Powell v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 21 June 1957
• Citation: 312 P.2d 698,48 Cal.2d 704
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: John Dyson POWELL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR the COUNTY of LOS ANGELES, Respondent. L. A. 24522.

Page 698

312 P.2d 698

48 Cal.2d 704

John Dyson POWELL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR the COUNTY of LOS ANGELES, Respondent.

L. A. 24522.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

June 21, 1957.

Gladys Towles Root, Eugene V. McPherson and Joseph A. Armstrong, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

William B. McKesson, Dist. Atty., Los Angeles, Jere J. Sullivan, Fred N. Whichello and Lewis Watnick, Deputy Dist. Attys., Los Angeles, for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Petitioner seeks by prohibition to restrain respondent court from proceeding with the trial of petitioner under an indictment charging him with the embezzlement of public funds. Although a stay of proceedings granted on the order to show cause issued by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, when the petition for the writ was before that court, was automatically continued in effect upon the granting of a hearing by this court, we nevertheless issued our order expressly continuing such stay, because of apparent uncertainty on the part of counsel and the trial court as to its continued effectiveness. We have concluded that although in seeking prohibition to stay his trial petitioner has mistaken his remedy, he has nevertheless made out a case entitling him to mandamus to compel the pretrial inspection of certain documents hereinafter specified.

As grounds for relief, petitioner alleges the denial by the trial court of his motion for an order authorizing petitioner and his attorney to inspect and make copies of a signed statement of petitioner made in the office of a chief of police and 'also for the typewritten transcript of the tape recording made' some five days later in the same police office. It is further alleged in the petition for the writ that the motion 'was supported by affidavits of your petitioner and his attorney, which contained allegations that the defendant was not able to recall, nor was he able to relate to his attorney the things contained in the aforesaid statements. That such documents may be necessary for the defendant (petitioner) to refresh his recollection; that the evidence contained in the statements is material to the issues of liability, if any, of the defendant, and that the statements * * * would be admissible at the time of trial, and that no copies of the above statements have been given to the defendant. * * * No affidavits were filed on behalf of the District Attorney or the Chief of Police * * *.' Petitioner further alleges, and respondents admit, ¹ that the motion was denied on the ground, among others, that in a criminal proceeding the accused is not entitled to a pretrial inspection of his written confession.

Respondents also 'admit that the evidence contained in the statements is material to the issues of the said case * * * and would be admissible at the time of trial * * * as evidence on behalf of the People * * * as constituting confessions or admissions; admit that no copies of the said statements have been given to petitioner * * *' but 'deny (on lack of information or belief) that such or any documents may be necessary for petitioner to refresh his recollection.'

In People v. Riser (1956), 47 Cal.2d 566, 305 P.2d 1, defendant, accused of two homicides, moved before trial for an order directing the prosecution to allow him to inspect statements made to police by certain witnesses immediately after the homicides. The motion was denied. During the trial defendant caused a subpoena duces tecum to issue commanding production of the originals of the same statements, one of which had already been referred to by a witness on cross-examination; on motion of the prosecution the subpoena was vacated on the ground that the statements were inadmissible as evidence. On appeal this court, holding (47 Cal.2d 566, 305 P.2d 15) that the trial court's view as to admissibility of the statements was without support and that it was error to vacate the subpoena, stated that (47 Cal.2d 585, 305 P.2d 12-13), 'Originally at common law the accused in a criminal action could not compel production of documents or other evidence in the possession of the prosecution. (Citation.) Production was denied before trial on the ground that to compel the prosecution to reveal its evidence beforehand would enable the defendant to secure perjured testimony and fabricated evidence to meet the state's case. It was felt, furthermore, that to allow the defendant to compel production when the prosecution could not in its turn compel production from the defendant because of the privilege against self incrimination would unduly shift to the defendant's side a balance of advantages already heavily weighted in his favor.' (Citations.)

'Whatever the force of these arguments when directed to pretrial discovery, they have little or no application when production is sought by subpoena during trial of statements referred to on cross-examination. * * * The decisions of this court have always impliedly recognized that on a proper showing a defendant in a criminal case can compel production when it becomes clear during the course of trial that the prosecution has in its possession relevant and material evidence. * * * Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case. * * * To deny flatly any right of production on the ground that an imbalance would be created between the advantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight of the true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of the facts. (Citations.)' It is, of course, statutory law in California that a defendant be provided with a transcript of the evidence taken by a grand jury. (Pen.Code, § 925.)

In the circumstances of the present case, to deny inspection of defendant's statements would likewise be to lose sight of the objective of ascertainment of the facts, and would be out of harmony with the policy of this state that the goal of criminal prosecutions is not to secure a conviction in every case by any expedient means, however odious, but rather, only through establishing the truth upon a public trial fair to defendant and the state alike. In the recent case of Dowell v. Superior Court (1956), 47 Cal.2d 483, 304 P.2d 1009, this court granted mandamus to compel inspection prior to trial of a personal injury action, of a statement taken from plaintiff in the hospital by defendant company's claims investigator the day after plaintiff had been injured. There, as here, plaintiff averred that he had forgotten what he had said in the statement. In holding that he was entitled to inspect and take a copy of the statement this court noted that the...