering the general principles authorizing punitive damages in a § 1983 case, we reject Alexander's argument that the district court's award was incompatible with those principles. We next consider a circuit split on the appropriate test for determining adequate notice of the capacity in which a governmental official is sued, and join the majority of circuits in adopting the "course of proceedings" test. Applying that test, we reject Alexander's lack of notice claim and affirm the district court's award of punitive damages against her.
In 1991, Walter Powell, an African-American police officer, filed several state and federal actions against the City of Pittsfield, the Acting Chief of Police, and the former Mayor, among others, for impermissible race discrimination leading to his termination from the police force. In September 1993, City Solicitor Kathleen Alexander entered into a settlement agreement on the City's behalf. The City agreed to pay Powell $81,000 and to reinstate him as a police officer "conditioned upon" his fulfillment of certain requirements, including "re-training" and "undergoing a complete physical ... examination." In return, Powell agreed to dismiss the actions, which had generated negative publicity for the City and fomented discord among members of the police department.
Instead of closing the book on a contentious period in City affairs, the signing of the settlement agreement marked the beginning of a new and even longer dispute. Indeed, nearly three years would pass before Powell returned to active duty as a Pittsfield police officer. As a result of that protracted struggle for the reinstatement contemplated by the settlement agreement, Powell filed the instant suit in federal district court in September 1997 against City Solicitor Alexander, the Mayor, the Chief of Police, the City Physician, and the City of Pittsfield for impeding and conspiring to impede his reinstatement to the City's police force in retaliation for his exercise of his constitutional right to petition the courts for redress.1 Powell alleged that, far from cooperating with his efforts at reinstatement, the defendants had engaged in a concerted campaign to prevent or stall his return to the police force — first by exploiting the possibility that his health was impaired by Hepatitis C infection, and then by selectively and belatedly enforcing a local ordinance barring police officers from holding outside employment2 — because he had filed the 1991 civil rights actions.
After a seven-day bench trial, the district court awarded judgment for Powell on all counts in an 87-page written decision containing 123 separately detailed findings of fact.3 The district court found that, "[f]ollowing the settlement, the defendants began a campaign of obstruction, choreographed by the City Solicitor, designed to pressure or manipulate Powell into abandoning his plan to return to the police force." Powell v. City of Pittsfield, 221 F.Supp.2d 119, 121 (D.Mass.2002). Moreover, the court stated that while "Alexander may have seen herself as a vigorous advocate representing the interests of the Pittsfield police department, ... her actions were especially unworthy of a City Solicitor." Id. at 152-53. The court awarded punitive damages in the amount of $10,000 against Alexander, who now challenges that award on appeal.
On appeal from a bench trial, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Cariglia v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir.2004). Under the clear error standard of review, an appellate court will not disturb the factual determinations of a trial court unless, "after a searching review of the entire record, the court of appeals `forms a strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has been made.'" Fed. Refinance Co. v. Klock, 352 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir.1990)). The trial judge "sees and hears the witnesses at first hand and comes to appreciate the nuances of the litigation in a way which appellate courts cannot hope to replicate." Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 152.
Alexander challenges as clearly erroneous the factual determinations underpinning the district court's conclusion that her course of conduct in delaying Powell's reinstatement was, taken as a whole, "both outrageous and reprehensible," Powell, 221 F.Supp.2d at 152. She also challenges any finding that her conduct was motivated by wrongful intent or involved "reckless or callous indifference," Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983), to plaintiff's federal rights. Crucial to the court's characterization of Alexander's "course of behavior" were three letters and two notes to which the district court adverted in its explanation of its assessment of punitive damages. We briefly describe here the relevant pieces of correspondence, the notes, and their context.
Because he had been off the police force for three years following his termination and during settlement negotiations, Powell was required as a condition of reinstatement to undergo a routine physical examination and to attend the police academy as though he were a new recruit. In October 1993, a physical examination by the city physician, Dr. Bird, indicated that while Powell was outwardly physically fit and healthy, he had slightly abnormal liver function. Later tests revealed that Powell had Hepatitis C, which may cause no physical symptoms and has a low risk of transmissibility through casual contact, but which can lead to serious liver disease.
On December 21, 1993, Dr. Bird wrote a letter to the City's personnel department and sent a copy to Powell in which he gave his opinion on Powell's physical fitness for reinstatement. The letter stated:
After review of all of Mr. Powell's currently available laboratory work, his consultation [with a specialist], and the Physical Standards for Public Safety Positions used by the City, I feel that Mr. Powell has a condition which would disqualify him for appointment to a public safety position. Listed as a disqualifying condition is active hepatitis. As it is my feeling, and that of the consultant, that Mr. Powell has chronic active hepatitis, I feel he would currently be disqualified.
The "standards" for "appointment to a public safety position" to which Dr. Bird referred were state guidelines used to determine candidates' eligibility for admission to "entry-level police officer training programs," namely, the police academy. Dr. Bird apparently assumed that the police academy admission guidelines also governed qualification for employment to the police force.4 Dr. Bird's letter concluded:
Alexander received a copy of Dr. Bird's letter from personnel department staff. Instead of either concurring in or overriding Dr. Bird's determination that Powell could not return to work, she requested that Powell undergo a liver biopsy before a final reinstatement decision could be made.
Although Powell initially disputed that he had Hepatitis C, he did have a liver biopsy in March 1994 at a Veterans Affairs medical center in New York. In May 1994 his attorney forwarded a letter from Powell's physician to Alexander, which stated that "despite some laboratory evidence of mild liver function test abnormality, [Powell was] looking healthy and fit for his job as a police officer" and was "totally asymptomatic for acute or chronic liver disease."
On May 12, 1994, Alexander responded by letter to Powell's attorney that the City needed more information so that Dr. Bird could review the biopsy results independently. Alexander wrote:
[I]f the City [P]hysician is satisfied that Mr. Powell may safely return to work and perform his duties based upon [the additional biopsy data], [the Mayor] will then, assuming all other conditions are met, make a determination, with [the Chief of Police], in regard to reinstatement.
Powell promptly signed a release allowing the biopsy results to be transferred from the Veterans Affairs medical center to Dr. Bird for analysis.
On July 5, 1994, Dr. Bird wrote a letter to Alexander, which the court...
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