Powell v. Ward, 527
| Decision Date | 17 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 527,D,527 |
| Citation | 542 F.2d 101 |
| Parties | Elizabeth POWELL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Benjamin WARD, Commissioner of Correctional Services and Janice Warne, Individually, and as Superintendent of Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellants. ocket 75-2107. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Stephen M. Latimer, Bronx Legal Services Corp., New York City (Donald Grajales, Project Director, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Margery Evans Reifler, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, on the brief), for defendants-appellants.
Before MOORE and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges, and NEWMAN, District Judge. *
In this class action brought on behalf of prisoners at New York's two state prisons for women to bring disciplinary proceedings into conformity with the procedural due process standards enunciated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), Judge Stewart issued a preliminary injunction applicable to the sub-class of prisoners at the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility. Powell v. Ward, 392 F.Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y.1974). This appeal 1 by defendant prison officials challenged only two provisions of that carefully drawn injunction: paragraph 1(f), concerning the membership of an Adjustment Committee or Superintendent's Proceeding in certain instances, and paragraph 2, concerning the time an inmate may be held in segregation pending a disciplinary hearing.
1. Applying the due process requirement of an impartial fact-finder, Judge Stewart ordered that no person who has participated in the investigation of acts complained of or who has been a witness to such acts could be a member of an Adjustment Committee or Superintendent's Proceeding relating to those acts. Defendants do not challenge this requirement. They do object to the disqualification of "the Deputy Superintendent for Security and any person whose job involves direct responsibility for institutional security" from membership of an Adjustment Committee or Superintendent's Proceeding "at which an inmate is charged with an act which purportedly threatens the security of the prison." Preliminary Injunction, paragraph 1(f). While making no finding that the Deputy Superintendent for Security was actually biased with respect to any prisoners charged with breaches of prison security, the District Court apparently concluded that the nature of her position and that of others with responsibility for institutional security created a risk of bias sufficient to disqualify such persons from determining allegations of misconduct that threatens the security of the prison.
In some circumstances the nature of one's position or the relationship between that position and the outcome of adjudications disqualifies a person from serving with the impartiality mandated by the Due Process Clause. See, e. g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). But the fact that a decision-maker has responsibilities to uphold standards of conduct does not inevitably mean that he is disqualified from adjudicating allegations that those standards have been breached. See, Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Assn.,--- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d ---- (1976); Withrow v. Larkin,421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). In Wolff v. McDonnell,supra, the Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to the impartiality of a prison discipline committee whose chairman was the Associate Warden for Custody. See also Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 306 (3d Cir.1974); Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.1973). We conclude that prison officials responsible for maintaining security are not disqualified by the Due Process Clause from adjudicating allegations of breaches of prison security solely by the nature of their positions. 2 Apart from constitutional requirements, the advisability of giving such persons adjudicatory tasks of this nature is a matter for decision by state legislators and administrators who, of course, need not be satisfied with merely meeting the minimum standards of the Constitution.
2. To prevent recurrence of instances of prolonged segregation prior to disciplinary hearings, Judge Stewart ordered that hearings for those confined to Special Housing or segregation pending investigation of charges must be held within seven days of such confinement. Prior to the injunction, the New York Department of Correctional Services had on March 12, 1975, instructed all...
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