Powell v. State
Decision Date | 22 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 38A02-0007-CR-462.,38A02-0007-CR-462. |
Citation | 751 N.E.2d 311 |
Parties | Jeremiah R. POWELL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, J. Michael Sauer, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
A jury found Jeremiah Powell guilty of attempted murder, a Class A felony. The trial court modified the verdict to guilty but mentally ill, and sentenced Powell to serve an enhanced term of thirty-five years in prison. He now appeals his sentence. We reverse and remand.
Powell raises two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as one: whether the trial court properly sentenced Powell to an enhanced term of thirty-five years.
Nineteen-year-old Powell had a relationship with Aaron Glogas. After the relationship cooled, Powell went to the video store where Glogas worked, armed with a shotgun, and encountered Glogas and Glogas' new girlfriend. A shot was fired, although no one was hit. Ultimately, Glogas got the shotgun away from Powell and restrained Powell.
Powell was charged with attempted murder. His counsel filed a "Suggestion of Incompetency," and Powell was examined by two doctors, both of whom opined that Powell was competent to stand trial. A jury trial was held, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Powell filed a motion requesting that the verdict be modified to guilty but mentally ill. The trial court granted the motion. The trial court then sentenced Powell to an enhanced term of thirty-five years' incarceration. The sentencing order, in relevant part, reads as follows:
R. 138. Powell now appeals his sentence.
The presumptive sentence for the crime of attempted murder, a Class A felony, is thirty years, with not more than twenty years added for aggravating circumstances, and not more than ten years subtracted for mitigating circumstances. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. Powell contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to an enhanced term of thirty-five years because it relied on improper aggravating circumstances, failed to consider a significant mitigating factor of which he presented evidence, and because the sentence is manifestly unreasonable.
It is well established that sentencing decisions lie within the discretion of the trial court. O'Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 951 (Ind.2001). This includes the decision to enhance a sentence. Id. We review sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. Ballard v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). When enhancing a sentence, a trial court is required to state its specific reasons for doing so, and accordingly, the trial court's sentencing statement must: (1) identify significant aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each circumstance is aggravating or mitigating; and (3) demonstrate that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances have been weighed to determine that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators. Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 (Ind.2000). We will examine both the written sentencing order and the trial court's comments at the sentencing hearing to determine whether the trial court adequately explained the reasons for the sentence. Davies v. State, 730 N.E.2d 726, 741 (Ind.Ct.App.2000),trans. denied, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1410, 149 L.Ed.2d 352 (2001). However, "[a] sentence enhancement will be affirmed in spite of a trial court's failure to specifically articulate its reasons if the record indicates that the court engaged in the evaluative processes and the sentence imposed was not manifestly unreasonable." Buzzard v. State, 712 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ind.Ct. App.1999),trans. denied.
"The trial judge is responsible for determining the appropriate weight of aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing." Hurt v. State, 657 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Ind.1995). Aggravating circumstances may include, but are not limited to, any of several factors enumerated in Indiana Code § 35-38-1-7.1. A single proper aggravating factor is sufficient to support an enhanced sentence. Craig v. State, 737 N.E.2d 442, 445 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). Even where the trial court considers improper aggravators in imposing a sentence, the sentence will be affirmed if it is otherwise supported by a legitimate aggravator. Davies, 730 N.E.2d at 742.
The finding of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the trial court. Hackett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 1273, 1277-78 (Ind.1999). An allegation that the trial court failed to find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Id. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Id.
Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution charges this Court with the responsibility to review and revise sentences "to the extent provided by rule." Indiana Appellate Rule 17(B) in turn provides as follows:
The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized by statute except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
A sentence is manifestly unreasonable when it is clearly, plainly and obviously so. Evans v. State, 725 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ind. 2000). Moreover, inasmuch as the sentencing process is inherently subjective, this Court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Hurt, 657 N.E.2d at 114.
As noted above, the trial court's order sentencing Powell to an enhanced thirty-five year term cited "[t]he person is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by commitment of the person to a penal facility" and "[i]mposition of a reduced sentence or suspension of the sentence and imposition of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the crime" as aggravating circumstances. In addition, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the following statements with respect to the aggravating circumstances:
R. 1039, 1041-43. Thus, it appears that the trial court actually relied on three aggravating factors: 1) the defendant was in need of correctional treatment that could best be provided at a penal facility; 2) imposition of a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime; and 3) the nature and circumstances of the crime.
The trial court cited in its sentencing order that Powell was in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment that could best be provided by commitment to a penal...
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