Power v. Sparks
| Decision Date | 07 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C11-0097-LRR,C11-0097-LRR |
| Parties | JEROME POWER, Plaintiff, v. STEPHEN SPARKS, ERICKA LAWLER, RANDY CLARK, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
This matter is before the court on the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (docket no. 1). The plaintiff submitted such application on August 2, 2011. Along with his application to proceed in forma pauperis, the plaintiff submitted a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, on August 9, 2011, the plaintiff filed a supplement to his complaint (docket no. 2).
I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Based on the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis, the court concludes that the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (requiring $350.00 filing fee). Thus, in forma pauperis status shall be granted to the plaintiff. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The clerk's office shall file the complaint without the prepayment of the filing fee. Although the court deemed it appropriate to grant the plaintiff in forma pauperis status, the plaintiff is required to pay the full $350.00 filing fee by making payments on an installment basis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); see also In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997) (). The full filing fee will be collectedeven if the court dismisses the case because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Here, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20 percent of the greater of his average monthly account balance or average monthly deposits for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Based on the plaintiff's account balance and the statements that the plaintiff made, the court finds that the initial partial filing fee is $4.54. Id. The plaintiff shall submit $4.54 by no later than December 30, 2011. Id. If necessary, the plaintiff may request in a written motion an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Therefore, after the plaintiff pays in full the initial partial filing fee, the remaining installments shall be collected by the institution having custody of the plaintiff. Id. The clerk's office shall send a copy of this order and the notice of collection of filing fee to the appropriate official at the place where the plaintiff is an inmate.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se complaint must be liberally construed. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994). In addition, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless, they must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). A court, however, can dismiss at any time a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A claim is "frivolous" if it "lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); accord Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1994). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Accordingly, a court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims that fail "'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . see Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555), or that are premised on meritless legal theories or clearly lack any factual basis, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. See, e.g., Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 27 (considering frivolousness); Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992) ().
III. CLAIM ASSERTED
Currently confined at the Linn County Correctional Center in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, submitted a complaint to redress issues that are related to an injury that he suffered. Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue appears proper.
In his complaint, the plaintiff states:
Physician Stephen Sparks examined my right index finger. He took a long hypodermic needle and inserted it into my finger down into the second knuckle which caused an injury. Dayslater, my finger became infected and I went to him complaining that I thought the needle was infected. He said that he saw no infection and placed me on ibuprofen 800 mg. because there was swelling due to the infection. 60 days passed and I'm still on 800 mg. ibuprofen and swelling has not gone down. My finger has turned black and blue. Stephen Sparks said I must have fractured my finger, but I assured him that I don't play sports. My wife called the head administrator of the prison clinic to complain. Physician Sparks called me back two days later and had an x-ray on my hand and found out that I did indeed have an infection that went down into my bone. I was immediately rushed to the U of I Hospital and admitted for 10 days. My finger was in bad condition to where doctors thought about amputating. Doctors asked me why did physician Stephen Sparks wait so long to send you to us (U of I Hospital) we could have treated this without surgery. I was immediately given surgery. Physician Stephen Sparks has been on probation for numerous complaints for malpractice and he has settled out of court on prior cases. He did not diagnosis my hand at all and was very negligent in his lack of diagnosis. M.D. Ericka A. Lawler made a statement that I should sue Sparks for damages, but M.D. Ericka A. Lawler's negligence has not helped. I went to her on a follow-up complaining that I am now disabled. I cannot bend my fingers. Her reply was nothing can be done and she just walked out of the room and left me sitting there.
Additionally, in his supplement, the plaintiff reiterates that the defendants acted negligently when they provided medical care to him. As relief, the plaintiff states:
I would like for physician Stephen Sparks to no longer treat patients and no longer be a physician and never work or be employed in the field of medicine. I am seeking compensation. My career as a culinary art student/chef has been set aside because of my hand. I cannot hold a chef knife in my hand to slice or chop food. I am seeking a total sum of $300,000,000 for stress, pain, suffering and the fact I am disabled due to unprofessional medical staffing. I ask that M.D. Erika A. Lawler and M.D. Randy Clark be held responsible for their action and lack of diagnosis.
IV. ANALYSIS
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to provide a "broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides no substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617, 99 S. Ct. 1905, 60 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1979). "One cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983' — for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything." Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617. Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (); Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94 (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980) (...
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