Power Road-Williams Field LLC v. Gilbert
| Decision Date | 18 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. CV–13–02065–PHX–DGC.,CV–13–02065–PHX–DGC. |
| Citation | 14 F.Supp.3d 1304 |
| Parties | POWER ROAD–WILLIAMS FIELD LLC, Plaintiff, v. GILBERT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Ellen B. Davis, Francis J. Slavin, Jr., Francis J. Slavin PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.
Jenny Jo Winkler, Robert Grasso, Jr., Grasso Law Firm PC, Chandler, AZ, David J. Ouimette, Dickinson Wright/Mariscal Weeks, J. Kenneth Mangum, James W. Fritz, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.
Defendants Town of Gilbert, City of Mesa, and Maricopa County have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 7. The motion is fully briefed. The Court will grant Defendants' motion in part and remand this case to Maricopa County Superior Court.1
Plaintiff Power Road–Williams Field, LLC brought this action in Arizona Superior Court on May 15, 2013. Doc. 1–1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges violations of state and federal law, including A.R.S. § 9–461.11(F) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants removed the action to federal court on October 10, 2013. Doc. 1.
Plaintiff owns approximately 73 acres of land located at the northwest corner of the intersection of Power Road and Williams Field Road in Maricopa County. Doc. 1–1, ¶ 6. Power Road is a major arterial roadway that experiences heavy traffic, services the larger metropolitan area, and serves as the common corporate boundary between Gilbert and Mesa. Id., ¶¶ 8–9.
Defendants entered into an intergovernmental agreement (“IGA”) pursuant to A.R.S. § 11–951 et seq., to undertake a $30 million improvement project to widen and realign a segment of Power Road, creating a separate one-way, three-lane road in each direction. Doc. 1–1, ¶ 11. The gist of Plaintiff's complaint is that the IGA did not comply with A.R.S. § 9–461.11(F) and that the process mandated by statute was not followed. Id., ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that the Town of Gilbert staff “decided to radically re-design and re-align the intersection of Power Road and Williams Field Road” in order to “retaliate against Plaintiff and deprive it of the economically viable use of Plaintiff's property” because Plaintiff had refused to cooperate with Gilbert's plan to annex part of the property. Id., ¶¶ 13, 57–58.
The Gilbert General Plan states that arterial roads should provide reasonable levels of traffic services (“LOS”), that traffic signals and intersection design should create a safe and efficient flow of traffic to optimize travel and increase corridor capacity, and that public projects should reduce vehicle emissions. Id., ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that Power Road could have been widened to three lanes traveling in each direction by using the existing alignment and right of way (the “Existing Improved Alignment”). Id., ¶ 29. Multiple traffic impact analyses commissioned by Plaintiff and Defendants reported that the Existing Improved Alignment would be superior to the proposed realignment. Id., ¶¶ 34–44. Nevertheless, the Gilbert Town staff chose to redesign the roadway intersection and construct an expensive and longer bridge over a floodway and canal (the “One Way Alignment”). Id., ¶ 30.
Plaintiff alleges that the One Way Alignment does not conform to the Gilbert General Plan and significantly reduces the value of Plaintiff's property. Id., ¶ 45. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants adopted the IGA without (1) reviewing the economic impact of the alignment on development potential for surrounding land; (2) considering the effect on area business or tax revenues; (3) determining whether the realignment of a major arterial roadway and construction of a multimillion dollar bridge would conform to the Gilbert Plan; (4) determining whether construction of the One Way Alignment would be cheaper than the Existing Improved Alignment; (5) considering the fact that the One Way Alignment will increase traffic wait times, reduce traffic service below acceptable LOS, and generate more air pollution; (6) analyzing the effect of the One Way Alignment design on traffic safety and intersection maintenance costs; and (7) determining whether the intersection design will fail before its ultimate design year due to the extremely short distances between signalized intersections.Id., ¶ 97. As a result of these failures, Plaintiff alleges that it was deprived of property without the process required by state law and is entitled to compensation of more than $7,100,000. Id., ¶¶ 118–19.
When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.2009). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and therefore are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ).
Defendants argue that the complaint must be dismissed for three reasons: (1) it is barred by res judicata; (2) it is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) it fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or A.R.S. § 9–461.11(F). Doc. 23 at 1; Doc. 7 at 2–3. The Court will address each argument below.
Plaintiff instituted an action in Arizona Superior Court in March 2011, suing Defendants for alleged violations of A.R.S. § 11–952 and § 9–461.11(F) (the “Previous Action”). Doc. 22 at 1; Doc. 22–1 at 1. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had violated the Gilbert General Plan (Doc. 22–1 at 28), failed to follow statutory procedures (Doc. 22–1 at 32), and failed to enter into an IGA (Doc. 22–1 at 33). Plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief, but no monetary relief, presumably because the improvements had not yet been built. The Superior Court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss three of Plaintiff's four claims for failure to state a claim and later granted summary judgment on the remaining claim. Doc. 22 at 2. Before final judgment had been entered, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that Defendants' IGA was defective and adding a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a state law claim for negligence. The Superior Court entered judgment on August 8, 2013. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals and briefing is now underway. Id.
“To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, federal courts look to state law.” Intri–Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). “Under Arizona law, a claim is barred by res judicata if a court previously issued a final judgment on the merits involving the same cause of action with the same parties.” Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (1986). Arizona uses the “same evidence” test for determining whether an earlier action is the same as the current action. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep't of Corrections, State of Ariz., 188 Ariz. 237, 934 P.2d 801, 804 (Ariz.Ct.App.1997). Under this test, “[i]f no additional evidence is needed to prevail in the second action than that needed in the first, then the second action is barred.” Id.; see also Rousselle v. Jewett, 101 Ariz. 510, 421 P.2d 529, 531 (1966). The “same evidence” test is quite liberal, and permits a plaintiff to avoid preclusion “merely by posturing the same claim as a new legal theory,” even if both theories rely on the same underlying occurrence. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 934 P.2d at 805.
The claims asserted in this case are not barred by res judicata. Although the claims asserted in the Previous Action arise from the same underlying dispute and within the same administrative and statutory framework, Plaintiff's claims in this case are legally and factually distinct. The Previous Action sought redress for harms stemming from Defendants' failure to enter into an IGA, failure to conform to the Gilbert General Plan, and arbitrary and capricious exercise of governmental powers. Doc. 23 at 3; Doc. 22–1 at 28–35. This case seeks redress for harms stemming from an allegedly deficient IGA that Defendants entered into after the Previous Action was filed, asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving Plaintiff of property without due process of law, and claims negligent use of governmental power to retaliate against Plaintiff. Doc. 23 at 4–5; Doc. 1–1 at 26–31. Although the claims arise from some of the same facts as the Previous Action, they are new legal theories based on some additional facts and therefore are not barred by res judicata under Arizona law. See Phoenix Newspapers, 934 P.2d at 805 ().
Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff's state law claims are barred by a one-year statute of limitation. Doc. 7 at 11. Defendants assert that the state law claims accrued on May 10, 2012, “at the very latest,” and that Plaintiff filed its complaint on May 15, 2013. Id. at 11–12. Both of Plaint...
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